4.1-4: As the title indicates, VII contains two lines of argument: (1) an argument from the “function” of being human (the ergon argument “based on the real nature of humans”); and (2) an argument based on what is “clear” and “manifest”. The chapter contains an opening and a closing, and possibly or probably a bridge passage (43.25-27), as well as either a single block or two fragments of quotation from Aristotle’s Protrepticus. It presents perhaps the earliest version of the famous ergon argument, and needs to be closely compared with the versions found in EE II 1 and NE I 7. Immediately after the opening is a summary of the rest of the overall argument of Aristotle’s Protrepticus as excerpted in Iamblichus VII-XII.

4.1-2 παρακλήσεις πρὸς τὴν θεωρητικὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ... τὴν κατὰ νοῦν ζωήν: “invitations to the observational kind of philosophy and the intellectual life” i.e., theoretical or speculative philosophy. Compare the parallel Iamblichean expression used in the opening to chapter VI: παρακλήσεις τὰς πρὸς τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ πρακτικὸν βίου (37.1-2). Compare also πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ θεωρητική φρόνησις from the title and opening of chapter X (4.15, 54.11). Iamblichus also uses the term “theoretical philosophy” to refer to arguments outside the Aristotle section (e.g. III 11.13, and especially in connection with Archytas in IV 20.23, 21.8, 12, 23.22). θεωρητικός is more likely to be used in the Aristotle sections in connection with ἐπιστήμη (e.g. below at 43.8, and X 56.2, 10).

4.2 διαφερόντως: Iamblichus also uses this term in the chapter heading of XI (4.20). 13, 19.21, 30.20, 65.21, 98.18, 110.23

4.3 ἀπὸ τῆς ... ἀπὸ τῶν: ἀπὸ + genitive is a formula which begins several of the chapter headings of Iamblichus’ Protrepticus, including also IX, XII, XIII, XIV, XVII, XVIII, and XIX; ἀπὸ + genitive occurs within a chapter heading at VIII 4.7-8 to express the same idea: the basis of considerations from which a protreptic argument follows.

4.4 ᾧ ποιμνὴ ἱσκουσαί τοῦτο προκείμενον: Compare Iamblichus’ use of the term ὑπομνήσεις in the chapter headings of VIII (4.5) and XVII (5.16), and verbal forms in the chapter openings of VIII (4.5), XVII (84.3), and XXI (121.12).

41.6-7 attribution: This is a perfectly typical opening formula of Iamblichus.

41.6-7 ἵδοι δ’ ἄν τις τὸ αὑτό: see also the exact same expression twice in IX (50.19, 53.2); cf. γνοῖν ἄν τις in VIII (47.5; cf. 49.15). Dirlmeier described these words as a “Petrafakt der Dialogsprache” (MM 1183a8, p. 177). Düring describes it as “a typical idiom” of Aristotle on the basis of a parallel at GC 316a10-11 (Attempt, 206). But see Vendruscolo, due frammenti, 298-299, who demonstrates that the passage is a
transitional one of Iamblichus. But the use of the expression in IX seems to be in Aristotle’s voice, suggesting that Iamblichus has borrowed a phrase from the local context in order to formulate his transitional statement.

A similar use of τοις can be seen in Iamblichus’ chapter opening of XIX (88.5) and chapter closing of II (10.11), where Iamblichus seems to be addressing any reader; cf. XX (99.19), XXI (116.27).

Iamblichus frequently uses the term τὸ αὐτὸ in transitional remarks, e.g. IV (20.15), V (30.12), XX (98.12), XXI (111.17, 114.29, 116.27). If it is necessary to find a definite antecedent to which this refers, it is presumably to the argument that philosophy should be done, and that it is possible, beneficial, and easy (i.e. to the arguments contained in Iamblichus VI, for which see the notes on 37.22-26).

41.6-7 ἀπὸ τοῦτων: See above note on the construction of ἀπὸ + genitive in the title of the chapter at 4.3; Iamblichus also likes to use the construction in chapter openings, such as XIII (61.5); XIV (72.9); XVII (84.1).

41.7-15 attribution and voice: It is uncertain whether 41.7-15 is a product of Aristotle himself or a condensation of Iamblichus meant to serve as a “table of contents” for the following chapters. As Jaeger noticed (Aristoteles, 66), the arguments listed correspond to the contents of chapters VII-XII: φρόνησις (VII-IX); ὅρετή (X); and ἠδονή (XI); cf. the similar reprisal of the “three lives” below at XII 59.26-60.7. Düring treats the first part of this as Aristotle (his B41, disconnected from its surrounding context in both directions); but he treats the second sentence as Iamblichus, because of the presence of the word εἰλικρινῶς (41.14). But there is no reason Aristotle could not have written that word (see parallels ad loc.). For further commentary, see Vendruscolo, Due Frammenti, 297-300; Berti, Aristotele, 489n139; Gaiser, Zwei Protr., 319-321.

