3.21 Σύμμικτοι προτροπαίοι: Iamblichus explains his methodology of using mixed authors and arguments to protreptic effect at *Protr.* I 7.18-8.2; cf. below on 37.1-2 and the summary of the whole *Protr.* at XXI 104.26-105.26. See Hutchinson and Johnson, ‘Authenticating’, 204-205.

3.21-22 πρός τῇ πρακτικῇ καὶ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ: This corresponds to the content at 37.3-22. Following these arguments, the chapter divides into three sections, showing that philosophy is possible (37.26-39.8), beneficial (39.9-40.11), and easy (40.12-41.5). For comments on this tripartite structure, see note at 37.22-26.

3.22-23 σοφίας κτησίν τε καὶ χρήσιν: See notes at 37.7-8 and 40.2-3, where philosophy is defined as “a use and possession of wisdom.”

36.27-37.2 attribution: Most editors agree that 36.27-37.2 is an opening by Iamblichus; Flashar alone prints it as part of a fragment of Aristotle (*Fragmente*, 182). It is in fact a typical chapter opening in the voice of the author of the cover text. Iamblichus has assimilated the person and number of his own introduction to the Platonic quotation with which he starts when he says “Let’s put it this way” at 37.2-3.

The section 37.3-11 is taken by Walzer, Ross and Düring to be a fragment of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*. Rabinowitz argued that the section is in fact a summary of certain stretches of Plato’s *Alcibiades*, but his thesis has not found agreement (see below note on 37.7-11). Yet this section does seem to contain a mixture of paraphrase and quotation and foreshadowing of conclusions, some of which may be due to Iamblichus and not the source text; although the thoughts seem appropriate to the source material, there seems to be compression due to Iamblichus, and that is perhaps why the section reads as if a longer argument has been forced into a quasi-syllogistic form. For this reason we leave the entire section in plain text in our reconstruction, although there seems to be no doubt that Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* is the source.


36.27 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνθρώποις διαλεγόμεθα: The remark, “But since ‘our dialogue is with human beings’,” is an allusion to a passage in Plato’s *Laws* V (732e3): “From the point of view of religion, we’ve expounded pretty thoroughly what sort of activities we should pursue and what sort of person the individual ought to be; but we have not yet come down to the purely secular level. But we must, because our dialogue is with human beings, not with gods” (*Laws* 732de, trans. after Saunders). It is not
possible to say, on the basis of the available evidence, whether or not the saying of the *Laws* was invoked in Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*. If it was, then the additional question arises of who would have referred to it (if Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* was a dialogue). What is the dramatic point of the saying? Düring (*Attempt*, 179) catalogues Aristotle’s discussions of a similar theme: the difference between human and divine goods (*Topics* 116b14-15, *MM* 1182b4-5; *EE* 1217a21-24; *Pol*. 1323b23-25). Aristotle may well have discussed this in the *Protrepticus*, but what we have here seems to be no more than Iamblichus borrowing a catchphrase.

37.1-2 συμμιγνύναι ταῖς τοιαύταις παρακλήσει τάς πρὸς τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ πρακτικὸν βίον προτροπάς: When Iamblichus says that he will “mix in some exhortations to the political and practical life as well” he is referring to his “mixed method” of protreptic (see note on the title of this chapter). But he is probably referring not just to the present chapter, but to the rest of the chapters up to XII as well (at which point he again shifts gears and begins to use material from Plato’s dialogues). In other words, he understands the excerpt of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus en bloc* to be an exhortation to the political and practical life.

37.1-2 παρακλήσει τὰς πρὸς τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ πρακτικὸν βίον: Compare the Iamblichean expression in the title of chapter VII: παρακλήσεις πρὸς τὴν θεωρητικὴν φιλοσοφίαν (4.1-2). In *Pol*. VII 3, Aristotle raises the question of whether ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος is more choiceworthy than the life of acquiring external goods (1324a25).

37.3-11 attribution and voice: the voice changes at 37.3 and is no longer that of Iamblichus; it could be citation, but there appears to have been some compression resulting in a missing premise about politics, so it seems to be a ‘fast-forward’ paraphrase of the source text on the part of Iamblichus.

37.3-5 τὰ ὑποκείμενα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῖν ... καθάπερ ὁργανά τινα ὑπόκειται: The body and other things that “underlie” our life, subserve it as tools. See below at 37.13-14 where Aristotle uses the same terminology in the context of one science being “subordinate” to another (and see also 40.6-11 and notes on these passages). Further, in *DCM* xxvi 80.5-6 and xxvii 86.6-22, Aristotle distinguishes between sciences in terms of the material that “underlie” them (also witnessed by Proclus, *In Euclid I*, *Prologue I*, ch. 11, 33.21-34.11).

37.3-4 οἶνον σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα: The transmitted text seems a bit bald, which suggested to ... Pistelli that the phrase following οἶνον was a marginal gloss. Kiessling would emend the text: οἶνον <τῶ> σῶμα καὶ <τὰ> περὶ τὸ σῶμα. But even if Aristotle would have used these definite articles, it would not be right to emend the text of Iamblichus, as later editors have followed Kiessling in doing, because this passage may be paraphrase rather than citation.

For the idea of “the body and the things concerned with the body”, cf. Plato *Phaedo* 114e (cited by Iamblichus at *Protr*. XIII 71.10). Aristotle holds that the lower and “less honorable” parts of the body exist for the sake of the upper and “more honorable”, see e.g. *PA* III 10.672b9-673a10. The same teleological relationship exists between the homogenous and heterogeneous parts of the body, according to *PA* II.1.646b11-28.
37.4 καθάπερ ὄργανα τίνα: The classic description of the body and its parts as “instruments” (organs) ruled by the soul is Plato, Alcibiades 129e-130c. Socrates’ also uses this terminology in an argument for the unity of the soul the Theaetetus: “it would be a very strange thing, I must say, if there were a number of perceptions sitting inside us as if if we were wooden horses, and there were not some form, soul or whatever one ought to call it, to which all these converge—something with which, through those things <sc. the eyes and ears> as if they were instruments, we perceive all that is perceptible (διά τούτων σιων ὄργανων αἰσθανομέθα σας αἰσθητά)” (184d1-7). That our bodies are tools (used by our souls) is a position held by Aristotle throughout his psychological and biological works (see especially DA II 1, 412a27-412b10; also 415b18, PA 645b14.) See further A. P. Bos, Soul and its Instrumental Body.

37.5-7 τούτων δ’ ἐπικίνδυνός ἡ στίν ἡ χρήσις, καὶ πλέον θάτερου ἀπεργάζεται τοῖς μὴ δεόντως αὐτοῖς χρωμένοις: for the idea of using things correctly, cf. Iambl. Protr. V 25.17 = Pl. Euthyd. 280e. As Aristotle says in Politics I 2, “Just as a human, when perfect, is best of the animals, so is a human, when separated from law and justice, worst of all. For injustice is most dangerous with weapons, and a human is born with weapons for intelligence and excellence, which can be used for very opposite purposes” (1253a31-5). The point that so-called goods could be evils in the hands of the ignorant was a Socratic commonplace and to some extent common ground, it seems, between Aristotle and his opponent in the school of Isocrates. For example, in Isocrates’ To Demonicus 6 we read a modified expression of essentially the same idea: “physical strength with intelligence brings advantages, but without intelligence it does more harm to the one who has it.” The speaker in P.Oxy.666 appears to interpret this Isocratean slogan in a somewhat confused way, which suggests that Aristotle has cast ‘Isocrates’ as the speaker; see note ad loc. At 37.6 πλέον θάτερου “more of the latter” lacks a referent, which would presumably be the evils that make bad uses of tools dangerous; this is another sign of Iamblichus providing a compression of the original line of argument.

37.7-11: The argument is comparable to Plato, Euthydemus 280d-282d. A working summary of its premises: (1) Our bodies and the things that support it are tools; (2) All tools can be used for good or bad (harm or benefit); (3) Philosophy teaches us how to put tools to good use; (4) Therefore, one should do philosophy.

Rabinowitz argues that this section is a “severe abridgement” of Alcibiades 129c-131b, 132ab, 133c-134a, and 134b-135a. His tortured argumentation is taken apart by Düring, Attempt, 181-182, who finds it “more probable that the author of Alcib. 1, whether Plato or not, used the κτήσεις—χρήσις argument for his specific purpose in this dialogue, and that consequently the Protrepticus and the Alcibiades (which might be written later than the Protrepticus) contain independent adaptations of this theme” (182).

A much more interesting prospect is Düring’s suggestion (Attempt, 181) that this section could be an Iamblichean paraphrase of P. Oxy 666 (his B2-5). He also compares Iambl. Protr. II, where we read: “It is better to have excellence with poverty than wealth with vice; and frugality with health than surfeit with disease. Just as lack of restraint with respect to food is injurious to the body, so are possessions to a soul in a bad condition. And it is equally dangerous to give a knife to a madman and power to a bad man.” κρείττων μετὰ πεινών ἀρέτην ὑποληπτεῖν οἷ ἀπλύτων μετὰ κακίας, ἀλλαξιώτας μετὰ ύπνους οἷ πολυφάσματι μετὰ νόσου. βλαβέρα μάλιστα τροφῆς μεν ἀθροία τῷ τῷ σῶμα, κτήσεως δέ τῷ τῷ ψυχήν διακειμένῳ κακίας, καὶ ἐπισφαλεῖς καὶ ὀμοιοῖς οὐνομεόν δοὺς μάχαιραν καὶ μοχθέρῳ δύναμιν. (9.4-10). Both Protr. II.9.4-10 and Protr. VI.37.3-11 show Iamblichus using as a source the same zone of argument of Aristotle’s Protrepticus as the P.Oxy.666 happens to preserve. But it is not clear whether either passage is an excerpt or
paraphrase of just the part of P.Oxy.666 that we have, or part of a continuation of the same argument. This is a further reason to keep the section in plain text. But the coincidence of argument between these two texts is evidence confirming for the attribution of P.Oxy.666 to Aristotle’s Protrepticus, although this argument does not seem to have been made by scholars who have studied P.Oxy.666.

37.7-8 τῆς ἐπιστήμης κτάσθαι τε αὐτήν καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ προσηκόντως: See below where philosophy is defined as “a possession and use of wisdom” (κτήσις τε καὶ χρήσις σοφίας, 40.2-3).

On the distinction between acquisition or possession on one hand, and use on the other, the locus classicus is Socrates’ argument in the Euthydemus: “one who is going to be successful must not only possess such goods but must use (χρησθαι) them too, or else there is no advantage in possessing (κτήσεως) them” (280d4-7). See also the advice given by Isocrates in To Demonicus (27-28): “Prize not the excessive possession of the goods you have, but their moderate enjoyment. Have contempt for those who are eager to be wealthy, but are not able to use the things they have, for such people are in much the same condition as one who bought a fine horse and didn’t know how to ride well. Try to build your wealth out of useful things and possessions (χρήματα καὶ κτήσεως); and they are useful for those who understand how to use them, but they are possessions for those who can acquire them.”

In Rhetoric I 5, Aristotle advises that protreptic speeches concerned with wealth should observe that true wealth consists in use and not mere possession (ὄλως δὲ τὸ πλοῦτεν ἔστιν ἐν τῷ χρησθαι μάλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κτήσθαι καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἑνεργεία ἐστὶ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρήσις πλούτος, 1361a23-24). And so he does in the discussion of wealth in NE IV 1: “spending and giving are the use of wealth, while taking and keeping are the acquisition or possession of it” (1120a9). But since the discussion of wealth in Protr. VI is itself a protreptic speech concerned with wealth, and contains the recommended distinction, this Rhetoric passage is evidence confirming that material in Protr. VI (and with it the connected material in P.Oxy.666) should be attributed to Aristotle’s Protrepticus (and the parallel in the NE IV 1 serves to confirm this).

