Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* chapter XII

Commentary

DSH & MRJ 2013 September 1

**<chapter heading: commentary>**

4.21-23 **chapter heading**: Generally comprised of iambichean lingo, it indicates the focus of the first paragraph in the chapter: philosophy brings about success.

4.21 ἀ πό τοῦ: ἀ πό + genitive is a formula which begins the headings of several chapters of Iamblichus’ *Prot.* See note to the chapter heading of Chapter IX (4.9).

4.22 ἔ φοδος: This term occurs in the headings to chapters IV, V, IX, XII, XIII, XVI, and XIX, having been used frequently in connection with Archytas in chapter IV (18.20, 19.11, 20.15, 22.11, 24.12); several other places show that Iamb. has adopted ἔ φοδος as a term of art: V 27.11 and 34.5; VIII 48.23; XIII 70.9, 72.8.

4.23 ἀ νυσιμωτάτην: This word is not used in the Aristotle Corpus, but it appears in a key protreptic passage of Plato’s *Republic* VII 518d, where the skilled educator knows how to redirect the souls of students most easily and “most effectively” (quoted by Iamb. in XVI 82.23-24), and, at *Laws* IV 716d, piety is a “most effective” way of living successfully. Iamb. also uses ἀ νυσιμωτάτην at III 14.16-17 “most effective protreptic” and XI 59.16-17 “most effective for cheerfulness”.

**<XII 59.19-60.10: commentary>**

59.19-23 **attribution**: In our view, these are the words of Iamblichus, a rather typical opening. During was led into error (see below, on 59.24) by supposing these to be Aristotle’s words. Our reasons for attributing it to the voice of Iamblichus are its metatextuality and position (at the head of the chapter; see further on opening sentences <internal reference>), as well as the hortatory subjunctive (λέγωμεν) and the needless abstractness (of the conceptual comparison at the end), more than its diction (no individual word is non-Aristotelian, though “explicitly” διαφρήδην is not attested in his Corpus).

59.19 εἰ δὲ δὲι μὴ μόνον ἀ πό: a typical iamblichean formula, cf. εἰ δὲ δὲὶ καὶ ἀ πο at the openings of chapters of *Prot.* XIII 61.5 and XVII 84.1, and δὲὶ δὲ καὶ ἀ πο at XIV 72.9.

59.19-20 ἀ πό τῶν μερῶν ... ἀ πό τῆς ὅλης ἐ ύδαιμονίας: Plato contrasts concern for health with concern with “the whole of success” περὶ ἀ νθρωπίνης ὅλως ἐ ύδαιμονίας (*Theaetetus* 175c). In *Rhetoric* I 5 Aristotle introduces “success and the parts of this” ἐ ύδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια συνῆς (1360b6-7, “parts” μόρια also at b8, b12) as a central feature of protreptic rhetoric; see our analysis of *Rhetoric* I 4-7 in the essay on the protreptic genre <internal reference>. In *Rhetoric* I 5 the “parts” μέρη of success listed are: good birth, numerous and good friends, wealth, numerous and good children, good old age, health, beauty, strength, size, competitive ability, reputation, honour, good luck, and virtue (1360b19-23). The concept is also at work and the label is
also applied in the ethical treatises, e.g. EE I 2 μέρη τῆς εὐθαυσοκρατίας (1214b26-7) and NE V 1 μόρια τῆς εὐθαυσοκρατίας (1129b18).

59.20 συλλογίσασθαι: “reach the conclusion”. Iamblichus had recently quoted Aristotle using this expression at XI 58.5-6, and he also uses it in the title to chapter IX (4.12-13).

59.20-21 ἀνωθέν: “on a higher level”. A similar idea is used by Iamblichus and described by analogy to the race course at VP I 6.4 and XXV 66.11; Comm.Math. II 12.15, VIII 32.11, XVIII 60.18, XXI 66.16. But Aristotle uses the expression to refer to higher order principles, see e.g. NE VI 6 1139b14 and VI 12 1144a13. According to Proclus: “The ‘divine’ Aristotle also tells the reason why the soul on coming hither from yonder forgets the spectacles it saw there, but on leaving hither remembers yonder the things it suffered here; and we must accept the argument. Indeed, he himself says that traveling the road from health to disease forces some people to forget even the letters they had learned, but when going from disease to health no one ever suffers this. And that the life without the body, being natural to souls, resembles health, and the life in the body, being unnatural, resembles disease. For yonder they live according to nature, but down here contrary to nature. Hence the likely consequence is that souls that go from yonder forget the things there, while those that go yonder from this world carry on having a memory of the things here.” (Commentary on Plato’s Republic II 349.13-26 (Kroll), translated from Fragment 5 of Aristotle’s Eudemus, in Ross, ed. Fragmenta Selecta).

This passage seems to us to be significant, not only because it is a rich set of parallels to the ‘hither’ and ‘beyond’ idea, and other ideas in XII 60.10-61.1, but because it is such a rich set of parallels that it might be more plausibly attributed to the Protrepticus than to the Eudemus.

