

Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* XI
 translation, text, *apparatus criticus*, commentary
 DSH & MRJ 2013 August 26

<commentary on chapter heading>

4.19-20: The title, extraordinarily brief, rather accurately reflects the singular focus of the chapter: an argument about pleasure. Chapter XI contains at least two blocks from Aristotle, each of two or three paragraphs. These are preceded by an introductory sentence by Iamblichus, separated by his bridge passage at 58.10-17, and followed by a couple of concluding sentences at 59.13-18.

<XI 57.13-57.6: commentary>

56.13-15 attribution: Düring bracketed his B92 (59.17-18) as from Iamblichus, but accepted all the rest of the chapter as his fragments B78-91; Walzer and Ross include the entire chapter, without comment, as fragment 14. But 56.13-15 is evidently a navigational passage of Iamblichus in which he has borrowed terminology from his source.

56.14 μάλιστα ὑπάρχει: The overall argument of the chapter a classical model of the “argument from the more and the less” is described in abstract in *Topics* V 8: “For constructive purposes, see if what is more is a property of what is more, for then also what is less will be a property of what is less, and least of least, and most of most, and without qualification of without qualification. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a higher degree of perception is a property of a higher degree of life, a lower degree of perception will be a lower degree of life, and the highest of the highest and the lowest of the lowest degree, and perception without qualification of life without qualification” (137b20-27, tr. Pickard-Cambridge ROT).

56.14-15 ἐντεῦθεν: Cf. VIII 48.20.

56.15-57.6 attribution and voice: so far as we can tell, nobody has registered doubts in print that this section is Aristotle. For analysis of the logic of the argument see generally Owen, *Logic and Some Earlier Works of Aristotle*, esp. 183-184; and de Strycker, *predicates*, passim. For a general analysis of the kind of logic employed in the chapter (but without specific reference to it) see Shields, *Order in Multiplicity*.

56.15 διττῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ ζῆν: Aristotle instances the multifariousness of the term “living” in *Top.* VI 10.148a23-36. He goes beyond pointing this to argue that these senses must be ordered by priority in *de An.* 414b25-415a1. Cf. *EE* II 1.1219a13-b3? *EE* VII 12.1244b23-33. Which draws out some ethical implications of the analysis along the same lines, with differently. Some version of this argument is represented in the *Long Commentary on the Physics* attributed to Averroes (see Rashed, *Lecteur*, 13-28; for a Latin text see Schnieja, *Drei prologe*, 185-188 which preserves two other versions; see also Harvey, *Hebrew translation*, for a Renaissance version).

56.15-16 τὸ μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν: Aristotle systematically treats of these terms in *Metaph.* IX 6-9. See Menn, *ἐνέργεια and δύναμις*, 73-114. Düring traces the history of this distinction, beginning with *Euthyd.* 280be And *Theaet.* (197b, 199a). He sees three aspects Aristotle's conception: -- (1) the first is

characterized by the relations κτήσις—χρήσις (VI 40.1-11, XI 56.15-22); ἔχειν—χρηῖσθαι (XI 57.7-12; cf. *Top.* 129b33, *EE* 1225b12; *NE* 1146b32; ἔχειν—ἐνεργεῖν (XI 57.19-23). -- (2) the second is characterized by the relation of ἕξις—ἔργον (*EE* II 1.1219a9-38). -- (3) the third is the relation mentioned here at 56.15-16, δύναμις—ἐνέργεια (cf. *Metaph.* V, VIII 6-9, *de An.* II 5). Aristotle stresses that success is a matter of activity, as opposed to mere capacity in *EE* II 1.1219a13f.

56.19 προσβάλλοντα τὴν ὄψιν: see below, ὄραν δὲ τὸν προσβάλλοντα τὴν ὄψιν τοῦ δυναμένου προσβάλλειν (57.11-12). Cf. *Theaet.* 193c.