The distinction is also used in Topics V (a work very likely in close chronological proximity to the Protrepticus) with reference to perception and knowledge (2.129b-130a), which is relevant to the excerpts in Protr. XI where the distinction between use and possession is again applied (56.15-58.14). For extensive commentary on Aristotle’s distinction between use and possession, and their connection with the distinction between capacity and activity (dunamis, energeia), see: de Strycker, ‘Prédicats univoques’, 597-618; and Menn, ‘Origins’, 78-87.

37.9 πάντα ταῦτα: Flashar says “Die worte ‘dies alles’ sind im kontext nicht recht verankert” (Fragmente, 182), but we see no difficulty with the construal: “all these things” that underlie the human way of life.

37.9 εὖ θησόμεθα: According to Düring (Attempt, 181), the phrase is found in Plato but not in the Aristotle Corpus.

37.9 φιλοσοφητέον: This is the same term that occurs as the conclusion to the consequential mirabilis argument attributed by ancient commentators to the Protrepticus by: Alex. Aph. in Top. 149.9-10; Olympio. in Alc. 144a16-17; Elias, Proleg. 3.19-20; David, Proleg. 9.3-4. It is also present at P.Oxy.666, iii.55-56. It occurs several more times in the Aristotle section of Iamblichus’ Protr.: VI 37.9, VI 37.19, VII 41.14, VIII 48.19, XII 60.8. For the context, see Ar. Rhet. 1399b11. Cf. Isoc., Antid. 205, Paneg. 6, Ep. 7.3. Stob. 785.20-21 (the dedication).
37.10 ὁ ὀρθὸς πολιτεύσασθαι: Kiessling’s conjecture πολιτεύσεσθαι (followed by Pistelli + des Places), restoring future from aorist, coordinates better with μέλλομεν followed by διάζειν. (For the verb in aorist see Pl., Crito 52c2.)

A similar idea is mentioned below at 37.16-17: ἢ τοῦ κρίνειν ἔχουσα τὴν ὀφθότητα. Cf. Isocrates’ terminology, which is more narrowly tailored for the king his speech specifically addresses: τὸν ὀρθὸς βασιλεύσουσα καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὃς χρή διοικήσουτά (ad Nicocl. 13).

<VI 37.11-26: commentary>

37.11-22 attribution and voice: Here Iamblichus excerpts directly from the Protrepticus of Aristotle. The context is a speech recently given by someone who has strong opinions about education and the superiority of practical and productive sciences over the so-called theoretical ones; we have identified him as Isocrates in our reconstruction; see the opening of DCM 26, with notes ad loc. These remarks cited in Protr. VI are part of the reply by ‘Aristotle’ to these earlier expressed opinions of ‘Isocrates’; for this reason it expresses Aristotelian commitments in language tailored to respond to Isocrates.

According to Jaeger (Development, 63) there is a “complete lack of connection” in the argumentation between 37.3-11 and 11-22. Düring saw the larger theme as “philosophical knowledge is knowledge of tools and is of essential value for a political leader” (Attempt, 179); but this bare statement does little more than conjoin the two issues for which Jaeger saw no connection. Düring conceived of the entire section as an abridgement of the original; his commentary expands it to slight improvement. The real connection is that both the use of tools and politics are instrumentally valuable, productive and practical sciences. Later it will be argued that as such they are subordinate to theoretical sciences. Rabinowitz considers (‘Sources’, 66-67) the arguments here to be condensations of Plato’s Statesman 287b-289c, implausibly.

37.11-16 This sentence establishes that only a science which commands and makes use of other sciences (such the productive sciences) has in itself the good in the strict sense, a premise to which Isocrates can also be committed.

37.11-13 μέν εἰσιν αἱ ποιοῦσαι ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ πλεονεκτημάτων ἐπιστήμαι, ἄλλαι δὲ αἱ χρώμεναι ταύταις: On the contrast between acquisition and use, see above note at 37.7-8. The terminology used in the formulation of this distinction between kinds of science here is interesting, but seems to coordinate with the familiar distinction between “practical” (πρακτική) and “productive” (ποιητική) science, both of which are frequently distinguished from “theoretical” (θεωρητική) science (Top. VI 6.145a15, Metaph. VI 1.1025b25, NE VI 2.1139a27). Unlike these passages, the productive and practical sciences are not at this point in the dialectic of the Protrepticus contrasted with the theoretical sciences. But productive science clearly corresponds to “the sciences that produce each of the things of which we want to have more,” and thus practical science to “the sciences that make use of those kind of sciences.” Aristotle argues that productive sciences subserve the practical ones in NE VI: “everyone who produces does so for the sake of something, and the product is not the end absolutely, but only relative to something; for the absolute end is what is to be done, because acting well is the end, and desire is for this” (1139b1-4).
37.13-14 μὲν αἱ ὑπηρετοῦσαι: See also below note on ἀνδροποδῶδες (40.6-7). The despotic idiom of the Protrepticus resonates with the argument of NE I.1-2, in which the account of subordination of sciences culminates in a description of political science—a paradigmatically practical science—as “the most authoritative and most overarching” (τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς, 1094a26-27). Similarly, in Metaph. I.2, Aristotle says that “the first principles and causes are the most knowable; for by reason of these, and from these, all other things are known, but these are not known by the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows that for the sake of which each thing is the most overarching of the sciences and more overarching than any subordinate one (ἀρχικωτάτῃ δὲ τῶν ἐπίστημῶν καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικῆ τῆς ὑπηρετοῦσῃς (982b4-5) and this end is the good in each class and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature” (982b2-7; cf. NE iv 1, and viii 3). This idea of subordination of sciences is integrated into Aristotle’s philosophy of science where he holds that one science (usually a productive and empiric science) is “under” another (usually a mathematical and theoretical science) for the purposes of scientific explanation (ὑπὸ, APo. I.7.75b15; see ὑποκειμένως δόξας at DCM XXVI.80.6 and note ). See McKirahan, ‘Subordinate Sciences’; and Johnson, ‘Aristotelian Explanation’. See also ὑπηρήσαι in the Antidosis of Isocrates, quoted below on note 37.15.

37.14 ἑτεραι δὲ αἱ ἐπιτάττουσαι: See below 37.18. In Metaph. I.2, Aristotle explains the significance of this designation: “of the sciences, that which is more desirable for its own sake and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not be commanded but must command (ἐπιτάττειν), and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey him” (982a14-19, tr. Ross, modified). Consistent with both this and the Protrepticus is the definition of intelligence in NE VI 10 as an “commanding” kind of knowledge, in opposition to understanding, which only judges: ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστὶν, τί γὰρ δεὶ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστὶν, ἡ δὲ σὺνειδὸς κριτικὴ μόνον (1143a8). Having a “commanding” kind of knowledge is not the summit of value, however. God, as Aristotle argues at the end of the EE, is not a commanding ruler, but is the end for the sake of which commands are issued (οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχον ὁ θεός, ἀλλ’ οὐ ἐνεκα ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιτάττει) (EE VII 15.1249b14).

37.15 ἡγεμονικώτεραι: Cf. ἀρχικώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἡγεμονικόν at Protr. VII 41.27-28. This conceptual scheme of despotism and leadership as applied to psychological and epistemological issues is common in Isocrates, as in the Antidosis: “Our nature is compounded of two parts, the bodily and that of the soul, and no one would deny that of these two the soul is more of a natural leader (ἡγεμονικώτεραν πεφυκέναι) and is of greater weight; for it is the function of the soul to deliberate both on personal and on public questions, and of the body to be servant (ὑπηρήσαι) to the judgments of the mind” (180, trans. Norlin, adapted). The continuation of this line of thought (in both Isocrates and Aristotle’s Protrepticus) is a comparison between gymnastics and philosophy; see note below on 38.16.


37.16-22 This sentence builds on the previous one 37.11-16 to argue that philosophy is the only science that includes correct rational judgment and unerring
practical prescriptions. This premise is also one to which Isocrates can commit himself, so he is also committed to the conclusion that we should do philosophy. The terms of this argument from 37.11-22 form a highest common factor of the theses that Aristotle is prepared to share with Isocrates.

37.16-17 ή τοῦ κρίνειν ἔχουσα τὴν ὀρθότητα: See below, note on 37.20-22.

37.18-19 ἐπιτάττειν κατά φύσιν δύναται: For ἐπιτάττειν, see above, note on 37.14. Which verb does κατά φύσιν go with? The point seems to be about an “ability to give orders in accordance with nature” (as opposed to giving “incorrect” orders), and not about a “natural ability to give orders” (although this translation is possible, and would be appropriate in a reference to natural slavery or patriarchy; these issues are connected regardless of the translation). For further commentary, see Mansion, ‘Contemplation’, 58-59. We take it that the former is the correct construal, and that further detail about how this comes about is offered by ‘Aristotle’ in the comments cited in Iamb. Protr. X; this chapter focuses tightly on the need for an understanding of nature in the work of a genuine politician.

37.19-20 φιλοσοφήτευν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου: See above note on 37.9. During (Attempt, 25-26, 185) brackets these words because it would repeat φύσειν φιλοσοφίαν from his B53 (40.1-11). But this is absurd, because these texts only came into proximity through his reordering and there is no reason to doubt that they appeared in the source text.

37.20-22 ὃς μόνης φιλοσοφίας τὴν ὀρθὴν κρίσιν καὶ τὴν ἀναμάρτητον ἐπιτακτικήν φρόνησιν ἐν ἐαυτῇ περιεχούσης: The program implicit in this comment is carried out later in the Protrepticus: Aristotle specifies what sort of ‘correct judgment’ might be expected of a philosopher assessing remarks by experts such as mathematicians (see DCM 27 84.21-85.3 together with the parallel passage in Proclus, In Euclid I, Prologue I, ch.11 32.23-33.2, and comments ad loc.); he also outlines what philosophical or methodological confusions tend to bring about errors (see Proclus, In Euclid I, Prologue I, 34.20-35.6, and note ad loc.)

The idea of unerring wisdom is attributed to Aristotle in a fragment of Chrysippus: “From these facts, they say, it follows that wise men cannot be deceived or err, and do all things well, as Aristotle says (τούτοις δὲ ὃς φασίν ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ τῶν σοφῶν ἀνεξαπατήτους έισαι καὶ ἀναμαρτήτους κατ’ Ἀριστοτέλην)” (Pap. Herc. 1020 = SVF II.131, p. 41.23 = Ross, Politicus, frag. 5, OT XII, p. 71). What work of Aristotle did Chrysippus have in mind? Furley, ‘rev. of Rab.’, rightly argues that we need not assume that it was the Protrepticus, but this does seem very likely, given that Chrysippus was himself an author of protreptic works and it is reasonable to assume that he had read Aristotle’s (the anecdote of Teles describes Chrysippus’s teacher Zeno of Citium as reading Aristotle’s Protrepticus). If Aristotle’s Protrepticus is the source for the comment by Chrysippus, it was probably in a zone of the dialogue in which ‘Aristotle’ expressed himself in terms of ‘wisdom’ rather than ‘intelligence’ (the preferred term of Isocrates); on Aristotle’s alternations between ‘wisdom’ and ‘intelligence’, see note on Protr. XII at 59.27-28. For ἐπιτακτικὴν see above note on 37.14.
37.22-26 attribution and voice: Editors agree that 37.22 represents a major division in the argument; Walzer and Ross here separate fragment 4 from fragment 5, and Düring imagines the next part of Aristotle’s text to be the beginning of Iamblichus’ Protr. IX, and the next part of Iamblichus’ Protr. VI as coming from rather later in Aristotle’s text (and a similar transposition is hypothesized also for 40.1, below). This reordering of the texts makes the argument less, not more, coherent.