59.21 διαρρήδην: “explicitly” is not attested in the Aristotle Corpus, though its cognates are attested there, and the adverb is attested in Lysias, Plato, and Demosthenes. With his pompous sentiment “let us state explicitly that, indeed,” Iamblichus is perhaps echoing a key passage in Laws XI where the Athenian says that one should delegate to lower courts the duty of assessing penalties only in minor cases, providing for most cases by “legislating explicitly oneself – if, that is, one ever were to legislate for a state organized in this way” (876b6-c3).

59.23 τὸ σπουδαῖον ἡμῖν ἢ φαύλον εἶναι αὐτὸ διακείσθαι: cf. VII 41.22-24 “everything is well disposed ἐὰν διακεῖταί when it is in accordance with its own proper virtue.”

59.23 ἡμῖν: “our” i.e. “human” as opposed to “divine”. Düring (Attempt, 253-254) struggles to deal with this pronoun, which he thought Aristotle would not have written, and so he offers an emendation of the text as a solution: πρὸς τὸ σπουδαῖον ἡμῖν ἢ φαύλον] πρὸς τὸ σπουδαῖος ἡμῶς ἢ φαύλους. But this is unnecessary if one recognizes that these words are the introduction of Iamblichus who has not yet begun to excerpt Aristotle’s text.

59.24-26 attribution and voice: the first (corrupt) sentence at 59.24-26 and the next brief concluding sentence at 59.26 are certainly not to be attributed to Iamblichus, except perhaps the initial words or phrases with which he may have modified his selection from Aristotle, as he occasionally does. Yet they seem not to have the density of a continuous
citation from Aristotle, so their relation to the underlying text is somewhat indeterminate. In our view these lines probably represent a condensing paraphrase of a longer passage, which was perhaps in dialogue form. (As at 59.26 and 60.1, Lamb. repeats οὐκόν “thus” at times when he provides assertoric prose condensations of dialogue passages <references are needed>.) The speaker of these passages that seem to have been condensed in 59.24-60.1 is running the same line of argument and so is the same speaker who is quoted at the major citation of 60.1-7: Aristotle.

The sentence is difficult to understand; not only does ‘this’ have no obvious reference, but there seems to be a textual corruption, as it contains no finite verb. We print and translate the text of F without emendation, marking both English and Greek as corrupt. Düring argues (ref. is needed) that something has accidentally gone missing from the text because there is no clear antecedent to τοῦτο. But we take it rather as an indication that Iamblichus has begun his excerpt at this point—what is missing is the preceding words of Aristotle, which have been replaced by the short opening of Iamblichus. As for the lack of finite verb, this too could be the result of carelessness in the stitching together by Iamblichus of his comments together with the text he is working with; for a similar case see <this happens, I think? in the Plato chapters>. Alternatively, the corruption could be in the manuscript tradition. If so, the simplest solution is the one that Pistelli contemplated, but didn’t print (“25 εἶναι induxerim” is his apparatus entry): the deletion of the infinitive, understanding the copula ‘to be’ with the verbal adjective. Another solution proposed was that of Vendruscolo (‘Due frammenti’ 317n79), who proposes αἱρέ<τα φα>τέου εἶναι, offering parallels to the verbal adjective. A more radical but perhaps more likely solution is to conjecture the loss of a line or so of text, perhaps caused by homoioteleuton on a word like αἱρετέου (DSH); on this suggestion the original text would have had something like this form: “For everything, both those that are to be chosen for this and those that are to be chosen on account of this, < … are to be chosen> by everyone, both those things we do as being necessary and the pleasant things that make us feel successful.”

59.25-26 τὰ μὲν ὡς ἀναγκαία τὰν πραγμάτων τὰ δὲ ἡδέα: Cf. Prot. IX 52.16-53.2 esp. 52.19 “goods and necessities” (τὰ σαγαθά καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα); Cf. NE VII 4 1147b24-26, the examples of necessities there being food and, interestingly, sex.

59.26-60.1 attribution and voice: see comment on 59.24-26, above. The speaker of the words that seem to have been condensed in 59.24-60.1 is running the same line of argument and so is the same speaker who is quoted at the major citation of 60.1-7: Aristotle.

59.26 οὐκοῦν: cf. above note at VII 43.1.

59.26-29 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τιθέμεθα ἢτοι φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τινα σοφίαν ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ τὸ μάλιστα χαίρειν <ἡ> πάντα ταῦτα: cf. VII 41.11-15 esp. 12-13: ἐίτε τῷ ζῆν εὐδαιμονῶς ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστίν εἴτε ἐν τῷ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχειν εἴτε ἐν τῇ φρόνησι; notice that the order in VII is the opposite of the one here in XII (intelligence, virtue, and pleasure).