56.19-22 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ γινώσκειν, ἐν μὲν τὸ χρηῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν λέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τὸ κεκτηῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν: In the terms ἕξις : χρήσις = δύναμις : ἐνέργεια in the context of scientific knowledge, see *Phys.* VIII 4.255a33-b5; *de An.* II 1.412a10-11, III 2.426a23-24; *Metaph.* IX 6.1048b2-6, XIII 10.1087a15-16; *NE* VII 5.1146b31-33; *EE* II 9.1225b11-12; de Strycker, ‘predicats’, 602n16; Menn, ἐνέργεια and δύναμις.

56.22-23 εἰ τοίνυν τῷ μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῆν διακρίνομεν καὶ τὸ μὴ ζῆν: See in VII, τό γε ζῆν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι διακρίνεται τοῦ μὴ ζῆν (44.9-10). Cf. “a higher degree of perception is a property of a higher degree of life” (*Top.* 5.8.137b25). *Top.* 129b33-34. In the *De Anima* perception and movement are the capacities most often associated with living. See Jaeger’s discussion, *Aristoteles*, 257 (German ed.). *EE* 1244b23-33 is a key parallel.

56.23-24 τὸ δ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι διττόν: Aristotle instances the multifarousness of the term “perception” in *Top.* 5.2.129b33-34 and 130a19-21.

56.24 κυρίως: This term is also used at 57.3, 58.12, 59.8; see the discussion of de Strycker, ‘predicats’, 604-605.

56.24-25 τῷ χρηῖσθαι ... τῷ δύνασθαι: Pistelli reports τὸ χρηῖσθαι ... τὸ δύνασθαι as the conjectural reading of Kiessling; but it is not a conjecture, as we find it already in L and no doubt in the descendent of L which Kiessling used to bring improvements to the edition of Arcerius. The dative construes nicely, and the variant reading is not tempting to us, though it was selected as correct by Pistelli.

56.25-57.1 διόπερ φαμέν αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸν καθεύδοντα λέγοντες, ὡς ἔοικε: We can construe the received text, though somewhat awkwardly. It has seemed to other scholars that something is missing (and they have written conjectural Greek sentences in order to fill it in, see the app. crit.). A gap is likely, and can be explained either as a product of textual transmission or a poor stitching job on the part of Iamblichus in excerpting Aristotle. According to Düring, the pleonasm is unparalleled in the Aristotle corpus; nevertheless, he follows Ross in rejecting doubt that this is what Aristotle wrote (*Attempt*, 246). What neither seems to have considered is the possibility that what we have here is an artifact of a dialogue. See Flashar, *Fragmente*, p. 196.

57.2-4 τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐγρηγορότα φατέον ζῆν ἀληθῶς καὶ κυρίως, τὸν δὲ καθεύδοντα: See also, above, in VIII where sleep the “common conception” about sleep is invoked (45.25-46.7 and note); and, below, a reiteration in the voice of Iamblichus at the end of XII (45.6-20). The nature of sleep is a crucial scientific as well as philosophical preoccupation of Aristotle. See the treatise *De divinatione per somnium*, in which Aristotle rejects the idea that dreams contain divinely inspired messages and insights; see also HA 536b30, 537a14; Chroust, ‘nature of dreams’, p. 168.

It is thought that Aristotle also discussed the veracity of dreams in the *Eudemus* (e.g. frag. 1 W/R = Cicero, *de Div.* 1.25.53). See also *On Philosophy* (e.g. frag. 14 Ross = SE *M.* 9.20-22). For sleep as an illustration of the *dunamis-energia* distinction see *APr.* 31b28; *de An.* 412a25; *Metaph.* 1024b23, 1074b18; *NE* 1095b32, 1147a14; 1178b19; *EE* 1216a2-10; 1219b16-20.

57.4 μεταβάλλειν εἰς ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν: “making a transition into the process”. Cf. *πάσαν κίνησιν* (58.24); see Menn, *δυναμῖς*. For “making a transition” cf. *NE* 1173b3.