The passage is a navigational one, and it corresponds to the two bridge passages and the concluding passage that follow (at 39.9-13, 40.12-15, and 41.2-5). So it is stated that philosophy is: (1) possible (δυνατά), see 38.20 and 39.5-6; (2) beneficial (ωφέλιμο), see 39.12; and (3) easy (ράος), see 37.26 and 40.15-41.2. For this reason it could be that Iamblichus has written this navigational paraphrase (so de Strycker, ‘Fragment 5a’, 77). These three points—that philosophy is possible, beneficial, and easy—are also mentioned, in this order, in a navigational and then a summarizing passage at DCM XXVI 82.14-17 and 83.2-5. On the other hand, these three points are rhetorical commonplaces of deliberative rhetoric (see, e.g., Anaximines Lampsacus 13.6-15.5 Spengel-Hammer), and so Iamblichus is probably preserving information about the number, order, and content of arguments on this topic in Aristotle’s Protrepticus. For this reason we keep this section in plain type. It is possible that the DCM passages are further compressions of this passage.

37.23 παραδεικτέον: In Cat. 5 Aristotle twice uses παραδεχομετό (4a28-9 and 4b4), to mean “one must grant” or “one must concede”, which seems to be what is meant here too, and so one is tempted to emend the text. The term παραδεικτέον, however, is used by Iamblichus in a different work (DCM 8 Festa), and appears in all the MSS. The received text may therefore provide evidence of Iamblichean intervention, and so emendation may distort Iamblichus’ manipulation of the text. Pistelli’s conjecture to ἀποδεικτέον would bring this word in line with the verbs at 40.13 and 41.2 (cf. Galen ed. Kuhn v.1, p. 154). But here we seem to have a different idea. The same problem precludes acceptance of Düring’s conjecture παραδεικτέον. Other possible conjectures could point to Iamblichus’ use of the terms ἐπιδείξαι (“display”) at 38.3, and ἀποδείχθαι (“demonstrate”) at Protr. VI 40.13 and 41.2-5 = DCM 26 82.14-17 and 83.2-5.

37.26 τὰ γὰρ ῥάω πάντες ἠδιον πονούμεν: See further below at 40.19-20, where the willingness of people to labor with pleasure at philosophy is held to be an indication of “the easiness of philosophy” (τῆς περίτην φιλοσοφίαν ... ῥαστώνης); and compare the texts referenced in the note at 38.21-22 on γνώσαι χαλεπωτέρων. The variant reading ποιούμεν for πονούμεν in V, and the apparently independently proposed emendations to the same of Arcerius (p. 28), and Flashar (Fragmente, 182) would not only render the thought more banal but also break the connection with ποιεῖν in the same argument, below at 40.23-24.

<VI 37.26-38.14: commentary>

37.26-38.3 attribution: This telegraphic overview seems to be Iamblichus introducing the content of several topics (speeches) of discussion that follow.

37.26-38.3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰς περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων, ἢτι δὲ περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τῆς ἀλλης ἀληθείας
This passage has generated a lot of controversy over whether we have here a twofold (Rabinowitz, de Strycker) or a threefold (Jaeger, 84; Walzer 28n1; Wilpert 32n13) division of philosophy (see Düring, ‘in the Protr.’, 89; de Strycker, ‘Frag. 5a’, 78-79n1). It is said to be easy to demonstrate that it is possible to acquire knowledge about both: (a) the just and the expedient; and (b) about nature and the rest of truth. But it is unclear whether (b) is meant as a single group, or whether we are to understand a further division: (b) nature and (c) the rest of truth.

A parallel passage in the Topics might suggest a threefold division. Aristotle says that of “propositions and problems” there are three divisions, “for some are ethical propositions, some are on natural science, while some are logical” (1.14.105b20). The arguments of Protrepticus 38.3-39.8 could be construed as corresponding to these divisions. In 38.3-38.14 are general epistemological observations about how all knowledge happens (“logical propositions”), by means of orderly causes and principles. In 38.14-22 are arguments about how we can acquire knowledge about practical things (“ethical propositions”). In 38.22-39.8 are arguments about we can acquire knowledge about nature (“natural science”). On the other hand, the interpretation that sees a twofold division corresponding to practical-productive sciences on the one hand, and theoretical sciences on the other, is tempting in its simplicity and insofar as it fits the context perfectly. See the comments above on 37.11-13. See also the note on 38.3 below, where the overlapping text in DCM XXVI at 81.7 reads: άει γάρ γνωριμώτερα ἀμφότερα. The likely presence of ἀμφότερα in the source text supports the interpretation that a twofold (rather than threefold) distinction was being made.

38.1 περὶ τῶν δίκαιων καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων: That there is a science of the just and expedient is taken by de Strycker, ‘5a’, to be a thesis which is demonstrated and then restated as a final conclusion at 39.9-13.

38.1-2 περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τῆς ἀλληλείας ἀληθείας ἐπιστήμας: Cf. DCM XXVI 79.12-13: περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀληθείας φρόνησιν. We are now speaking not just of “intelligence” but “sciences” concerned with nature and the rest of truth. Note that ἐπιστήμας is plural here, but singular in the restatement as a conclusion at 39.10.

For this sense of ἀληθείας see Phd. “investigate the truth of things” (σκοπεῖν τῶν ὑστέρων τὴν ἀληθείαν) (99e6). Aristotle follows this usage in extant works: “The first of those who studied philosophy were misled in their search for truth and the nature of things (τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν ὑστερων) by their inexperience” (Phys. 191a24-6); φιλοσοφήσαντας περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (Metaph. 983b2-3; cf. MM 1182a24-29 NE 1103b33.)

For this use of ἀλληλείας see Smyth 1273 (citing Xen., Anab. 1.3.3) and Pl., Symp. “intelligence and the rest of virtue (φρόνησιν τε καὶ τὴν ἀλλήλην ἀρετήν)” (209a3-4).

38.2-3 ἐπιστήμας δυνατοὶ λαβεῖν ἐσμέν: Cf. δύνατοι λαβεῖν αὐτῆς ἐσμέν below at 38.20 and then δυνατοὶ λαβεῖν αὐτῶς ἐσμέν at 39.10-11, at which see the note regarding the shift from plural ἐπιστήμας to singular αὐτῆς and back to plural again with αὐτῶς.

38.3-14 attribution and voice: Protr. VI 38.3-7 = DCM 26 81.7-9; and 38.10-14 = 81.12-16. Jaeger holds that the materials here are entirely Aristotelian, but that
Iamblichus has severely affected their arrangement. Iamblichus, he writes, “has used Aristotle’s ideas as building stones, and crudely forced them into his own miserable framework. No trace of the original architecture remains” (Development, 64). De Strycker, ‘5a’, 82-84 argues that this text is the primary version of which DCM 26 is secondary. Düring (Attempt, 198-199, 200-201) follows de Strycker’s interpretation; for further commentary see: Krämer 1959, 352; Gaiser 1963, 504.

De Strycker, ‘5a’, sees the following syllogism at work in the whole stretch of argument from 37.26-38.3. 1. Thesis: There is a science of the just, natural, and true (37.26-38.3); 2. Principle: (38.3-5); 3. Major premise: science applies more to things that are determinate, ordered, and causal (38.5-7); 4. Minor premise: determinate, ordered, and causal apply more to things that are good and prior (38.7-14); 5. Application of the principle to the thesis: the soul and nature are better and prior (38.14-39.8); 6. Final conclusion, restatement of the thesis: science applies more to the good and the prior (i.e. soul and nature) (39.9-13).

We share de Strycker’s interpretation (see our overview of the relations between Protr. VI and DCM XXVI, on p.=NN), and attribute the arguments to Aristotle, and we also hold that they were made in his own voice. In the Corpus, Aristotle very frequently distinguishes between things “better known to us, and things better known by nature.” It is very likely that what we have here in the Protrepticus is an early version of this idea. Compare, for example, APo. I 2: “Things are prior and more cognizable in two ways; for it is not the same to be prior by nature and prior in relation to us, nor to be more cognizable and more cognizable to us. I call prior and more cognizable in relation to us what is nearer to perception, prior and more cognizable absolutely what is farther away. What is most universal is farthest away, and the particulars are nearest; and these are opposite to each other” (71b33-72a5; cf. APr. II 23.68b35-7; Top. VI 4.141b5-8, passim; Phys. I 1; Metaph. V 8.1017b7-19, 1019a1-4, 1029b3-12, XIV 3.1090b5-7; NE 1095b2f., 1106b29; EE 1218a1-15). See also Plato, Phil. 65a.

38.3-5 ἄει γὰρ γυνωριμότερα τὰ πρῶτερα τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῶν φύσιν τῶν χειρόνων: Compare the overlap in DCM 26 at 81.7: ἄει γὰρ γυνωριμότερα ἀμφότερα; this is possibly the correct reading. The presence of ἀμφότερα supports the interpretation that a twofold (rather than threefold) distinction is being made at 37.26-38.3 (see note ad loc.).

38.5 ὁρισμένων καὶ τεταγμένων: Proclus, cites “Aristotle” as author of an argument to the conclusion that mathematics deals with beautiful things, because it deals with determinate, orderly, and symmetrical things, and these are the chief forms of beauty. (See our commentary on Proclus in Euc. chapter 9 for arguments that Proclus is paraphrasing from Aristotle’s Protrepticus.) For Proclus, this is part of the second argument made in defense of mathematics against “certain contentious persons” who attack mathematics. The first argument addresses the charge of uselessness. The second argument (in Euc. 26.10-27) answers the claim that mathematics has no share of the good, by showing that the objects of mathematics are beautiful.

Aristotle says at Metaphysics XIII 3 that the chief forms of beauty are “order, symmetry, and definiteness (τοξίς καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὁρισμένον)” (1078b1). Beauty is also defined at Pol. 1326a33 and Poet. 7.1450b-51 in terms of order and magnitude (μεγεθεί), where it is clear that magnitude implies “definiteness” (cf. [Pl.], Def. 413d). The context of the Metaphysics discussion is a proof that mathematics deals
with things that are beautiful, and so those who detract from mathematics by arguing that it deals with neither the good nor the beautiful are wrong. This is course relevant to this section of the Protrepticus because we are here in a zone in which a speaker is replying to an attack on mathematics because it is useless (i.e. does not relate to goodness or beauty). See DCM XXVI 82.23-25 (and commentary ad loc. for our arguments that the source is Aristotle’s Protrepticus) where it is asserted (without subsequent argument) that knowledge of mathematics is superior to all other kinds of knowledge, leading other occupations in “beauty and accuracy”.

Relevant to the present context is a fragment of the lost On Ideas that relates an argument in favor of the ideas on the grounds that the objects of science must be definite: “The things of which there are sciences must exist; now the sciences are concerned with things other than particular things; for the latter are indefinite and indeterminate, while the objects of science are determinate (απειρά τε και ἀόριστα, αἱ δὲ ἐπιστήμαι ὀρισμένων); therefore there are things other than the particulars, and these are the ideas” (fr. 3 Ross p. 122 = OT vol. XII p. 125). See further de Strycker, ‘5a’, 86-87.

38.6 ἐπιστήμη μᾶλλον ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων: A series of comparisons follow in which the first of a pair of opposites is said to be “more knowable” (“epistemologically prior” in other words) than its opposite, including: prior things / posterior things; better things in their nature / worse things in their nature; determinate and orderly things / indeterminate and disorderly; causes / effects; a decent person / a worthless person. Assuming the validity of these oppositions and the truth of its judgments about the relative epistemological priority, the argument will eventually show that the most knowable objects are at once the most orderly, the most determinate, and the best (and philosophy, especially mathematical philosophy, takes those as its objects). See below 38.8 and 10-11 for repeated use of μᾶλλον.

There is a different stretch of argument utilizing μᾶλλον in Protr. VII 57.6-58.10. There the issue is to which kinds of object terms like “living” and “knowing” apply to more, with the somewhat surprising result that philosophers can be said not only to know more, but also to be more alive. Nevertheless, the two arguments (here in VI and there in XI) are connected and together constitute further evidence for the unity of the source of Iamblichus’ Protr. VI-XI. For further commentary see: de Strycker, ‘μᾶλλον chez Aristote’, 303-304; ‘Predicats’, passim.