The addition of Vulcanius <ἡ> πάντα: “or all these things” is justified by the most important direct parallels in the EE, beginning with EE I 1, where Aristotle lays out the three alternatives, and describes taking all of them as a definite option (one that he describes having been defended): “But to be succesful and to live happily and well must
exist in three things above all, which are considered most desireable. For some say
intelligence is the greatest good, some others virtue, and some others pleasure. And some
disagree about the extent to which each of these contributes to success, declaring the
contribution of one to this to be more than that of another, some holding that intelligence
is a greater good than virtue, others that virtue is a greater good than intelligence, and still
others that pleasure is a greater good than both of those. And some think that to live
successfully to consist of all of these, others of two of them, and others of a certain one of
them.”

59.27-28 φρόνησις εἶναι καὶ τινα σοφίαν: “intelligence and a kind of
wisdom”. It has been held to be highly significant (since Jaeger (1923), Aristotleles, <page
reference>) to see intelligence and wisdom closely associated here, when they are
rigorously distinguished into separate but unequal provinces in NE VI: wisdom is
theoretical knowledge concerning what is always and necessarily true, while intelligence
is practical knowledge concerning what is true for the most part. Also surprising and
significant is that it is intelligence in Chapter XII to which the reader is exhorted, at
59.27, 60.1, 60.6, 60.7, whereas in NE VI 13 wisdom is represented as a higher objective
than intelligence: “and yet intelligence is not authoritative over wisdom or over the best
part, just as neither is medicine over health, for medicine does not use health but sees that
it somehow comes to be; it gives orders for its sake but not to it” (1145a6-9; see also
Johnson, Teleology, 224-228). Also in NE VII 12 Aristotle defines intelligence as the
intellectual ingredient of virtue, as he resumes at NE X 8 1178a16-19; and yet in NE X 7-

Jaeger recognized when he characterized the contents of the work as follows: φρόνησις
( chapters VII-IX), ἀρετή ( chapter X), and ἠθοποιία ( chapter XI). In a forthcoming paper,
we argue that the three lives argument is a common structural feature of the Prot., EE,
and NE, see our forthcoming paper, ‘Aristotle’s Protrepticus and the Nicomachean
Ethics’. See also the monograph of R. Joly, Le Thème Philosophique des Genres de Vie
dans l’Antiquité Classique, esp. pp. 106-110. On the three lives as a Pythagorean idea,
corresponding to a division of the soul into νοῦς, θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, see Burkert, Lore, 74
citing Posidonius in Galen Plac. Hipp. et Plat. 4.7, 5.6.
8 the life of wisdom is still higher than the life of virtue, as it fulfils “the authoritative and better part” in us (1178a3).

What significance does it have that Aristotle chooses to associate the two words ‘intelligence’ and ‘wisdom’ at this point in the Protrepticus and argue that intelligence is the key ingredient of a successful life? Jaeger drew the conclusion that Aristotle had not yet, at the time of writing his Protrepticus in 353/2, formulated his doctrine of wisdom, and that this was one of the ways his philosophy underwent development: “Whereas the Protrepticus understands phronesis in the full platonic sense, when we come to the Metaphysics the conception has disappeared. The Nicomachean Ethics also presents a wholly different picture. In this work the phronesis of the Protrepticus is definitively rejected” (Aristoteles, Eng. version, 82); cf. “the Protrepticus is still completely dominated by the conception of phronesis in the old sense” (84). Very early on Gadamer attacked the idea that any definite conception of phronesis could be pinned on Aristotle in a protreptic (as opposed to systematic) work (Der Aristotelische Protreptikos, 138-165).

The argument is key to Jaeger’s developmental interpretation, as J. D. Monan says “this complete identification of speculative and practical, moral knowing under the single title of phronesis is absolutely fundamental to Jaeger’s entire reconstruction of Aristotle’s development” (Moral Knowledge, 5). In fact, the position has proved to be a confused and confusing suggestion. Düring complained of “the lengthy and rather confused discussion concerning the two senses of ἐπιστήμη has shown that the whole problem is a construction by modern scholars” (Attempt, 191). But his reason for thinking this was that he considers that “Aristotle avoids strict terminology in the Protrepticus” (191). Besides begging the question, this response ignores the fact that there may very well have been, and probably was, a discussion of the interrelation of various intellectual virtues, such as intelligence, wisdom, and insight. Those who read Japanese will benefit more than we do from the clear two-page English abstract of Norio Fujisawa’s 1973 article summing up this controversy: ‘Aristotle’s Conception of Philosophy in the Protrepticus: Comparison with with Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle himself in his Later Treatises’, in Journal of Classical Studies 21, 133-134.

It must be agreed at the outset that the mutually exclusive demarcation of σοφία and ἐπιστήμη was not characteristic of Plato, who treated them as synonymous; and so, if Aristotle likewise uses them equivalently in his Protrepticus, this would confirm Jaeger’s view that Aristotle developed his views on this in the meantime. “In Plato there is no distinction between σοφία and ἐπιστήμη, except that the former may be used ironically, like our ‘clever’, while the latter never is” (J. Burnet, Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito, Oxford, 1924, at 12, on Euthyphro 2c6), as quoted by E. de Strycker (‘5a’ 85n1), who comments, “in the course of thirty years, I have searched the whole of the dialogues to test this assertion of Burnet’s and have found it to be completely true”).