41.7 ὁ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ γιγνώσκειν: Cf. the same conjunction at 43.26-27.

41.7-9 ὁ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶν αἱρέτων καθ’ αὐτὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (οὕτως γὰρ ζήν δυνατὸν ὡς ἀνθρώποις ἀνεύ τούτων), χρήσιμον τε εἰς τὸν βίον ύπάρξει: The fact that it is not possible to live as a human without intelligence and cognition makes these activities hypothetically necessity for a human to lead a properly human way of life. Aristotle distinguishes three major kinds of necessity (ἀναγκαίου) in Metaphysics V.5: (1) that without which it is not possible to live, as a co-cause (οὐ ἀνέυ οὔκ ἐνδέχεται ζῆν ὡς συναιτίου), for example breathing and food; (2) that without which the good cannot either exist or come to be (ὦν ἀνέυ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἢ ἐίναι ἢ γενέσθαι), for example taking a drug to cure fever; and (3) the coerced and force (1015a20-26), for example of a piece of heavy earth to fall. The third kind is not at issue here, but Aristotle seems to hold that intelligence and cognition are necessary in two ways corresponding to the first and second kinds of necessity: (1) in order for the human being to survive as such (οὕτως γάρ ζῆν δυνατὸν ὡς ἀνθρώποις ἀνεύ τούτων); and (2) in order for goods that are useful to the human way of life to be provided (χρήσιμων τε εἰς τὸν βίον ύπάρξει). Intelligence and cognition are not only valuable as constituting what we are as a type of living being, but also in getting for ourselves the things we consider good.

41.10-11 ὁ τι μὴ λογισμαένοις καὶ κατὰ φρόνησιν ἐνεργησασιν τελειοῦται: EE 1220b6.
41.11 κατὰ φρόνησιν ἐνεργήσασιν: NE 1179a22; MM 1201b14.
41.12-13 εἰ ἦσαν ἐς ἐπίτε: cf. XII 59.26-60.1.
41.14 φιλοσοφήτευον: See the same expression in VI (37.9, 37.19), VIII (48.19) and XII (60.8); and also POxy. 666.iii.55-56. There are also the reports about Aristotle having used the expression in the context of the famous self-refutation argument: Alex. Aph. in Top. 149.9-10; Olympiodorus in Alc. 144a16-17; Elias, Proleg. 3.19-20; David, Proleg. 9.3-4.
41.14 ἐκλυκρινώς: For a prominent use, see Philebus 59c, where it stands as a criterion of certainty, purity, integrity, etc. (and cf. 52d; Symp. 211e) In Aristotle: Phys. I 4.187b4, Meteor. 340b8, Mund. 397a35, de An. 426b4, Col. 793ab, HA 627a3, NE 1176b20.

41.15-24 attribution and voice: Except for the first few words, there are no anachronisms or other tell-tale signs that Iamblichus is the author. The extreme compression of the argument suggests intervention, but much of the Corpus has a similar character. It is easily possible that one of the characters in the dialogue, including ‘Aristotle’ himself, could speak such an academic jargon-laden, syllogistic train of speech.

41.15 ἐτι τοῖνυν: This phrase is frequently used by Iamblichus to indicate discontinuity in his source (Hartlich, 256; Slings; Vendruscolo, Due Frammenti, 300). In the Aristotle section, see also below 42.5, and XI 58.17. Also in Isocrates: Ad Demonicus 46.

41.15-22: In the parallel passage in NE I 13 introducing the bipartite human psychology, this division is referred to the “published works”, “Some things are said about it, adequately enough, even in the exoteric writings, and we must use these; e.g. that one element in the soul is irrational and one has a rational principle. Whether these are separated as the parts of the body or of anything divisible are, or are distinct by definition but by nature inseparable, like convex and concave in the circumference of a circle, does not affect the present question” (1102a25-30, trans. Ross, modified).

41.16 τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν: Cf. below, τοῦ κυριωτάτου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν (43.1-2) and the same expression in XII (60.4-5). On the Platonic background, see Dirlmeier, Gnomon 24 (1952), 79 and his note on MM 1200b35, p. 375. Cf. Alc. I.130d. NE 1168b31.