38.6-7 τῶν αἰτίων ἡ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων: See below note on 38.10-11 and, further, de Strycker, ‘Fragment 5a’, 91-93.

38.8 τεταγμένα τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν μᾶλλον: See above note on 38.6.

38.10-14: = DCM XXVI 81.12-16. The general line of thought here, that prior things are more causes of things than posterior things, was a sort of Academic axiom, as evidenced by de Strycker, ‘Fragment 5a’, at 93, adducing evidence from fragments of Aristotle’s On the Ideas, as well as Topics and Metaphysics. The particular development of this line of thought in terms of letters and syllables was also an Academic commonplace; see below, on 38.14. Plato was also responsible for bringing into philosophy the sequence line/plane/solid, on which see de Strycker, ‘Fragment 5a’, at 94, with rich illustration.

38.10-11 αἰτία τε μᾶλλον τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ὑστέρων: For μᾶλλον, see above on 38.6. But here the issue is not epistemological priority (ἐπιστήμη μᾶλλον),
but causal priority (αἰτία μᾶλλον). Above, at 38.8, causes were said to be more knowable (epistemologically prior) to their effects or results.

38.11-12 ἐκείνων γὰρ ἀναίρουμένων ἀναίρεται τὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔχοντα: “for if they are eliminated, then the things that have their substance <made> out of them are eliminated.” Aristotle applies this eliminative scheme to the scale of living things at Protr. VII 44.11-13, “if perception were eliminated then life itself would be eliminated (ἀναιρεύμου).” This is related to a citation at Protr. V 35.14-18 (see note ad loc.), in which he says “when perception and intellect are removed (ἀφαιρεθεῖσα), a human becomes pretty much like a plant.”

The use made of the eliminative scheme was one that Plato used, according to Aristotle at Metaphysics V 11, the entry on ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ in Aristotle’s so-called ‘philosophical lexicon’: some things can exist without other things, while the other things cannot exist without these (1019a3-4). Aristotle uses the idea of ‘eliminating the substance’ ἀναιρεῦμεν τὴν οὐσίαν in only two contexts, of which the main parallel is Metaphysics XIII 10 (see below, on 38.13-14, and compare L 5 1071a34-35, “the causes of substances may be treated as causes of all things, in the sense that when they are eliminated everything is eliminated.”) A less relevant parallel is Metaphysics IV 4, 1007a20; denying the law of non-contradiction will “eliminate the substance.” In other passages, what gets eliminated is something else than a substance: reason and/or discussion is at risk of being eliminated at Metaphysics IV 4 1006a26, XI 5 1062b11, and XI 6 1063b11; knowledge and the whole study of nature and the first principles of the sciences are at risk of being eliminated at Metaphysics II 2 994b20 and I 9 992b9 and Physics I 2 185a2; the position of the opponent is eliminated by the opponent himself, something that happens to the Platonists at Metaphysics I 9 990b17-22 (plus a doublet at XIII.4 1079a14-19) and also to those who deny the law of non-contradiction (IV 8 1012b15); both changing and coming into being are at risk of being eliminated at Metaphysics IX 3 1047a14 and a20, and also at Physics I 8 191b12; chance would be eliminated by arguments at Physics II 4 196a14; false theories like those of Democritus would eliminate “many established opinions and phenomena of the senses” (De Caelo III 4 303a23), and it is a strike against a theory of eternity like Plato’s that it eliminates “some of the data” (De Caelo I 12 283a6), and a strike against a theory of Ideas like Plato’s that it eliminates “many things” (Metaphysics XIII 7 1082b33).

38.13-14 μὴ καὶ μὲν ἄριθμῶν, ἐπί πεδα δὲ μηκῶν, στερεὰ δὲ ἐπί πέδων: “if numbers <are eliminated> then lines <are eliminated>, if lines then surfaces, and if surfaces then solids” The background to this idea is Academic discussion of constructive (‘Euclidean’) geometry, which Aristotle refers to in de Anima I 2.404b18-26 (referring to Tim. 53d). Alexander of Aphrodisias describes Aristotle setting out the Academic dogma on this point in On Philosophy (in Metaph. 117.23-118.1 = Ross, frag. 11, OCT p. 178, OT p. 83; see also in Metaph. 55.20-57.28 = Ross, frag. 2 of “On the Good”, OT p. 117-119). On this background, see Burkert, Lore and Science, 25n51, 43.

At Metaphysics XIII 2 1077a24-36, borrowing this Academic doctrine, Aristotle speaks of ‘generating’ first lines, then planes, then solids, which are composed respectively out of planes, lines, and points; and at I 9 992a10-24 (cf. XIII 13 1085a7-b4), he states the Academic view that planes “come from” wide and narrow (and lines from short and long, and solids from deep and shallow), whereas he wonders how planes could “contain” lines (or solids could contain lines and planes), and mentions that Plato
“often” laid it down that the first principle of lines was the indivisible line, which he (Aristotle) would prefer to refer to as a point. The idea crops up as a stock example elsewhere: as an example of priority, line is prior to surface (Metaphysics V 11 1018b37-1019a1); a line depends on points for its being, as does a triangle on lines (Posterior Analytics I 4 73a34-37); prior things are more cognizable than posterior things, as a point is more intelligible than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a solid (Topics VI 4 141b5-22; on this parallel see also below, on 39.7-8.)

Complications arise, however, when we take note that what we find in this passage of Protrepticus is not the sequence point/line/surface/solid, but the less geometrically accurate and more problematical sequence number/line/surface/solid. The radical solution is Pistelli’s conjecture at 38.13 στιγμών, to restore ‘points’ rather than ‘numbers’; but this solution is too radical for him to print in his text. Possibly Iamblichus made a textual alteration here based on his own philosophy of mathematics; but probably the example was accurately cited from Aristotle, and as such gives witness to an Academic analysis of points in terms of numbers, as he says at Metaphysics XIII 9 1085a32-33), referring to Platonists: “the point is thought by them to be not 1 but something like 1.” And this correspondence would make sense, given Aristotle’s characterization of the “limits of body” as “surface, line, point, and unit” (Metaphysics VII 2 1028b15-17), and his comment at Posterior Analytics I 27 that the respective basic entities in geometry and arithmetic, the point and the unit, differ just because the latter lacks a position.

Complications about the metaphor of number/line/surface/solid were part of the reason that Rabinowitz denied the Aristotelian provenance of these lines. According to him, “It will be noted that at Protr. 37.22-41.5 the author writes as one committed to a doctrine according to which lines are generated from numbers, planes from lines, and solids from planes. Whoever may have been the originator of this doctrine, it is at least clear that Aristotle did not hold it, for he knows and attacks the doctrine as a Platonist tenet again and again in the Metaphysics,” referring to 9 passages in that book (‘Sources’ p.85, with note 132, emphasis added). It will be noted by us in reply (with Gadamer, ‘Aristotelische Protreptikos’, 158), that Aristotle expresses no commitment about the metaphysical details of this idea, which were indeed elaborated by certain Platonists (Plato or Xenocrates according to Burkert, Lore and Science, p. 25) and rejected by Aristotle in the passages cited by Rabinowitz; he was simply using it as an immediately comprehensible example of two senses of ‘priority’. This objection by Rabinowitz was refuted in Furley’s review of his book (at 180), in Düring’s Attempt (at 200-201), and in Hutchinson & Johnson’s ‘Authenticating’ (at 274-275). At Metaphysics V 8 1017b17-21, Aristotle repeats the same idea as here expressed in the Protrepticus, but in reverse: “a body is eliminated by the elimination of the plane, as some say, and the plane by that of the line; and in general number is thought by some to be this sort of thing, for if it is eliminated, they say, nothing exists.” Even in two of the passages cited by Rabinowitz, Aristotle mentions as familiar the priority of numbers (not points) to lines, planes, and solids: “we find similar difficulties in the case of the kinds posterior to number—the line, plane, and solid” (Metaphysics XIII 9 1085a7-9); “nor can it be explained either how the lines and planes and solids that come after the numbers exist or will exist” (Metaphysics I 9 992b13-15). If more refutation of Rabinowitz’s way of arguing is needed, a more nuanced study of the 9 passages adduced by him shows that Aristotle’s main concern is
with the Platonists’ incorrect belief in the separate real existence of geometrical entities such as lines, surfaces, and solids (992b13-18, 1001b26-1002b11, 1028b16-27, 1060b6-19, 1076b11-39, 1080a12-b36); they are not the sort of thing of which material bodies could be literally composed (1077a24-36); they cannot be constructed out of the Form of Large and Small (1085a7-b34); and to them cannot be ascribed a real existence on the grounds that the point is the limit of the line and the line is the limit of the plane (1090b5-32). Nothing in these passages contradicts Aristotle’s claim in our passage that the simpler mathematical entities are existentially prior to more complex ones; all the perplexities in these passages revolve around issues about the particular mode of existence that mathematical entities may or may not have, or how these simple mathematical elements are built up out of yet more primitive elements, such as Large and Small.

38.14 στοιχεῖα δὲ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων συλλαβῶν: “letters <are causes more> than what are named ‘syllables’.” The construal of this phrase is tricky; it seems to be continuing the immediately preceding line of thought and asserting that when syllables are eliminated, then so are elements; yet this gets the thought upside down. As a solution, a Byzantine or Renaissance scholiast on this passage says, “it should be construed thus: στοιχείων δὲ οἱ ονομαζόμεναι συλλαβοί”, viz. ‘when the elements are eliminated, the things named syllables <are eliminated>,’ and the scholiast adduces a chiastic phrase from Iliad IV.535 as alleged evidence for the possibility of this construal. Wilpert and Düring both adopted the scholiast’s construe. Kiesling’s conjecture (see his note ad loc., p. 107) reverses the order of elimination so that the elimination of syllables results in the elimination of the things called elements (/letters). Rose (1886, 61n1) deleted the words, presumably on the basis of their absence in the overlapping DCM XXVI at 81.16 (although no reason is given by Rose). De Strycker puzzled over the phrase (‘Fragment 5a’, at 80, note 2), noting the history of its construals and conjectures. To us the awkwardness seems merely an artefact of the selection process of Iamblichus, which makes the overall shape of the line of reasoning at times unclear simply by shortening it; the phrase construes nicely when governed by the parallel above at 38.10-11, the phrase that precedes what we mark in parentheses.

On the concept στοιχείων, see Wilpert, ‘Zwei arist.’, 128-140 and de Strycker, ‘fragment 5a’, 98-100. The word στοιχείων, in the phrase στοιχείων φωνῆς, refers to a ‘letter’ in an alphabet that represents spoken discourse, and then Plato seems to have applied it by transference to refer to the one of the primitive ‘elements’ that make up the complexes which we encounter in reality. The letters are causes more than syllables are causes, argues ‘Aristotle’ at this point of the Protrepticus, because if there weren’t letters there wouldn’t be syllables; they are existentially prior to syllables. At 39.7-8 Aristotle makes the different but related claim that letters are cognitively prior to syllables, which are cognitively prior to the speech (λόγος) which they make up. The closest parallel to these two related claims is Metaphysics XIII 10, where Aristotle explores certain paradoxes that can arise from the necessary presupposition that there are separately existing things in the world that are made up of first principles and ‘elements’; Aristotle elaborates the paradoxes in terms of ‘letters’ and syllables.