But Aristotle does not treat these terms as equivalent in his Protrepticus; a wider collection of evidence and an appreciation of the dialogue construction of the work can explain what surprised Jaeger and others. The main negative target of the work seems to be Isocrates and his distinctly limited conception of philosophy, which stretched no further than to be able to enhance the intelligence (and perhaps the virtue) of a talented student to make practical decisions by estimating the success of a personal or political proposal. We think that Isocrates also featured in Aristotle’s Protrepticus as a character
(see <internal reference to our essay on the *Protrepticus* as a dialogue>), some of whose lines are quoted by Iamblichus in chapter VI, especially his (‘Isocrates’) rousing exhortation to philosophy, which culminates thus: “by all means one ought to do philosophy, since only philosophy includes within itself this correct judgement and this unerring executive intelligence (φρονησιν)” (37.19-22).

<Here we need a selection of paraphrases and quotes from Isocrates using ‘intelligence’ in the context of defining his own philosophy in opposition to that of Plato. We should search for ‘phronesis’ in the selection of Isocrates that we are proposing for the Green Series.>

Aristotle wrote for ‘Isocrates’ a key speech, we think, in criticism of philosophy, quoted by Iamblichus in *Comm.Math.* XXVI 79.1-81.4; and in this speech ‘Isocrates’ is so attached to his term φρονήσις that he defines even natural philosophy as a sort of it: the end of all philosophy, ventures ‘Isocrates’, is said by some to be the “science of what is unjust and just and bad and good, a science similar to geometry and the other sciences, while others say that it is intelligence (φρονησις) about both nature and that sort of truth, the sort of knowledge introduced by those around both Anaxagoras and Parmenides” (79.10-15). Aristotle obviously took a contrary view: natural philosophy is not φρονήσις τις (a sort of intelligence), but σοφία τις (a sort of wisdom) (*Metaph.* IV 3.1005b1). Aristotle had earlier in his *Protrepticus* given an elaborate 5-part analysis of different types of wisdom and a 5-stage anthropological prehistory of σοφία, as well as an etymology of the term (provided that the Philoponus evidence is to be attributed to Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, as we argue that it should, see <internal reference>). In this account, the highest stage and latest developing type of σοφία is abstract formal wisdom, the type that is below and earlier to develop is natural philosophy, and the next earlier (and lower kind) of wisdom is political virtue. So whereas Isocrates regards intelligence as the highest intellectual virtue, especially as applied to politics, and disdains natural and abstract conceptual philosophy, which he thinks of as a kind of intelligence and at best preparatory to real philosophy (*Antidosis* 261-271), Aristotle, on the other hand, regards them all as types of wisdom, in descending order of worth: abstract ‘metaphysical’ philosophy; natural philosophy; political virtue.

It is in the context of the rhetorical interactions between ‘Isocrates’ and ‘Aristotle’ that we will find the explanation of Aristotle’s surprising association of φρονήσις and σοφία at 59.27-28 of chapter XII; at this point, it seems the character ‘Aristotle’ is directing his comments at ‘Isocrates’, using the latter’s characterization of philosophy as primarily involving intelligence, though not failing to briefly mention his own preferred concept: “intelligence and a kind of wisdom.” A similar rhetorical purpose is served by switching between ‘intelligence’ and ‘wisdom’ in an earlier comment by ‘Aristotle’ in chapter VI; in a passage heavily barbed with anti-Isocratean edginess, he had argued that intelligence is the supreme of goods, that philosophy is a possession and a use of wisdom, so that wisdom itself must be among the greatest goods, and that intelligence is worth much more than the vast property for which reason some sail as far as the Pillars of Heracles (39.25-40.6, emphasis added).

In *EE* II 1 Aristotle refers back to this passage (the one quoted by Iamblic. in XII) as having established that intelligence, virtue, and pleasure are the end for humans, either separately or together; and in I 1 he mentions disputes about the relative value of intelligence, virtue, and pleasure, as well as about their relative contributions to success
(both passages are quoted in the previous note). The passage of the *NE* which parallels the *EE* I 1 passage adds back the detail that was missing from the two *EE* passages, that ‘intelligence’ is not the only way of specifying the intellectual ideal, and mentions that there were people who took different views: “some identify success with virtue, some with intelligence, others with a kind of wisdom (σοφία τίς), others with these, or one of these, with pleasure or not without pleasure, while others also include external prosperity” (*NE* I 9.1098b23–26) τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἀλλοις δὲ σοφία τίς ἐίναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταύτα ἢ τοὺτων τι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἂνευ ἡδονῆς· ἐτέρωι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐεργείαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν.