<XI 57.6-23: commentary>

57.6-23 attribution and voice: Although the first several words may be a rough transitional formula of Iamblichus, the rest seems to be a continuation of the argumentation from the previous section, in the voice of ‘Aristotle’. Flashar, *Fragmente*, 196 considers the passage to have been compressed by Iamblichus, resulting in an awkward train of thought at 57.8-9. But no one to our knowledge has published doubts that the rest of the passage is attributable to Aristotle. According to Owen, the logical doctrine of this paragraph is contradicted by Aristotle’s assertion, in other apparently early works, that “if one predicate can be called more X than another, the predicate must apply to them both in exactly the same sense” (‘earlier works’, 184); he cites *Phys.* 7.249a3-8, *Cat.* 11a12-13, cf. *Pol.* 1259b36-38.

57.6-7 διὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλέποντες: Düring translates “judging by this criterion” (*Attempt*, 246); but more literally “looking to this” or “in view of this”. Cf. *Phd.* 273cd. De Strycker, ‘predicats’, 603n21-604, brackets the prepositional phrases a glosses, arguing that *διὰ ταυτο* cannot refer to *αἰσθανεσθαι τινος* (57.6) and that *ὅταν οὖν* points to a new distinction. But a sufficient explanation of the awkwardness is a poorly executed resumption of citation by Iamblichus. We see similar kinds of compression in *Protr.* XII, Plato sections, etc.). We resist deletion because the phrases seem to preserve some important terminology from the source.

57.8 Des Places mistook a comment by de Strycker, ‘predicats univoque’, 607-608 to be a conjecture (<το> *λεγομενον*), which he then printed. But there is no reason for the conjecture (and none given); in fact, de Strycker is pointing out how not to construe the argument.

57.8-9 ἢ τῷ ποιεῖν ἢ τῷ πάσχειν: “either by acting or being acted on.” For this opposition, see *de An.* 430a18, and *Cat* 9. But as Flashar points out, this distinction does not quite map on to the main capacity/activity distinction. Something in the argument seems to have been misunderstood by Iamblichus, or else gone missing in his selection; in favour of the latter is the re-appearance of the acting/being acted on idea at 57.22-23.

57.11-12 ὁρᾶν δὲ τὸν προσβάλλοντα τὴν ὄψιν τοῦ δυναμένου προσβάλλειν: see above on 56.19.

57.12-14 τὸ μᾶλλον λέγομεν καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ὧν ἂν εἰς ἡ λόγος ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὕστερον: See above note on VI 38.10, and *μᾶλλον* above at 57.9-10. There is a systematic treatment of priority and posteriority in *Metaph.* V 11.1019a1-4. It is possible that Aristotle refers to the present discussion when in *NE* VIII 1 he says, “it is possible for the more and the less to exist for

things different in species, and this has been mentioned by us previously”, δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῶ εἶδει. εἴρηται δ’ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐμπροσθεν (1155b14-16; for the suggestion see Stewart ad loc.). Aristotle treats “the topic of the more and the less” (τόποι τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον) in *Cat.* 5.3b33-4a9 and *Top.* II 1, II 10, and IV 2.123a14-15, V 8, VI 4.141b28-29. See also the discussions of priority and posteriority at *Cat.* 12 and *Metaph.* 5.11. The Platonic background is to be found in *Phileb.* 53b. *EE* I 8.1218a1-15. Compare the logic of VI 38.3-14 (= DCM 81.7-16). And see Owen, ‘some earlier works’, 183-184.

57.13 <ὁ> λογος: de Strycker, *predicats univoque*, 613-614 discusses Aristotle’s usage in the *Top.* and *Cat.* and argues that the expression would be familiar with the addition of the definite article.