By recycling the familiar metaphor of letter, syllable, word, and phrase to stand for various levels of analysis of reality, from primitive elements up to complex wholes, Aristotle alludes to a central idea expressed in a series of passages in some of Plato’s later
works. At Statesman 278cd, the Visitor makes the comparison between individual letters in complex syllables and simple elements in the long ‘syllables’ of reality, having commented at 277e-278a that the length and complexity of a syllable can destabilize the knowledge of the letter in a learning mind. Similarly, at Theaetetus 204a the parallel is explicitly drawn between the complex formed of syllables (words) and the complex formed of elements (things); for more on this passage, see below, on 39.7-8. At Timaeus 48bc, Timaeus asks some deep questions about earth, air, water, and fire: how did they come to be? what were they like before that? “We tend to posit these as the στοιχεία of the universe and say that they are its ὀρχάς, but they are not as fundamental even as syllables – only someone short on intelligence could find that plausible,” referring to Empedocles and perhaps others. Later, as if to answer these deep questions about what can be considered an ‘element’, Timaeus suggests that the pyramidal shape is the στοιχείον of fire, and that the constituent types of triangle which make up all material substance are themselves στοιχεία (56b and 57c), thus reaching a deeper level of analysis. The report of Eudemus of Rhodes (fr. 31 Wehrli = Simpl. in Phys. 7.10-14), that Plato distinguished elementary first principles from other ones and was the first to call these first principles στοιχεία, is plausible; it was probably based on this passage together with his knowledge of Aristotle’s history of philosophy. According to Favorinus in the 8th book of his Miscellaneous Histories, Plato was the first to introduce into philosophy certain of its key terms, including δισελεκτิกή and στοιχείον (D.L. III.24). In a rather different metaphor, Socrates introduces the idea of ‘moral literacy’ at Republic III 402bc; just as literacy involves knowledge of the basic letters that when variously combined make up many different words, so we state-designers should focus on the various forms of the basic virtues that get combined into many different moral personalities.

To the Academics of the mid-fourth century, ‘syllable’ was a key term, as witnessed in [Plato], Definitions 414d-e, where ‘syllable’ appears in a group of 9 linked definitions of linguistic entities, including ‘letter’ or στοιχείον φωνῆς. The locus classicus for the idea that words can be analyzed into syllables which can be analyzed into different sounds such as vowels and consonants and semivowels and then analyzed into different letters is Plato’s Cratylus 424c-425a; this was evidently the procedure by which Theuth discovered the alphabet for the use of humanity (Philebus 18b-19a). A similar analysis is offered by Aristotle in Poetics 20 1456b20-34, but he quickly tires of the subject, suggesting that it is better if the details are left to those who make a particular study of metre. According to another Academic author, this is the very thing that Hippias of Elis was said to do ([Plato], Greater Hippias 285d). Those who are working on their speech rhythms “first divide off the forces or powers of the letters or elements, then those of syllables, and only then” investigate the rhythms that are made out of those components (Cratylus 424bc), indicating that ‘syllable’ was a term of art. Syllables in themselves are not significant (Aristotle, De Interpretatione 4 16b31), and are not synonymous with the letters which make them up (Topics VI.13 150b20). Speech can be measured by short and long syllables (Categories 6 4b33, Metaphysics XIV.3 1087b30), individual words can be lengthened by extra syllables (Poetics 21 1458a2), syllables can be ugly (Rhetoric III.2 1405a31), and the syllables of one word can be rhyming and chiming with those of another word in apposition ([Aristotle], Rhetoric to Alexander 28 1436a10).
All the above evidence points to the hypothesis that these terms entered Academic philosophy from literary theory. Düring offers no support for his claim (Attempt, p.202) that “the comparison letter – element was first used (and perhaps invented) by Democritus in order to illustrate the form, arrangement and position of the atoms ... it then became a stock illustration.” This had been the view of Diels, in his Elementum, eine Vorarbeit zum griechischen und Lateinischen Thesaurus (Leipzig, 1899), but it was debunked by W. Burkert, in ‘ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ. Eine semasiologische Studie’ Philologus 103 (1959), 167-97, followed by Michael Wigodsky, ‘HOMOIOTETES, STOICHEIA, and HOMOIOMERELAI in Epicurus’, Classical Quarterly 57 (2007), 521-542, at 523-6.

In Aristotle’s works, a central text expressing the application of the ‘letters’ idea to the ‘elements’ of the universe is Physics II.3 195a16; just as the material is a cause of an artificial product made out of it, so too “letters are the causes of the syllables” which are made up out of letters, and fire and similar elements are causes of bodies which are made up out of elements (this passage is repeated verbatim at Metaphysics IV 2.1013b18, and the application of the idea is presupposed as familiar at Generation of Animals I.18 722a32). Aristotle explores the difference between heaps and structures with reference to ‘syllables’ at Metaphysics VII.17 1041b12 and VIII.3 1043b5; more than juxtaposition is needed to make letters into syllables rather than alphabet soup, and structure or form (not mere juxtaposition) is needed to turn elements into things rather than heaps.

But the most elaborate use of the syllable idea to illustrate paradoxes in the idea of elements making up complex things is Metaphysics XIII 10; let syllables stand for beings and let letters stand for the elements of which they are made, says Aristotle at 1086b22-24, and on one horn of the dilemma whether elements are individual or universal, each ‘syllable’ will be unique whereas, on the other horn, there will be infinitely many syllables. But what Aristotle does in this chapter is the fallacious tactic of infinite-or-nothing reasoning against which we are cautioned by Socrates at Philebus 16e-17a: “But nowadays the clever ones among us make a one haphazardly, and a many, faster or slower than they should; they go straight from the one to the unlimited and omit the intermediates. It is these, however, that make all the difference as to whether we are engaged with each other in dialectical or only in eristic discourse.” The eristic mistake is then deconstructed in terms of letters and their discovery by Theuth (see Stephen Menn, “Collecting the Letters” in Phronesis 53 (1998), 291-305). Was Aristotle one of the “clever ones,” mentioned by Socrates in Philebus? If so, when Aristotle says at Metaphysics M10 that he had already run such an eristic dilemma “in the Discussions of Problems,” could this be the title or label of an Academic document containing arguments of Aristotle, some of which were rebutted by Plato in his late Philebus?

The expression τῶν ὄνομαζομένων συλλαβῶν at 38.14 (“what are named syllables”) is to be compared to two related expressions encountered 13 times in surviving works of Aristotle, τά καλομένα στοιχεία and τά λέγομενα στοιχεῖα. (See Crowley, ‘Aristotle’s “So-Called Elements”’. ) Aristotle seems to have used such familiar expressions as τά καλομένα X to draw attention to some usage of the word X, whether common or novel, generally without any particular attitude of skepticism towards the propriety of that use of the word. In this popular work, Aristotle may be making allowances for an audience not conversant with the novel technical terms of the literary theorists, such as ‘syllable’; see above note. Another possibility is that he is calling attention to the etymology of the term, which literally means something like “bring
together” and so indicates that they are posterior to and dependent on the “elements” which are “brought together” in them.

<VI 38.14-22: commentary>

38.14-22 attribution and voice: We attribute this section to Aristotle and hold it to be in the same voice as the speaker of the previous and next words, i.e. Aristotle himself.

The argument that the existence of skills that improve the body (e.g., gymnastics and medicine) to the existence of skills that improve the soul is one with extensive parallels in both Plato and Aristotle, and many are noted by de Strycker, ‘5a’, 88-89.

38.15-16 ψυχή μὲν σώματος ἄμεινον (ἀρχικότερον γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ): See VII 41.29 and note ad loc.: ψυχή μὲν σώματος βέλτιον (ἀρχικότερον γὰρ). It has been argued just above at 37.3-37.11 that the soul uses the body like a tool and its parts as instruments (organs).

38.16 περὶ δὲ σώμα τέχναι καὶ φρονήσεις: This comparison between gymnastics for the body and philosophy for the soul was a part of Isocrates’ own educational advertisements, as in the Antidosis: “Since this is so, certain of our ancestors, long before our time, seeing that many arts had been devised for other things, while none had been prescribed for the body and for the soul (περὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν), invented and bequeathed to us two disciplines, physical training for the body, of which gymnastics is a part, and, for the soul, philosophy, which I am going to explain. These are twin arts--parallel and complementary--by which their masters prepare the soul to become more intelligent (φρονιμωτέρας) and the body to become more serviceable (χρήσιμωτέρα), not separating sharply the two kinds of education, but using similar methods of instruction, exercise, and other forms of discipline. For when they take their pupils in hand, the physical trainers instruct their followers in the postures which have been devised for bodily contests, while the teachers of philosophy impart all the forms of discourse in which the mind expresses itself” (Antidosis 181-3, trans. Norlin, adapted). This quotation is a continuation of the quotation of Antidosis 180 in note on 37.15 above, and by reading the passage continuously, one can see the arguments about the despotic relationship between the soul and body were already linked by Isocrates with the comparison between gymnastics and philosophy.

38.17 ἰατρική τε καὶ γυμναστική: These are stock examples in Plato, Apo. 20b, Grg. 464b3-465c1; Phd. 94d3-4; Clit. 409a2; Rep. 3.404b4-8; 405c8-d6; Soph. 226e8-227a1; Leg. X 889d6. But here the possibility of a skill and intelligence about the soul is proven by means of an a fortiori argument: since we agree that there is knowledge about the body in the form of the arts of medicine and gymnastics, and since the soul is prior to the body, we must agree (38.3-14), that the soul is even more knowable. In fact, we are necessarily more ignorant about our bodies than about our souls, and so it should be possible to develop techniques and knowledge about the soul, if it is possible for the body.

38.19 ψυχικὰς: The reading in F (and L) is clearly ψυχικὰς. Pistelli prints ψυχής without variant noted, in effect misreporting F; des Places misreports the reading as coming from Pistelli’s reading of F, and he wonders what the reading of F is); yet R and V do happen to have the reading ψυχής. ψυχικὰς never occurs in Plato. But in the Aristotelian context ψυχής would be a banalization; ψυχικὰς is a technical term developed and used by Aristotle in important texts, e.g. “psychic” pleasures (NE III 10.1117b28), “psychic” parts (An. II 12.424a23); “psychic origins” of motion (MA 10.703a12), especially in contexts of reproduction, with respect to both sexually and
spontaneously reproducing organisms (GA II 3.737a8, III 11.762a26,b17); and “psychic heat” as a cause of motion (GA III.11.762a20).

38.19-20 ἐπιμέλεια καὶ τήχη: Same exact phrase as Alc. 124b3 and thus parallel as well to the earlier ἐπιμελεία τε καὶ σοφία (123d3-4); compare τῇ αὕτῃ σοφίᾳ κτισμένος καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ (Meno 90a5).

38.20 δυνατοὶ λαβεῖν αὐτὴν ἐσμὲν: See above δυνατοὶ λαβεῖν ἐσμὲν at 38.2-3 and δυνατοὶ λαβεῖν αὐτὰς ἐσμὲν on 39.9-11 (and see note ad loc. regarding the shift from plural ἐπιστήμης to singular αὐτήν and back to plural again with αὐτὰς).

38.21-22 τῶν μετ’ ἀγνοίας πλείονος καὶ γνώναι χαλεπωτέρων: Compare the above use of τὴν χαλεπότητα … τὰ ράξω (37.22-26), which seems to assert that philosophy has as its object “difficult things”; whereas here gymnastics and medicine are said to be about things “more difficult to know” while they are being contrasted with philosophy.

In Metaphysics I 2, Aristotle considers it a criterion of the wise man that he “is able to cognize things that are difficult (τὰ χαλεπὰ) and not easy (μὴ ρᾴδια) for a human” (982a10-11). He then specifies that “the most universal things are the most difficult to cognize (χαλεπωτάτα τούτα γνωρίζειν), because they are furthest from the senses” (982a23-25). The argument of this part of the Protrepticus should be compared with the argument in the protreptic section of Parts of Animals I 5 about the relative difficulty of getting knowledge about the heavenly bodies than about animals (644b25-645a10). Aristotle says that despite the accuracy available to the student of the stars, the student of terrestrial things such as animals has access to “their greater and more frequent cognizability” (τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ πλείω γνωρίζειν αὐτῶν, 645a1-2). In such protreptic passages, it is common to mention the relative ease of the inquiry (e.g. the accessibility of the objects to cognition), even if the scientific knowledge is understood to be of “difficult” things. The same point is developed below, where Aristotle discusses indications of “the easiness of philosophy” (τής περὶ τὴν φιλόσοφίαν … ῥαστῶνης, 40.19-20). When Aristotle argues that philosophy is “easy”, he does not mean that it contains no difficulties or can be accomplished without effort. Rather he means that it is not exhausting and laborious: “thinking has more resemblance to a coming to rest or pausing than to a movement; the same may be said of inferring. It might be urged that what is difficult and forced is incompatible with happiness” (DA I 3.407a32-b1). Thinking, the activity that Aristotle’s god is continually and eternally absorbed in, is not wearisome to it (Metaphysics XII 9.1074b28).