Seen in the light of these passages, Jaeger’s surprise about the juxtaposition of ‘intelligence’ and ‘wisdom’ here says more about the confusing consequences of not recognizing Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* as a dialogue than it does about any subtle development of his thought; Aristotle in his *Protrepticus* already had a focus on what he saw as higher sciences, for which he wished to reserve the term σοφία, and so he slipped this term into the discussion even here where he was drawing conclusions from premises and in terms with which Isocrates was committed to agreeing.

59.27-28 τινα σοφίαν: “a kind of wisdom”. Cf. *NE* I 9 1098b24, *Metaph.* IV 3.1005b1; Cf. Philoponus, *in Nic. Arith.*, Intr. I <above, internal reference>. A related expression γνώσις τίς is used by the speaker (‘Aristotle’, we think) at VII 44.19 to affirm that perception is “a kind of cognition,” as well as in a passage on friendship in *EE* VII 12 which seems to refer back to the *Protrepticus*; because life is bound up with perception, living itself is “a kind of cognition” (1244b28-29). Just later in VII, at 45.3, vision is said to be “a kind of knowledge” ἐπιστήμη τίς. See also the comments on Theophrastus in Joly 1956, 135-136n8; Walzer, *Magna Moralia und aristotelische Ethik*, 192.

59.28 ἡ πάντα: The text without Vulcanius’ supplement can be construed, but the argument seems to require an inclusive approach to the three lives argument (so that any or all of the three kinds of lives motivate the same result), and so the minimal conjecture gives much better sense.

60.1-7 attribution and voice: these lines are definitely to be attributed to Aristotle, as it has none of the signs point to Iamblichus (position in chapter, metatextuality, hortatory subjunctive, needless complexity, late diction), and several signs pointing to Aristotle, besides the obviously Aristotelian content: density, subtlety of thought, balanced clauses and appositions. We think that they are spoken by ‘Aristotle’, who had earlier indicated this future line of argument in the section excerpted by Iamb. at VII 41.11-15, and that ‘Aristotle’ has been the speaker in every citation by Iamb. from chapter IX onwards.

60.4-5 ἀρετῆ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ κυριότατον τῶν ἐν ἠμῖν: Compare the passage in VII, in which it is specified that intelligence is the most authoritative thing in us: τῆς φρόνησιος … του κυριωτάτου … ἐν ἠμῖν (43.1-2).

60.5-6 ἡ διειστον τε πάντων ἐστιν ὃς ἐν πρὸς ἐν ἠ φρόνησις: For the related idea that living pleasantly applies most or only to philosophers, arising from their intelligence and observation, see XI 59.9-13.

60.5 ὃς ἐν πρὸς ἐν: Compare the expression used in Aristotle’s *Sophistici Elenchi* 1 165a24-25: ὃς ἐν πρὸς ἐν ἐι πεῖν “comparing one thing with another.” A similar expression was used earlier in the *Protrepticus* at VII: ὃς ἐξ ἐν πρὸς ἐξ ἐν.
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κρίνεσθαι (43.3) “judging one disposition in comparison with another.” The idea of the expression is pairwise comparison, which yields a rank ordered sequence of items of higher value. See below at 60.9-10 where we conjecture that the same phrase as in *SE* I was used, perhaps by Iamblichus: ὡς ἐν πρός ἐν εἶπεν.

60.6–7 κἂν ταῦτα πάντα ταῦτα φη τις εἶναι τῆν εὐδαιμονίαν: “even if someone were to say that all these same things together are success, it is to be defined by intelligence.” Cf. the fourth option of the tetralemma above (59.28–60.1): intelligence, virtue, enjoyment, “or all these things” <ἡ> πάντα ταῦτα. Worth considering is Düring’s conjecture τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ (all these same things are in success); less probable is [ταῦτα] Vendruscolo (Due frammenti, pp.319–320).

60.7 ὁριστέον ἐστὶ τῷ φρονεῖν: Aristotle here is concerned with defining or determining what eudaimonia is, a project on which Aristotle also embarks in *EE* I 4: “Most of the disagreements and difficulties will become clear, should we define well what we ought to think success to be (ἂν καλῶς ὀρισθῇ τῇ χρῇ νοοίζειν εἶναι τήν εὐδαιμονίαν) (1215a20–22). The syntax of definition involves specifying the differentia in the dative case (ὁριζεῖν + dative), as in the general remark of *Meteorology* IV: “everything is defined with respect to its function” ἀπαντα δ’ ἐστίν ὁριζομένα τῷ ἔργῳ (*Meteor.* IV 390a10). For example, in the *PA* Aristotle says that “the animal is defined by perception” τῷ ζωῷ ὁριζόμενον ὁρισταὶ (666a34). In the *Protrepticus* Aristotle is arguing that the human happiness is to be defined by intelligence, having already established that intelligence is the function of the human being in chapter VII. Thus we see parallel construction in that chapter: τὸ γε ζῆν τῷ ὁριζόμενῳ διακρίνεται τῶν μὴ ζην, καὶ ταύτης παρουσίας καὶ δυνάμει τῷ ζῆν διωρισταὶ (44.9–11). This analysis is significant evidence for Ross’ conjecture at 60.7, the dative τῷ instead of τῷ before φρονεῖν. This conjecture allows us to avoid the banal terms of moral preference that have been substituted for ὁριστέον: αἰρετέον (Vulcanius); ἀριστῶν (Vendruscolo).