57.15 μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν: Aristotle argues at length that the term ‘good’ is ambiguous, and cannot without be equivocation be reduced to one of its senses in *NE* I 6 and *EE* I 8. See *NE* I 4.1096a19-b14 and b21-25, where Aristotle argues that wisdom and pleasure correspond to different definitions of the good (quote it). See also de Strycker, ‘predicats’, 611-615.

57.16 τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τὴν φύσιν αἰρετὸν τοῦ ποιητικοῦ: *Phys.* 207a14. *Pol.* 1323b26.

57.16 ποιητικοῦ: Des Places introduced confusion at 57.16 when he printed ποιητοῦ for ποιητικοῦ, noting in his apparatus for 87.9, “ποιητοῦ] ποιητικοῦ Anon. (Pistelli, p. iv et in textu).” On p. iv of his *Praefatio*, Pistelli had approved the early conjecture by “Vulcanius (immo Anonymus)” from the ‘absurd’ ποιητοῦ to ποιητικοῦ. He also printed this, which suggested to Des Places that he must have neglected to record that this was a conjecture; but no, it is the reading present in F and Pistelli’s printing of it was accurate, only his account of it as a conjecture in his *Praefatio* was misleading to Des Places, who did not collate F carefully enough to see this.

57.17-19 καίτοι τόν γε λόγον ὀρώμεν ὡς οὐχ ἦ ἐστι κατηγορούμενος ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἐκάτερον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ὠφελίμων καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς: This sounds like an anti-platonic point, similar to the criticism of the generic good in *EE* I 8 and *NE* I 4. The participle κατηγορούμενος is used frequently in the *Corpus*.

57.17 οὐχ ἦ: The manuscript reading οὐχὶ results in a contradiction. But the minimal emendation of Vitelli makes perfect sense of the argument. De Stryker’s emendation οὐχ εἶς is also possible, but more severe and not as explicable from a textual transmission perspective.

57.17-18 ὡς ... ὅτι: For the construction, see Bonitz, *Index*, 872a1-4.

57.18-19 ὅτι ... ἀρετῆς: de Stryker, ‘predicats univoque’, 615n50-616, argues that these are marginal glosses.

57.19 ζῆν ἄρα μᾶλλον: It may seem odd to treat “living” as something that admits of more or less; Owen comments on the logical difficulty of this (‘some earlier works’, 183). And yet, this is the motor of Aristotle’s argument. It requires that there be degrees of vitality, an idea which Aristotle embraces. Compare, for example, the idea of more or less noble animals in *IX* 50.27-51.6 (and see notes therein) and in the “scale of nature passages” (such as *HA* VIII 1 588b21-589a5; cf. Johnson, *Teleology*, 204-205). Cf. *EE* 1219a23-25 and *NE* 1098a7-17.

57.19-23: Compare the argument at *EE* II 1.1219a23-25. See also Shields, *Order in Multiplicity*.

<XI 57.23-58.14: commentary>

57.23-58.10 attribution and voice: This continues the argumentation of the previous paragraph and its a fortiori logic. No specific doubts have been registered about the authenticity of this section. There are solid parallels to the Corpus; see below.

57.25-25 ἐνὸς ἢ δύνάμις ἐστὶ, τοῦτο αὐτὸ πράττει τις, εἰ δὲ πλειόνων: Cf. *NE* 1097a25-28 (flute example) and 1098a17.

57.26-27 ἦτοι μόνον ὅταν αὐλῆ χρηταί τις ἢ μάλιστα: *NE* 1097a27 (a note to a lecturer to expand on a stock example?); 1098a17.

57.27 ἴσως γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων: Düring says that this is “probably corrupt” and suggests an improvement that brings about a decent sense: ἴσως γὰρ τούτῳ ἐπὶ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. “for perhaps this applies to other things.” And yet this sense is not exactly what the line of thought requires. What we have is so telegraphic that we suspect that Iamblichus is responsible for the compression. For ἐπὶ with the dative meaning ‘for an end or purpose’ see LSJ B.III.2.