<VI 38.22-39.8: commentary>

38.22-39.8 attribution and voice: 38.22-39.4: = DCM XXVI 81.20-24. We attribute this to Aristotle on the basis of strong verbal and philosophical parallels. This is a continuation of the speech in defense of theoretical philosophy, and in this section natural philosophy in particular. We can assume that the detractor of theoretical philosophy called into question the value of theoretical speculations into nature, as did Isocrates when he complained of the absurdity “of the ancient sophists, who maintain, some of them, that the sum of things is made up infinite elements; Empedocles that it is made up of four, with strife and love operating among them; Ion, of not more than three;
Iamblichus, Protrepticus chapter VI

Alcmaeon, of only two; Parmenides and Melissus, of one; and Gorgias of none at all” (Antidosis 268). The present speaker replies “whether it is fire or air or number or any other natures that are causes of and primary to other things, it would be impossible to be ignorant of these things and to recognize any of the other things” (39.4-5). A fragment of a papyrus (P.Vindob.G26008) fits in perfectly to complete this thought about the possibility of knowledge of nature: “they show that what things are composed of is not infinite, but the one says one, another two, another three, another four” (B.5-13). See our presentation of this evidence on pp. NN, which Glenn Most has attributed to the lost Protrepticus, rightly, we think.

38.23 τῶν αἰτίων καὶ τῶν στοιχείων: Düring was troubled by the terms being used synonymously, and assumes that it represents a stage of terminological development of the earlier Academy (Attempt, 201). But see the discussion of στοιχείων above at 38.14.

39.1 φρόνησιν ἢ τῶν ύστερων: Compare φρόνησις in a moral and presumably less fundamental sense at at P.Oxy.666 (iii.40 and iii.47), and at Iamb., Protr. V 34.17-35.18, VI 37.3-22 and 38.14-22, and VIII 46.22-47.4.


39.4 εἶτε ἀριθμός: Pythagoreans made numbers the principles and elements of nature according to Metaph. 986a1-2.

39.4-5 πῦρ εἰτ' ἄρη εἰτε ἀριθμός εἰτε ἄλλαι τινες φύσεις αἰτίαι καὶ πρῶται τῶν ἄλλων: According to Aristotle, both Anaximines and Diogenes of Apollonia considered air the original element (984a5); Heraclitus considers fire the element (984a7). The expression ἄλλαι τινες φύσεις could refer to the “roots” of Empedocles, the “forms” of Plato. Later ἔνωσ and ἔνδος would be called “natures” by Aristotle (e.g. Phys. 193a28-b5). Other candidates could be mentioned, such as the “seeds” of Anaxagoras or the “atoms” of Democritus.

39.7-8 πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἢ λόγου γνωρίζοι συλλαβάς ἃνυνοῶν, ἢ ταύτας ἐπίστατο μηδὲν τῶν στοιχείων εἰδῶς: “for how could anyone either be familiar with speech who was ignorant of syllables, or have knowledge of these who understands nothing of the letters?” See above, on 38.10-14, where Aristotle asserts the existential and causal priority of στοιχεία over συλλαβάς. In this passage, by contrast, he asserts the epistemological priority of letters to syllables, which themselves are epistemologically prior to higher complexes of speech. A comparable expression of epistemological priority is at Categories 12.14b2: in the science of grammar the letters are prior in order to the syllables, and in demonstrative sciences (such as geometry) the elements are prior to the constructions. This coheres well with the position that Plato had taken some trouble to elaborate in the key parallel passage in his Theaetetus 201e-206c. Socrates had dreamt of people saying that there was no knowledge possible of primary elements, which can only be named, not further specified; knowledge is possible only of the complexes that are made up of elements. But at 203e paradoxes begin to emerge about how the elements are combined into complexes, paradoxes set out in terms of letters and syllables, and centered around the ideas of sum and whole and part, as a result of which the dream theory is rejected, and the conclusion is “that the elements are much more clearly known, and the knowledge of them is more decisive for the mastery of any branch of study than knowledge of the complex” (206b).
In Aristotle’s works, the closest parallel to the idea expressed in Protrepticus is Topics VI 4: “What is prior without qualification is more cognizable than what is posterior, a point, for instance, than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a solid, just as a unit is more intelligible than a number, for it is prior to and a principle of all number. Likewise, also, a letter is more cognizable than a syllable. Whereas to us it sometimes happens that the converse is the case, for a solid falls under perception most of all, and a plane more than a line, and a line more than a point, for most people learn such things earlier, for any ordinary intelligence can grasp them, whereas the others require a precise and exceptional understanding. Absolutely, then, it is better to try to come to know what is posterior through what is prior, inasmuch as such a way of proceeding is more scientific. Of course, in dealing with persons who cannot recognize things through terms of that kind, it may perhaps be necessary to frame the account through terms that are familiar to them” (141b5-19 ROT, adapted). The somewhat snide tone of Aristotle’s comments here, together with the elaborate correspondence, between element/compound/thing and both letter/ syllable/word and point/line/plane/solid, suggest that in this Topics passage Aristotle is recalling the very zone of his Protrepticus from which Iamblichus is quoting in chapter VI, a zone of reasoning with snide comments directed against Isocrates.

39.9-40.1: commentary

39.9-13 attribution: This is a navigational passage, summarizing the preceding argument about the possibility of philosophy and fulfilling the plan described at 37.22-26 (see note ad loc.), and introducing the next answer to the apotreptic to philosophy, an argument about the usefulness and easiness of philosophy. According to de Strycker (‘5a’, 81), the thought at least is attributable to Aristotle; it is the conclusion of a syllogism, identical to the thesis stated at 37.26-38.3 (see note ad loc.). We leave it in plain text because it is seems that a longer summary of these conclusions has been compressed by Iamblichus, making it a ‘fast-forward’ paraphrase that preserves some information from the source text. The program is certainly Aristotelian, and the speaker ‘Aristotle’ may well have provided these navigational points in his original speech. In one of the chapters of the Rhetoric devoted to protreptic speech production, Aristotle advises that: “things are practicable in two senses: it is possible to do them; it is easy to do them” (1363a21-23). For arguments about the “easiness” of philosophy, see below at 40.20.

39.11 τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς περὶ ψυχῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη καὶ διότι δυνατοὶ λαβεῖν αὐτάς ἐσμεν: Although Iamblichean intervention is certainly possible here in a navigational passage, one need not agree with Düring’s suggestion (Attempt, 62 and 202) that Iamblichus has changed what was ἐστιν ἐπιστήμαι in Aristotle’s text to ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη. The plural ἐπιστήμαι is used in a transitional passage of Iamblichus at 38.2-3, but the singular ἑπιστήμη is used at 38.20 (in the voice of Aristotle). Further, there is no difficulty in construing “a science of truth and <a science> of virtue concerning the soul, and for this reason we will be able to acquire them.”

39.11 περὶ αὐτῶν: Düring (p. 202) points out that the pleonastic use of αὐτῶν is common in Aristotle; see Bonitz 125a40-46.

39.11 ὁ τι δὲ <καί>: Düring accepts the reading of the parallel passage at DCM 81.24; but both seem to be paraphrases on the part of Iamblichus.

39.13-40.1 attribution and voice: We attribute this entire section to Aristotle, and think that it was part of the same speech in defense of theoretical philosophy given in response
to Isocrates’ attack on theoretical philosophy. 39.16-40.1 = DCM XXVI 82.1-11. But it looks to us like the Protrepticus version has preserved more of the argument, in fact the major premise: that we all agree that the stronger by nature should rule.

39.13-16: Allan, ‘explanatory notes’, 228-230, emends the text by parallel to Pol. III (1281a33 cf. Metaph. I 2.982a17-19, 1287a28; NE V 10.1134b35, 10.10.1180a18-24). But there is no reason to think that Iamblichus’ text should have contained that construction. Flashar calls this (Fragmente, 184) “unsinnig verkürztes Referat des Iamblichos”.

39.13 πάντες γὰρ ὁμολογούμεν: Who exactly is the “we” that are all agreeing about the nature of political authority? One has only to consider the speech of Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias (482e-484c) and Socrates’ attack on it (488b-490b) to appreciate the widespread disagreement about such matters.

That “we all agree” that the strongest or more excellent ought to rule and have authority over the law would not be disputed by Isocrates, who uses the point to argue that the behavior of those in power should be followed by their subjects just as they obey the law. “Obey the laws established under the kings as well, yet consider the strongest law to be their behavior, for just as in a democracy a politician must serve the masses so too it makes sense for someone who has settled a monarchy to revere the king” (Dem. 36). The same sentiment is expressed in the Antidosis: “Pattern after the character of kings, and follow closely their ways. For you will thus be thought to approve them and emulate them, and as a result you will have greater esteem in the eyes of the multitude and a surer hold on the favor of royalty. Obey the laws which have been laid down by kings, but consider their manner of life your highest law. For just as one who is a citizen in a democracy must pay court to the multitude, so also one who lives under a monarchy should revere the king” (36, trans. Norlin). For Aristotle’s own description of a pertinent point on which not everyone agrees, see next note.

39.13-14 δεῖ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίοτατον ἀρχεῖν καὶ τῶν τὴν φύσιν κράτιστον: The context necessary to interpret these words is contained in Politics I 6, where Aristotle discusses the positions of the various disputants about the justice or injustice of slavery (before attempting to justify so-called “natural” slavery), and argues that the heart of the matter is (1) who should rule and (2) what role should superiority in strength or force play in the determination: “Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and what makes the views invade each other’s territory, is as follows: in some sense excellence, when furnished with means, has actually the greatest power of exercising force: and as superior power (τὸ κράτους) is only found where there is excellence of some kind, power seems to imply excellence, and the dispute to be simply one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill, while the other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger (τὸ τῶν κρείττονα ἀρχεῖν)). If these views are thus set out separately, the other views have no force or plausibility against the view that the superior in excellence ought to rule or be master” (1255a11-21 ROT). This shows that we need not interpret this premise in the Protrepticus to require that “might makes right”. On the contrary, the identification of “stronger by nature” with “superior in force” is a mistake, Aristotle argues, because “stronger by nature” is to be identified with “superior in excellence”. Precisely the same point is being argued for here in the Protrepticus.

39.15 τῶν δὲ νόμων ἀρχοντα καὶ κύριου εἶναι μόνον: A strong statement about the rule of law, more refined than what we find in Herodotus: δεσπότης νόμος (7.104.18). Isocrates in To Demonicus 36 presents an altogether weaker exhortation to follow the law and the king.
During asserts that these words do not reproduce the original (Attempt, 203), and the scholiast mentions a difficulty with μόνω (153.11-13 des Places). But we do not see a difficulty in construing the words as they stand.

39.15-16 οὗτος δὲ φρόνησις τις καὶ λόγος ἀπὸ φρονήσεως ἑστιν: Cf. NE X 10, “the law has a compulsive power, while it is at the same time an account proceeding from a kind of intelligence and intellect (φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ)” (1180a21-2).

39.16-40.1: = DCM XXVI 82.1-11.

39.17 τίς ἡμῖν κανών ἐν τίς ὀρός: In the version transmitted in DCM XXVI, this is not put as a rhetorical question and the pronoun has dropped out; this is an example of the phenomenon of ‘dialogue excision’ on the part of Iamblichus.