60.7–10 attribution and voice: The first words could be still quoted from Aristotle, but the probability of there being from Iamblichus rises thereafter; and there is obscurity or a crux at 8–10 which might be Iamblichus. The most sound procedure is to abstain from recognizing it in our translation as either citation from Aristotle or comment from Iamblichus; but we incline to think that this is probable: Hence everyone who is capable of it should do philosophy; for this is surely either living perfectly well, or it is at least most of all, speaking on a one to one basis, responsible for their souls.

60.8 φιλοσοφήτεον: This expression is also used in chapters VI (37.9, 37.19), VII (41.14), VIII (48.19); in *POxy* 666 (iii.55-56). Further, various reports about the *Protrepticus* discuss the expression in connection with the consequentia mirabilis (Alex. Aph. in *Top.* 149.9-10; Olympio. in *Alc.* 144a16-17; Elias, *Proleg.* 3.19-20; David, *Proleg.* 9.3-4).

60.8–10 ἢ γὰρ τοι τούτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ τελέως εὗ ζῆν, ἢ μάλιστά γε πάντων ὡς ἐν <πρός ἐν> εἰ πεῖν αἶτιον ταῖς ψυχαῖς: Compare the construal implicit in Düring’s translation: “for this is either complete good life, or of all single things most truly the cause of good life for souls” (B96). But if such a reading is correct then one would need a modification of the text along the lines offered by Gigon (and thus Düring offers his scilicet, reprinted by many subsequent editors). But there is a
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simpler solution that examines more closely the rhetorical structure of the argument. Aristotle usually expresses the stronger alternative first and then the qualified one (cf.?). So he does here (and this explains the particle γέ, untranslated by Düring). We take the first τό in 60.9 with αἴτιον in 60.10, interlaced with πάντων (“of all causes”) in 60.9. Although the word order seems odd, this reading maintains the typical rhetorical pattern, and the received text, and gives good sense: among the causes of the perfectly successful life (either intelligence, virtue, pleasure, or all of these), intelligence is either to be identified as the cause, or is at least to be considered, on a comparative basis, as the greatest of all those possible causes.

60.9 τὸ τελέως εὗ ζήν: A very similar expression was used in XI τό γε τελέως ζήν (58.9).

60.9-10 ως εὖ <πρὸς εὖ> εἰ πειν: There is no parallel in the Corpus to the expression as written in F, but there is a relevant parallel to the expression ως εὖ πρὸς εὖ, used 5 lines above (60.5): ως εὖ πρὸς εὖ εἰ πειν (SE 1, 165a24-25). Thus we conjecture that the phrase πρὸς εὖ has dropped out. When restored to ως εὖ <πρὸς εὖ> εἰ πειν, the sentence makes good sense: when one cause of living perfectly well (intelligence, virtue, or pleasure) is compared with (or set before) another, intelligence is determined to be, if not the exclusive cause, then at least it is to be called the greatest of all the possible causes, when one compares it systematically with other candidates. This pairwise comparison was the procedure used by Plato to rank the value of pleasure at the end of his Philebus. A similar expression is used in Rhetoric I 6, where the context is related to the one here in the Protrepticus: “speaking of them individually (ως δέ καθ’ εὖ εἰ πειν), it is necessary for the following things to be goods: success, etc.” (1362b9-10).

60.10 αἴτιον: The use of this term seems to resonate with the passage in chapter IX that ridicules someone (probably Isocrates) for not telling the difference between a “cause” (αἴτιον) and a “co-cause” (συναιτιον) (53.2). Düring causes confusion by entering a scilicet within his edition of B96 αἴτιον <sc. τοῦ τελέως εὗ ζήν> ταῖς ψυχαῖς – yes, his construal does seem to be correct, and we might have appreciated being informed of this; but Aristotle’s text cannot be enhanced by this neo-Greek supplement. Worse still is Gigon’s procedure, perhaps inspired by Düring’s; Gigon simply conjectures a word to go into the same place: αἴτιον <τούτου> ταῖς ψυχαῖς.