58.1-2 μᾶλλον χρῆσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς χρώμενον φατέον: Cf. Plato, *Clit.* 407d4; *Euthd.* 280e3-281a8; *Men.* 88e1; cf. Dio. Chr. 13.13.

58.2 τὸ γὰρ ἐφ’ ᾧ: identified with τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα *Metaph.* 1022a8.

58.2 ἐφ’ ᾧ καὶ ὡς: Vitelli’s conjecture ᾧ καὶ ὡς (followed by Pistelli but not Des Places) is presumably motivated to create agreement with the sketchy ἐπὶ τούτῳ at 57.27. It is not clear whether ἐφ’ ᾧ does not refer to a discontinuous idea. Perhaps the passage has undergone compression as a result of either scribal transmission or Iamblichus’ excerpation. The line of thought, however, is clear: both the objective (ἐφ’ ᾧ) and the mode (ὡς) should naturally be determined in accordance with the best use.

58.3-10: Compare the account in *de An.* I 2.403b25-27, where Aristotle argues that the two definitive powers of the soul are sensation and movement (cf. III 3.427a17-19). See *EE* II 1.1219a35-39, *NE* X 7.1177b26-1178a8; de Strycker, *predicats*, 604.

58.4 ἔργον: This is the reading of R; both Pistelli and Des Places print this, misreporting it as the reading of F. The singular is more grammatical than the manuscripts’ ἐργων, although it is possible to construe the plural.

58.5-6 συλλογίζεσθαι: This term is also used in the title to IX (4.12-13) and in XII (59.20).

58.6-7 ζῆ μᾶλλον ὁ διανοούμενος ὀρθῶς καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ὁ μάλιστα ἀληθεύων: Owen argues that this conclusion trades on an ambiguity of μάλιστα: “Plato had ignored or exploited the ambiguity in μᾶλλον, and when the author of the *Protrepticus* propounds a Platonic argumentum ex gradibus, he accordingly seeks to safeguard his argument by recognizing the ambiguity but treating it as harmless. Only by minimizing it can he go on to argue that the man who is superlatively alive knows that which is superlatively exact and intelligible; for the first superlative and the second correspond to different senses of μάλιστα” (‘earlier works’, 184).

58.3 δὴ: Düring is convinced that this is a reference to B70 (43.20-25).

58.9 τό γε τελέως ζῆν: Cf. in XII, τὸ τελέως εὐ ζῆν (60.7-10). *NE* X (1177a27).

58.10-14 attribution: It is possible that there has been compression of the source text here, but to us it seems more likely that this is a redundant conclusion on the part of Iamblichus.

58.11 ὅπερ εἶναι: “that which it is to exist” is a technical phrase in Aristotle, sometimes corresponding to τὸ γένος and occasionally τὸ τί ἐστίν and οὐσία (see Bonitz, *Index*, 533b55-60. Düring invites a comparison with Cic. *Fin.* 2.13.40, thinking it possibly a “reminiscence”, but there is no real parallel.

58.12 μάλιστα καὶ κυριώτατα: Exactly the same phrase is used in VII: μάλιστα καὶ κυριώτατα (41.24). Iamblichus often picks up and repeats phrases from his source text in the comments that he composes to introduce them or finish with them.

<58.15-59.3: commentary>

58.15-17 attribution: uncertain, although at least some of the terminology seems to originate in the source, such as τελεία ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀκώλυτος. Nevertheless, several considerations combine to indicate that these sentences are in the voice of Iamblichus: the passage stitches a connection between two unrelated arguments, one of which has just come to a simple and easy conclusion (58.5-10); it repeats the thought of Aristotle without further development; and it contains late vocabulary – at 58.15 the word ἀκώλυτος, meaning ‘unhindered’, is a word preferred by later authors (e.g. Polybius, Josephus, and Epictetus) to the synonym which Aristotle uses instead, ἀνεμποδιστος (though Plato does once use the adverb ακωλυτως). On the other hand, compare 58.15-17 with *NE* VII 13.1153a15, 1153a1, a15, a20-23, 14.1153b10-16, X 3.1173b15-20, 1174b18-23.