Aristotle uses this terminology throughout the Protrepticus. In Protr. X Aristotle mentions an artefactual “standard” or “ruler” (κανών, 54.25), and later “criteria” (ὀροὺς, 55.1) taken from nature itself, i.e. the truth, by reference of which to judge what is just and noble and beneficial” (55.1-3). DCM XXVII contains a discussion of the “criteria” (ὀροὺς, 84.9) that must be observed in mathematical investigations—the discussion is parallel to the discussion in PA 11 of “certain criteria (ὀροὺς) with reference to which one appraises the manner of exposition” (639a13-14).

Two parallel passages in the NE are crucial to the interpretation of these terms used in the context of the Protrepticus, the first in III 7, “the serious man judges each thing correctly, and perceives the truth in each thing. For each condition has an idea of the fine and pleasant, and perhaps the serious man differs from others most be seeing the truth in each thing, being as it were the standard and measure of them (ἔσοπρερ κανῶν καὶ μέτρων αὐτῶν ὦν)” (1113a29-33). The second is NE X 5, in which it is said that “excellence and the good man are the measure of each thing”: ἑστιν ἐκαστοῦ μέτρων ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἀγαθός (1176a17-18). Medicine is used to illustrate this point in the highly parallel passage of EE VIII 3: “Since the doctor also has a criterion (ὀρός) by reference to which he judges what is healthy for the body and what is not, and with reference to which each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is healthy, while if less or more is done health is no longer the result, so in regard to actions and choice of what is naturally good but not praiseworthy, the good man should have a criterion (ὁρός) both of disposition and of choice and avoidance, with regard to a large or small amount of wealth and good fortune, the criterion being, as above said, as reason directs” (1249a21-b3 ROT, adapted). Düring (Attempt, 203-206), in discussing the Platonic background, emphasizes the importance of Theaetetus 178b, 179b, and 183c.

39.17 ἀκριβέστερος: See below τάς ἀκριβείας (40.19). The intellectual virtue of precision or accuracy is repeatedly mentioned in the Protrepticus. In DCM XXIII, the issue of the accuracy of demonstrations is introduced (τῶν ἀποδείξεων ἀκριβείαιν, 71.2). In DCM XXVI the issue of the accuracy of opinion is raised (ἡκριβολεύονται, 79.10), followed by the introduction of the idea of “accuracy in accounting about the truth” (περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀκριβολογία, 83.7). Later the “beauty and accuracy” (ἀκριβεία) in mathematics (83.24-25) is mentioned. Following this, in DCM XXVII the degree of precision (ἀκριβείαιν, 86.8) to be expected in mathematical demonstrations (and criticisms) is compared with the lesser degree to be expected in rhetorical arguments. For a good discussion of the issue in general which does not ignore the Protrepticus, see: Kurz, 'Akribeia: Das Ideal der Exaktheit in der Philosophie des Aristoteles' (esp. pp. 124-125). Accuracy or precision in respect of opinion was an ideal

39.18 ὁ φρόνιμος: Aristotle uses “the intelligent man” to lay out the general topic of comparative value in Topics III 1: “Now then, first, the thing which is longer-lasting or more secure is more choiceworthy than the kind of thing that is less so. And that which would be chosen by the intelligent or the good man (ὁ φρόνιμος ἢ ὁ ἄγαθος ἄνήρ) or by the right law or by the men who are serious about each thing when they choose it such as it is, or those who know each kind of thing scientifically (e.g. in medicine or in carpentry, those things that most or all of the doctors [would choose], or in general that which most or all men or all things [would choose], like the good.” (116a13-19; cf. 145a26). In Nicomachean Ethics VI 5 he investigates the intellectual virtue of intelligence (phronesis) by discussing the general characteristics of ὁ φρόνιμος: “we may grasp what intelligence is by observing what kind of people we describe as intelligent” (τοὺς φρόνιμους, 1140a25). When he distinguishes phronesis from political science in NE VI 8 he recycles the theme—pronounced in the Protrepticus—that the young are better at mathematics than political science (1142a11-18).

See Düring’s note (Attempt, 203) in which he defends his interpretation connecting this with the ἄνήρ σπουδαίος (Düring, ‘Aristotle in the Protrepticus’, 92) against the criticisms of Monan, Moral Knowledge, 13. For further commentary, see: Mansion; de Vogel.

39.18-19 κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αἱρούμενος: deleted by Gigon and not present in the version of this sentence at DCM XXVI 82.3 (see note ad loc.).

39.19 καί: We follow the text at DCM 82.4, which does not have the extraneous καί; extraneous because the de in line 20 already provides a more appropriate (contrastive) conjunction.

39.21 κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας ἔξεις: For similar expressions in Protrepticus: κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας ἄρετῆν Protr. VII 41.23 and κατὰ τὸν οἰκείον βίον DCM XXIII 70.19-20. A related thought is offered at NE II 3.1105a31, that the τέλος will appear different, depending on what kind of person one is.

39.21-24 (τὸ μὲν γὰρ δικαίως εἶν ὁ δίκαιος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ὁ τῆν ἀνδρείαν ἔχων, ὃ δὲ σωφρόνῳ τὸ σωφρονεῖν ὁμοίως), δὴ λοιπόν ὅτι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὁ φρόνιμος αἰρήσεται πάντων μάλιστα: This is the traditional Academic fourfold scheme of virtues, including justice, courage, wisdom, and self-control. This canon, which had been solidly established in the Academy by Plato, was evidently a tidy simplification of a wider and more complex field of traits or virtues. Aristotle shows himself aware of the centrality of these four virtues and also unwilling to reduce the other virtues to these four. In the Nicomachean Ethics he sometimes argues by eliminations based on these four virtues as if they were the core of the conceptual field (X.7 1177a31-32), and sometimes he refers to these four plus liberalitas (X.9 1178a28-33); but there are actually quite a few more moral virtues. We see the same tendency in the Protrepticus, since other virtues also make a prominent appearance there, such as liberalitas (IX 53.7) and kalokagathia (IX 53.1). Aristotle’s consistent view would seem to be that the four main virtues are central but not cardinal. But elsewhere Aristotle sometimes restricts his discussion to these four. For example, in Politics VII I 1323b33-36 and VII.15 1334a22-36. Interestingly, this is a zone in which Aristotle recycles material from the Protrepticus; the passage from VII 15 is a discussion of the kinds of virtues possessed by those dwelling in the Isles of the Blessed.
Rees (‘Bipartition’, 115) argues that although Plato holds these four virtues to rest on a tripartite conception of the soul, Aristotle in the *Protrepticus* holds the same virtues to rest on a twofold division of the soul (into rational and irrational). Although there is no direct expression of the bipartite doctrine in the fragments of the *Protrepticus* that survive, Rees argues persuasively that Aristotle refers to his *Protrepticus* when making the bipartite division of the soul in *NE I* 13.1102a26-28. But there is no evidence of tight linkage between the virtues that are discussed in the *Protrepticus* and a specifically bipartite as opposed to tripartite conception of the soul.

39.24 δήλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὁ φρόνιμος αἰρήσεται παντων μάλιστα: Monan would add: καὶ <κατά> τὸ φρονεῖν ὁ φρόνιμος αἰρήσεται. But this does not avoid the fact that the argument is some kind of tautology, and in fact the supplement would render the thought more banal. Of course the intelligent person chooses in accordance with intelligence most of all—but what Aristotle seems to assert here is that the intelligent person chooses most of all to be intelligent. The psychological doctrine underlying the idea that the intelligent person will “choose most of all” to be intelligent seems also to be at work in *NE I* 8 (1099a7-24), where Aristotle argues that the lover of justice (and in general the lover of any virtue) will find pleasure in the sphere of justice (or virtue in general), just as a lover of pleasures will find pleasure in certain sights and sounds.

39.25 τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως: According to Meteorology IV 12: “Everything is defined by its function (ὤπαντα δ’ ἐστὶν ὄρισμένα τῶ ἔργῳ). For when things are capable of performing their function they truly are themselves (τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀληθῶς ἐστὶν ἐκαστὸν), for example an eye when it can see” (390a10-12); cf. Politics I 2: πάντα δὲ τῶ ἔργω ὀρίσται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει (1253a23). The principle is applied here in the *Protrepticus*: if intelligence is the function of being human, then the intelligent man will most of all want to be intelligent.

〈40.1-11: commentary〉

40.1-11 attribution: We continue to attribute this argument (which draws conclusions based on the immediately previous arguments) to the same speech of ‘Aristotle’.

40.2-3 εἶπερ ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν φιλοσοφία ... κτήσις τε καὶ χρήσις σοφίας: See above note on: τῆς ἐπιστήμης κτάσθαι τε αὐτὴν καὶ χρήσθαι (37.7-8). The use of σοφία (in place of ἐπιστήμη) in 40.3 is entirely consistent with Aristotle’s usage of these terms here and in the extant works; compare also Protr. XII: φρόνησιν καὶ τινα σοφίαν (59.26-60.1, see note ad loc.). The definition of philosophy as “both use and possession of wisdom” seems to be unique to the *Protrepticus* (nothing like this is said in *Euthydemus* or *Alcibiades*, for example), and was probably formulated in this dialectical context as a direct response to Isocrates’s charge about the uselessness of mathematical and theoretical philosophy, using a distinction and vocabulary familiar to Isocrates (e.g. To Demonicus 28).

40.4-5 οὐδὲ δεῖ χρημάτων μὲν ἑνεκά πλεῖν ἐφ’ Ἑρακλέους στῆλας καὶ πολλάκις κινδυνεύειν: The idea of sailing to the ends of the earth for wealth is a typical protreptic theme—see the Greek Anthology book X, esp. 1.8, 5.7-8, 8.7-8; 41 and 60. The “Pillars of Hercules”, meaning “the opposite headlands of Gibraltar
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and Apes’ Hill near Tangier” (LSJ s.v. Ἦρακλειος; Hdt. 2.33, 4.8) are referred to twice in *Meteorology* II: once with reference to “the entire region within the Pillars of Hercules” (1.354a12), meaning the whole Mediterranean; and then to the distance between “the Pillars of Hercules and India” (362b21), meaning the ends of the inhabited world, since beyond “the Pillars of Hercules and India” (362b28) the ocean severs the inhabited world from forming a continuous band around the globe.

The nautical theme and piloting metaphor continues later in the *Protrepticus*, in passages cited in Protr. X, which updates the Platonic image of the helmsman or κυβερνήτης of the ship of state; see 57.27 (and note ad loc.) about the fittingness of the pilot metaphor for the issues about the soul controlling the bodily “instruments” raised earlier in this chapter (VI 37.3-11). Wendland compares Isocrates, *To Demonicus* (19) “Do not hesitate to travel a long way to those who proclaim to teach something useful, for it would be a shame when merchants traverse such vast seas for the sake of increasing the substantial fortune they have, but the young did not endure travel for the improvement of their own intelligence.” Jaeger (*Development*, 59-60) and Düring (*Attempt*, 226) agreed with Wendland that the author was imitating Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*. For our interpretation of the relation between *To Demonicus* and Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, see pp. NN.

40.6-7 ἀνδραποδώδες: See above note on οἱ ὑπηρετόσαι (37.13-14) for a discussion of Aristotle’s use of the despotic idiom in this context. Quite apart from its literal political meaning, the term ἀνδραποδώδες (40.6-7) indicates somewhat metaphorically the vice of “servility” in Aristotle, which he evidently considers applicable not only to natural slaves, but also to men of a certain depraved psychological condition. The term appears in the context of the three ways of life argument also in *EE* I 5.1215b35 and *NE* I 3.1095b19-20. In both cases it is associated with the life of pleasure and the life appropriate to brute animals. It is also invoked in the similar context of an analysis of temperance and its corresponding vices at *NE* 3.10.1118a25,b21. In the initial description of the problem of weakness of will, Aristotle wonders how the incontinent man’s knowledge could be “enslaved” to some master, i.e. pleasure (*NE* VII 1.1145b24). “Neither for the pleasure of eating or that of sex, if all the other pleasures were removed that knowing or seeing or any other sense provides humans with, would anyone value existence, unless he were utterly servile, for it is clear that to the one making this choice there would be no difference between being born a brute and a human; at any rate the ox in Egypt, which they reverence as Apis, in most of such matters has more power than many monarchs” (*EE* I 5.1215b34-1216a1). The term further occurs in both ethical works as the vice opposite irascibility in the analysis of the virtue of good temper or gentleness (*EE* 1231b10, b20, b26; *NE* 1126a8).