<XII 60.10-61.4: commentary>

60.10-15 attribution and voice: Except for the last sentence, which is certainly composed by Iamblichus, this paragraph is of most uncertain attribution. Since it comes between a paragraph that is derived from Aristotle’s Protrepticus and a chapter that is derived from Plato’s Phaedo, we can have no a priori confidence that the material of this paragraph comes from the Protrepticus, or even from Aristotle (unlike every other paragraph between the beginning of VI and the middle of XII; for the proof that they all derive from this one work see our ‘Authenticating’ 281-284). It could perhaps have been a famous passage from a work by Heraclides of Pontus, which Iamblichus knew, or from another Platonist or neo-Platonist author. Or it could have been taken from this or another work of Aristotle which contained an allusion to or a reflection of a striking passage from Heraclides. If it was this work, it must have come after the passage previously quoted by Iamblichus, in which case it could have been ‘Heraclides’ who spoke the lines, or else it
could have been ‘Aristotle’ who spoke the original lines, addressing himself to Heraclides (as he had addressed himself to Isocrates in the first paragraph of XII) in terms designed to appeal to his Platonic sensibilities. Another possibility to consider is that Iamblichus may have done the same here as at the end of the next chapter, where he finishes his excerpts from Plato’s *Phaedo* with a short pastiche of somewhat disconnected sentences and phrases (for further details on this passage, see our ‘Authenticating’ 233-235); if so, then the content would consist of phrases from Aristotle, but the assembly of it into this form would not have been mechanical and so we cannot reconstruct Aristotle’s text on this basis. Clearly we need to leave these two sentences in plain text, indicating an uncertain relation to the underlying text, in this case very uncertain. The material is suggestive, however, and merits further investigation.

Scholars have taken a variety of positions about the attribution of this paragraph, marking various points as the end of the Aristotle excerpt. The first scholar on the scene was Bywater (1869), who gave no clear indication about where he thought the Aristotle material ended (‘Lost dialogue’, 63), calling chapter XII an “appendix” but referring only to the first sentence (which was however written by Iamblichus, not Aristotle). Next, Hartlich (1889, 254-255) made the division where we think it is most likely: at 61.1 λύπης. Next, Jaeger (1923, 100n1) suggested dividing after the first sentence of the second paragraph, at 60.15 πάντες, and was followed in this in the fragment collections of 1934 and 1955 by Walzer (it seems) and Ross. Then Düring (1961), when marking the end of his ‘Fragment B96’, preferred to retrench back to the end of the first paragraph, finishing the excerpt at 60.10 ψυχαίς, whereas Schneeweiss (1966) went all the way in the other direction (<p. ref.> and included the whole chapter, including the obvious Iamblichean closing sentence which ends at 61.4 προσήκοντος. For us the probably correct dividing line is the one that Hartlich drew; but confidence is not available.

The unavailability of confidence has not prevented certain scholars from expressing strong attitudes about their attributions. Jaeger declared that the first sentence in the second paragraph 60.10-15 “seems to me unmistakably genuine” (1923, 100n1); but then it is unclear why he rejected the next sentence which has many of the same features, yet he did: arguing against Hartlich, Jaeger says that to suggest that Aristotle “is the author of the conclusion actually found in Iamblichus (60.7-61.4) is to let desire stifle critical reflection. Enthusiastic the sentences may be, and even inspired; but it is not the controlled enthusiasm of Aristotle, who never forgoes the strict rhythm of his apodictic advance … the loose and merely associative conjunction of these notions into an edifying summons to the other world, the confusion of ideas that can be detected in them, the sacerdotal unction with which the writer introduces some of Plato’s ceremonial words, the presence of certain distinctly Neo-Platonic phrases like ‘the heavenly path’ and ‘the realm of the gods’, and lastly the excessive loquacity of the conclusion, with its inability to come to an end – all these things betray retouching by Iamblichus” (*Aristoteles*, 79).

We agree that there is a certain degree of ‘loquacity’ in the conclusion at 61.1-4, which should be attributed to Iamblichus, but there is nothing like as much loquacity in Iamblichus as in Jaeger. On the other hand, there is no reason to be confident that there has been “re-touching” by Iamblichus, nor do we see sufficient reason to believe that there wasn’t. (Walzer’s fragment collection, which was inspired by Jaeger’s work, shows confusion about the extent of the attributed fragment, which is labeled as extending to 60.7, but with another paragraph appended with text from 60.7-60.15 (i.e. the end of the
first and the beginning of the second of the paragraphs that we have established); but Ross, who generally followed Walzer passively, labels and prints all of chapter XII up to 60.15 as his fragment 15.)

Other scholars see this second paragraph as being derived from a different work of Aristotle, his Eudemus. Düring, arguing fiercely in ‘Problems’ (168) against Jaeger who is said to “go far beyond the evidence,” says that 60.10-15 is derived rather from his Eudemus, pointing out convincing parallels to a passage about Aristotle’s views in Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic, which he assumes was rightly attributed to his Eudemus by earlier scholars (II 349.13-26 = Eudemus, fragment 5 Walzer). (For this passage, see the Appendix to this Commentary.) Gigon agreed (<in his contribution to Plato and Aristotle in mid-fourth century, p.271 (according to de Vogel>). The attribution to Eudemus is congenial to Flashar, who compares this section to his ‘Fragments 44-46’ (viz. VIII 47.5-48.9), passages which he would prefer to attribute to Aristotle’s Eudemus (‘Fragmente’, 197). But for a deconstruction of the old notion that the material in chapter VIII could derive from Eudemus, see our ‘Authenticating’, 284-288. A consideration against the attribution of these lines by Düring and Gigon (and later Flashar) to Eudemus is provided by Cornelia de Vogel in ‘Problems around a new edition’ (289): they had insufficient grounds to do so, “for why should every thought about the soul and the after-life have been written by Aristotle in the Eudemus? Why could he not have expressed such thoughts in the Protrepticus?”