58.15 τελεία ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀκώλυτος: ἀκώλυτος does not occur in the Corpus; the adverb only in Plato. Düring compares ἐμποδίξει in *NE* 1153a15, b10-16; *Pol.* 1295a37. But again, no real parallel. Aristotle discusses the importance of a conception of success as an *unimpeded* activity in *NE* VII 14.1153b9-12. Aristotle argues that wisdom is the most continuously pleasant activity in *NE* X 7.1177a19-21.

58.16 τὸ χαίρειν: identical with ἡδονή in *Phileb.* 21a; *GA* 724a1; *Pol.* 1323b1.

58.17-59.3 attribution:

58.20 μὴ τῷ πίνειν ἀλλὰ τῷ συμβαίνειν : An application of the doctrine of accidents. See above in VII (43.28).

58.21 καθήμενον: cf. *Phys.*, οἶον τὸ καθῆσθαι ὡς χωριζόμενον (186b21).

58.22 φήσομεν: On the future tense, see Brink, 34. The variation between φήσω and ἔρω (58.28) in the same passage is, according to Düring, unparalleled in Plato and Aristotle.

58.24 πᾶσαν κίνησιν: cf. ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν (57.4-5).

59.2 αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν: See above 58.17-27.

<XI 59.3-18: commentary>

59.3-13 attribution and voice: continues on the progressive a fortiori argument about pleasure from the previous section.

59.5 ἡδονήν: Cf. the concept of pleasure discussed at *Metaph.* XII 7.1072b26.

59.7-8 εἰ τοίνυν καὶ πολλὰ ψυχῆς εἰσι χρήσεις, ἀλλὰ: for this grammatical construction, cf. above in chapter 5 (34.2735.5); for parallels in the corpus see Eucken, *De Arist. Dic. Ratione*, 33.

59.8-9 ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα: Pl. *Ep.* VII 344b.

59.9-11 δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ τὴν γιγνομένην ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ θεωρεῖν ἡδονὴν ἢ μόνην ἢ μάλιστα ἀναγκαῖον ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῆν εἶναι: Cf. *NE* X 7 (1177a19-21). Rashed, ‘textes inedits’, 224-229. Alexander *de Ideis* apud Ambrosianus Q74 sup. lines 10-11 (Rashed, 221): Quote the Greek.

59.13-17 attribution: Iamblichus. There is certainly a change of tone of voice at 59.13; after the long sinewy argument concludes, we get a static enthusiastic comment in apparently Platonic language. For a similar case, see XII 60.10-61.1; in both cases it remains so far unclear to us whether Iamblichus is transmitting ideas and expressions from his reading of the *Protrepticus*, perhaps from a distinctively Platonic or Pythagorean passage therein, or whether he feels free to add Platonic words and phrase *ad libidem*.

59.14-15 ἀπὸ τῶν μάλιστα ὄντων πληρουμένη: Düring points out (*Attempt*, 252): πληροῦσθαι not in this sense in the Corpus and with ἀπό not until later Greek.

59.15 στέγουσα: compare *Rep.* 586ab.

59.15 μονίμως: Compare in X, βέβαιος (55.23).

59.16 εὐφροσύνην: See Walsdorf, ‘Epicurus’, 228, 254n116, who points out that the only occurrence of this term in the corpus of Aristotle is in the *Topics* (112b21-26).

59.16-17 ἀνυσιμωτάτη: The word appears in the chapter heading of XII (4.23). Cf. Plato, *Leg.* 716d and *Rep.* 518d.

59.17-18 attribution: This seems to be static metatext, insufficiently progressive and with excessive superlatives, suggesting Iamblichean authorship.

59.17 δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν: cf αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν above.

59.17-18 τὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ ἀγαθὰς ἡδονὰς: *NE* 1153a29, 1172a22.