40.7 τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ζῆν εὗ: Cf. Protr. VIII 46.23: τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ ζῆν εὔδαιμόνως. See also the Greek Anthology 10.43.

40.8-9 καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν αὐτῶν ἀκολουθεῖν δόξαις ἀλλὰ μὴ τούς πολλοὺς ἀξιοῦν ταῖς αὐτῶν: To whom do αὐτῶν and αὐτῶν refer? Conceivably we are looking at another case of dialogue that has not been completely removed. The marginal correction in F ἀξιοῦν ταῖς αὐτῶν (followed by Pistelli and Düring) and change of breathing is necessary because ἀξιοῦντες αὐτῶν is impossible to construe, while the corrected version construes nicely.
40.12-15 **attribution:** Iamblichus’ bridge passage again summarizes the preceding argument, and announces the next (and final) one: that philosophy is easy. See note on 39.9-13.

40.13 ικανῶς ἀποδειχθαὶ νομίζω: Note first person singular usage which, especially as part of this highly dialectical expression, could be a fossil of the original dialogue.

40.15-20 **attribution and voice:** = DCM XXVI 82.17-82.2. We attribute this section to Aristotle (and the identical overlap in DCM XXVI) and think that it is a continuation of the speech, in Aristotle’s own voice, in defense of theoretical philosophy. Strong support for this attribution is supplied by Proclus, who (unlike Iamblichus) directly attributes the argument to Aristotle in his Commentary on Euclid’s Elements I: “The intrinsic value for those who take part in it would be clarified also by what Aristotle somewhere says, that despite there being no reward offered to those researchers, they nevertheless in a short time have made such progress in mathematical theory, and moreover that everybody feels at home with it and wishes to spend their leisure on it, neglecting other matters, even those who attain little of the benefit that comes from it. Hence those who are disposed to despise cognition of mathematical objects do not actually have any taste for the pleasures in them (prologue I, chapter 9.28.13-22; See text, translation, and commentary on pp. NNN).

40.15 **παρά:** Scaliger’s conjecture is confirmed by the parallel passage at DCM 82.17. It was adopted as a conjecture in Kieslings’ edition and passed into all modern editions; but Pistelli, who evidently started on the basis of Kiesling’s edition, neglected to mention that it was a conjectural emendation rather than a manuscript reading; and this perhaps misled E. des Places, who evidently relied on Pistelli (“je ne pu que constater la scrupuleuse exactitude de l’édition Pistelli” p.21) into reporting F as having this reading.

40.15-17 τὸ γὰρ μῆτε μισθοῦ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γινομένου τοῦς φιλοσοφοῦσι, δι’ ὁν συντόνως οὕτως ἄν διαπονήσειαν: The overlapping DCM XXVI has τοῦς φιλοσοφοῖς at 40.16, with equivalent meaning.

Plato emphasizes the great discipline, labor and effort required for philosophy in Letter 7: πόνος (340d8), συντείνων ὅτι μάλιστ’ εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην (344b7-c1). The Protrepticus strikes an altogether different tone, arguing that philosophy is relatively “easy” and even enjoyable to work at (see above on 37.26: τὰ γὰρ ράσω πάντες ἤδιον πονοὺμεν).


See note below on μετὰ γὰρ τὴν φθοράν καὶ τοῦ κατακλυσμὸν at DCM XXVI 83.7-8 regarding Aristotle’s view is that the arts and sciences are subject to cycles of birth, development, maturation, and death due to periodic meteorological catastrophes. Lovejoy and Boas, Primitivism, chp. 6 usefully collect and translate the primary evidence and situate this theory within Aristotle’s cosmology and politics. The following texts are
key: “the same opinions appear in cycles among men not once nor twice nor occasionally, but infinitely often” (Meteorology I 3.339b27); “it is probable that each of the arts and sciences has been many times investigated in the past as far as it is possible for it to be and has again perished” (Metaphysics XII 8.1074b10); “It is perhaps necessary to believe that other things also have been discovered repeatedly, or rather infinitely often, in the long course of time. For necessity itself probably taught them what is needful and then by degrees led them to refinements and superfluidities; and when these have once taken a start, it may reasonably be supposed that they will increase” (Politics VII 10.1329b25).

Operating under the assumption that the universe is eternal, and the human race is eternal, one wonders why the arts and sciences have not already been perfected in the infinite time they have had to develop. An answer is provided by the following remark of Cicero in Tusculan Disputations, which has been attributed to the Protrepticus by Walzer and Ross: “Aristotle in upbraiding the philosophers of old for thinking, according to him, that thanks to their genius philosophy had reached perfection, says that they had been guilty of extreme folly or boastfulness; all the same he adds that he saw that, as a consequence of the great advance made in a few years, philosophy would be absolutely complete” (3.28.69, tr. King; cf. Düring’s reservations (Attempts, 230-231), which we share). So Aristotle upbraided the ancient philosophers for thinking that they had nearly brought philosophy to perfection, but this does not prevent him from asserting that philosophy has nearly been brought to perfection in his own time. It follows that Aristotle must think himself to come fairly late in a cataclysmic cycle, during which time philosophy has had sufficient time to develop so that in his own time it nears perfection. Aristotle must further be committed to the view that these nearly perfect arts and sciences will also be destroyed in the future, and have to be recovered by future generations. Ironically, this became true for his own Protrepticus.

Proclus in his Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, twice relates aspects of this very speculative prehistory, attributing the ideas to Aristotle, and most likely using the Protrepticus as his source (see text, translation, and commentary on Prologue I, chapter 9.29.1-9 and Prologue II, chapter 4.64.7-65.7). The account of the development of arts in three stages according to three different kinds of goods (goods necessary for life, goods for leisure and pleasure, and goods for contemplation and philosophy) follows the account at Metaphysics I 2.982b11-28.

Asclepius (in Nic. Arith. Intro. I.a (Taran, see our text, translation, and commentary on pp. NN) recounts a story about the rise of human arts and wisdom after destruction and cataclysm, in a passage in which he references Aristotle and seems to be using the Protrepticus as his source. There is also an account of the development of the the arts and wisdom along the same lines, but not attributed to Aristotle, at Epinomis 974d8-976c7.

40.19 ταὶς ἀκριβείαῖς: For the plural, compare Meteorology II 5: “if one reckons up these voyages and journeys, so far as they are capable of yielding any precise data (ταὶς ἀκριβείαῖς), the distance from the Pillars of Hercules to India exceeds that from Aethiopia to Lake Maeotis and the furthest parts of Scythia by a ratio greater than that of 5 to 3” (362b21-25, tr. Lee, adapted). See also Republic VI, where Socrates complains that “it’s ridiculous, isn’t it, to make every effort to attain the most precise (ἀκριβέστατα) and clear data about other things of little value, and not to consider the
important things worthy of precise data” (τὰις ἀκριβεῖαις 504d8-e3). A similar expression of this Platonic thought, even more resonant with allusions to ideas also discussed in *Protrepticus*, is *Philebus* 58c, where Socrates tells Protagoras that what he was seeking was not “what skill or which science excels all others in grandeur and beauty, and is of most use to us, but rather to find out which one could oversee what is clear and precise and as true as possible, even if its profit is vanishingly small.” See note above on ἀκριβέστερος (39.17).

40.19-20 σημεῖόν μοι δοκεῖ τῆς περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι ῥαστῶνης: The argument was announced above in navigational passages (37.26, 40.14). Arguing that something was in a sense “easy” was a conventional protreptic trope, which Aristotle specifies at *Rhetoric* I 6: “Things are done easily when they are done either without pain or quickly: the difficulty of an act lies either in its painfulness or in the long time it takes” (1363a23-24). Now precisely these two elements of easiness that he distinguishes are present here: ἐξ ὀλίγου χρόνου (40.18-19 above and 40.24 below) and μεθ’ ἡδονῆς (40.23, below). This seems to be evidence confirming that this section should be attributed to Aristotle. On the trope, see also Cicero *On Invention* 169; [*Ar.*] *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1421b25; Isocrates, *contra soph*. 16). But see texts cited in the above note at 38.21-22 on γνῶναι χαλεποτερῶν.

40.20-24 τὸ πάντας φιλοσωρεῖν ἐπ’ αὐτῆ καὶ βούλεσθαι σχολάζειν ἀφεμένους τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντσαι, οὐ μικρὸν τεκμήριον ὃτι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἢ προσδερεῖα γίγνεται: ποιεῖν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐβείλει πολὺν χρόνου: The expression οὐ μικρὸν τεκμήριον ὃτι at 40.21 nicely balances the earlier σημεῖόν μοι δοκεῖ (40.19) and gives the impression of an adversarial speech.

The meaning of the term “easiness” as applied to the practice of philosophy in the above passages needs to be understood in the context of Aristotle’s anthropological speculation about the development of philosophy with the rise of the leisure class, which arises here and is connected with the earlier mention of the progress of the arts and sciences (see above note on 40.16-19). In *Metaphysics* I 1, Aristotle writes: “at first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the common perceptions of man was naturally admired by men, not only because there was something useful in the inventions, but because he was thought wise and superior to the rest. But as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the necessities of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. Hence when all such inventions were already established, the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered, and first in the places where men first began to have leisure. This is why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure” (981b, ROT). The argument in the *Protrepticus* relies on the fact that people choose to spend their leisure on it to reach the conclusion that it is an enjoyable activity in which progress can be made in a short time; but this requires time not absorbed with the tedium of survival and mere living. The sentence ποιεῖν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐβείλει πολὺν χρόνου at once relates to two different points, both to the point that, far from work at it with difficulty, people choose to spend their leisure doing it (βούλεσθαι σχολάζειν, 40.20), and the point that philosophy has made great progress “in a short time” (ἐξ ὀλίγου χρόνου, 40.18).

The importance of the fact people do philosophy “with pleasure” (μεθ’ ἡδονῆς) in the immediate context is that if they experience pleasure, then they are not experiencing pain, and that is an indication that an activity is easy in the sense in which Aristotle recommends that term be used in the *Rhetoric* (see above note on 40.19-20). Many
parallel texts could be adduced, beginning with *Euthydemus*: “surely philosophy is an enjoyable subject” (χαρίεν γέ τι πραγμα ἐστιν ἤ φιλοσοφία) (304e6-7). Aristotle in the *Poetics* writes: “to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it” (4.1448b13-15); and he takes this to be an established fact in *NE X* 7: “at all events, philosophy is thought to offer pleasures marvelous for their purity and their enduringness” (1177a25-26). See also Cicero *Tusc.* 5.72, who mentions the usefulness and pleasure of doing philosophy as the reason to occupy leisure with it.

40.26-41.1 ὁμοθύπων τις ἀνθρώπινη τῆς οἰκουμένης: For Aristotle the “inhabited world” (or inhabitable world) stretches from the Pillars of Hercules to India, beyond these the Ocean breaks up what would otherwise be a continuous band stretching around the globe (see above note on 40.4-5).

41.2 ἀπτεταί τῆς ἁληθείας: Aristotle uses the same expression in *EE* II 10: ἀπτεταί γε πη τῆς ἁληθείας (1227a1-2); cf. *Tim.* ἀνερ ἁληθείας ἐφάπτεται (90c1-2).

41.2-5 attribution: Iamblichus summarizes the contents of the chapter by referring to the three things about philosophy that have been shown: that it is possible, useful, and easy. This summary may possibly have been derived from a summary made by the speaker ‘Aristotle’. Navigational passages throughout the chapter point to this structure (and a similar structure for part of *DCM XXVI*); see above notes on 37.22-26 and 39.9-13.