Wherever we draw the line, chapter XII contains the last quotation made by Iamblichus in his Protrepticus section, and therefore the latest passage available to us in Iamblichus (assuming he uses the same techniques as with Plato and quotes without reversing order). It certainly draws a conclusion, and it might conclude the whole work. But it probably isn’t right at the end of Aristotle’s Protrepticus, if only for the simple comparative reason that Iamblichus doesn’t provide the end of any of the various Plato works from which he quotes. It is easy to be misled about the shape of partly preserved books, as Düring was (Attempt, 7) when he declared himself to be “pretty certain” that the last of the Protrepticus is preserved in his ‘Fragment B110’, at the end of Chapter VIII (78.19-79.2).

60.10 ἐνταύθα: “down here”, viz. in the mundane, not the astral, realm. Humans are the most noble of all creatures “down here” ἐνταύθα at IX 51.4-5; contrast “say goodbye to life and depart hither” ἐντεύθεν at VII 48.20, viz. away from down here in this life.

This contrast is given great play in a parallel passage of Aristotle of which Proclus makes us aware in his commentary on Plato’s Republic; for this passage (2. 349.13-16 Kroll) see the translation printed in the Appendix below, noting especially ἐντεύθεν versus ἐνταύθα at c.15-16, ἐκεῖ versus ἐνταύθα at c.20-21 and at 25-26, ἐκείθεν versus ἐντεύθεν at c.24-25, and ἐκείθεν versus ἐκεῖ at c.13-14. Relative to XII 60.10-11 this text contains a very close parallel, so close as to suggest that Proclus may even have been basing his report on the same text as this: up there (ἐκεῖ) our souls live according to nature, but down here they live contrary to nature (ἐνταύθα δὲ παρὰ φύσιν). There seems likely to be a textual basis for this parallel, which means either that Iamblichus is here basing himself on Eudemus, or else he is here continuing to base himself on Protrepticus, and this evidence should be removed from the evidence basis for Eudemus and reassigned as evidence for Protrepticus.
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60.11 παρὰ φύσιν: cf. VIII 48.14. This claim contradicts claims made in other parts of the *Protrepticus*, which express the view that humans exist by nature or in accordance with nature. The speaker of IX 50.27-51.4 (‘Aristotle’, we think) dismisses the Platonic view that most animals have come into being “unnaturally because of some corruption or wickedness;” this issue can be dismissed because all can agree that humans are the animals with the highest status “down here” ἐντοῦθεν, from which consideration “it’s clear that we have come to be both by nature and according to nature.” Two further discussions (each by the same speaker, ‘Aristotle’, we think) speak about the natural virtues, natural functions, and natural compositions of humans (VII 41.24-42.23) and their natural ends and the natural sequence of their normal development (IX 51.16-52.5).

What explains this contradiction? This section of Iamblichus’ text seems to be expressing a point of view friendly to that of Heraclides of Pontus, who did champion a Platonic view, both in his published works and in this dialogue as the character ‘Heraclides’. Either Iamblichus has stopped quoting Aristotle’s book and is now relying on a book by Heraclides, or (more likely) Iamblichus is continuing to rely on Aristotle’s book, where ‘Heraclides’ is perhaps speaking his piece, after ‘Aristotle’ finished speaking his; or else ‘Heraclides’ is being addressed by ‘Aristotle’ in terms that will appeal to him, and what ‘Aristotle’ says about humans being “unnatural” remains fully deniable, because he has been careful to say “perhaps” ἢσως, at 60.11.

60.10-18: Compare the tenor of VIII 47.5-48.21; Vendruscolo, *Due frammenti* 321 provides a nice chart of the parallels.

60.15 ἡδίου καὶ ὅσαν: It is a protreptic commonplace to assert that an activity is “easy”. Compare in VI, ῥαστώνης (40.20) and in X, ῥαδίως (54.12).

60.15-61.1 attribution and voice: see note to 60.10-15, which has the same attribution status as this sentence.

60.16-17 οἱ μάλιστα μακάριοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς: cf. in VIII, τὰ δοκοῦντα ἦναι μεγάλα (47.7) and μακάριος (47.22).

60.18-61.1: Iamblichean in style, containing many neoplatonic elements and themes. See Vendruscolo, due, 321; Hartlich 255n1; Rabinowitz, p. 59.


60.20 ἀπερείσωμεν: Cf. Plato, *Statesman* 274b for the idea of humans as such being ‘settled’ by the gods; cf. *Protr*. V, 34.25 for the idea of cognition being ‘founded’ on other needs.


61.1-4 attribution: Iamblichus.

61.1-4: Largely a statement in somewhat different words of the chapter’s title; perhaps the chapter’s title was drafted by Iamblichus from the elements of this last sentence.