41.16-17 καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δὲ ἄρχεται: Cf. EE II 1, “We must consider the soul. For excellence belongs to the soul and essentially so. But since we are looking for human excellence, let it be assumed that the parts of the soul partaking of reason are two, but that they partake not in the same way, but the one by its natural tendency to command, the other by its natural tendency to obey and listen; if there is a part without reason in some other sense, let it be disregarded. It makes no difference whether the soul is divisible or indivisible, so long as it has different faculties, namely those mentioned above, just as the curved includes the concave and the convex” (1219b26-35, ROT). The argument also reappears at the end of the EE VIII 3: “One must then, here as elsewhere, live with reference to the ruling principle and with reference to the formed habit and the activity of the ruling principle, as the slave must live with reference to the master, and each of us by the rule proper to him. But since man is by nature composed of a ruling and a subject part, each of us should live according to the governing element within himself” (1249b5-10). (There are several good discussions of this passage in connection with the present passage of the Protr., including: Rees, Bipartition; and Moraux, From the Protrepticus.) The idea of ruling and ruled parts in the soul also occurs in the Politics; see, for example, 1254a4-5, 1260a4-5, 1333a16-25; cf. EE 1219b.
41.17-18 τὸ μὲν χρὴται τὸ δ’ ὑπόκειται ὡς ὄργανον: Cf. VI 37.3-7; Alcib. I 129e-130c.

41.19 συνάττεται: Leg. 903d; EE 1219b29-31?

41.20 τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν λόγος ἐστὶν ὁπερ κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχεῖ:
Vendruscolo calls attention to the asymmetry in this sentence, which he explains in terms of corruption or paraphrase on the part of Iamblichus from an original that might have been in the form τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὁπερ κατὰ φύσιν; and this attracted the gloss λόγος on the part of Iamblichus. In this case the original sentence would have said this: “One part of the soul is that which by nature rules and judges our affairs, and the other part follows and is naturally ruled.” Alternatively, he suggests, there could have been corruption from τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τῷ μὲν λόγος ἐστὶν ὁπερ κατὰ φύσιν: “the part of the soul in which there is reason by nature rules and judges our affairs, and the other part follows and is naturally ruled.” In favour of this latter conjecture is 41.30 below, a passage where the speaker is braiding together premises previously established; at 41.30, “reason and thought” are ascribed to what Aristotle wishes us to see as the better part of the soul, and he does not say that one part of the soul is reason. The corruptions in manuscripts from τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ τῷ are extremely common, as they have identical pronunciations.

41.20-22 τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν λόγος ἐστὶν ὁπερ κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχεῖ καὶ κρίνει περὶ ἡμῶν, τὸ δ’ ἔπεσαι τε καὶ πέφυκεν ἀρχέοθαι:
The fact that there is a part of the soul “in which there is reason” is assumed in the argumentation below at 41.30 ψυχῆς τὸ λόγου ἐχοῦ. For this idea in general, see EE 1219b26-1220a5; MM 1885b, 1177b30-1178a10, 1196a26; and see Rees, Aristotle and Plato in the mid fourth cent., 191-200; Mansion, 70.

41.24-42.4 attribution and voice: Vendruscolo, Due Frammenti, 304, detects Iamblichean modification here, especially the phrase τὰ μάλιστα καὶ κυριώτατα καὶ τιμώτατα τὴν ἀρετὴν (41.24-25) for two reasons: (1) τὰ μάλιστα has only adverbial force; and (2) the excessive superlatives. One solution of Vendruscolo is to transpose τὰ μάλιστα to just before εὗ διάκειται; but transposition is not necessary if we agree with Vendruscolo, as we should, that the awkwardness of this sentence could have resulted from the transformation of dialogue into continuous speech on the part of Iamblichus. To support this latter point, Vendruscolo refers to Hartlich 1889, who had earlier suggested that rough transitions and apparent mistakes could be signs of the transformation process from what had originally been a dialogue, a perceptive suggestion with which we agree.

41.22-23 πὰν δὲ εὗ διάκειται κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν: Compare πάντες αἰρόνται μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας ἔξεις in VI 39.20-21 (and see note). The notion of native or congenital virtue is familiar from Plato, e.g. Rep. τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς (353c; cf. 443d; Leg. 959a). And it is common in Aristotle, e. g. NE, ἐκαστὸν δ’ εὗ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται (1098a15; cf. Pol. 1260a25-26; MM 1200a2-11). For εὗ διάκειται: compare τὸ σπουδαῖον ἡμῖν ἢ ἕφιλον εἶναι αὐτὸ διακείσθαι in XII 59.23.

<VII 41.24-42.4: commentary>
41.24 μάλιστα καὶ κυριώτατα: cf. XI 58.12; μάλιστα καὶ κυριώτατα.


41.25-27 τοῦ βελτίους ἁρα φύσει βελτίων ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἀρετῆ: cf. EE, καὶ τῆς βελτίους δὴ ἔξεσθω ἔστω βελτίων τὸ ἔργον (1219a5-7; cf. 1218b37ff. 1219a31-33). That something is in its best condition when it is in accordance with its proper excellence (or virtue) is argued at NE 1098a18, 1177a4-5. PA 645b29. Pol. 1323b13-21.

41.27-28 ἀρχικῶτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἡγεμονικῶν: See note at VI 37.15 on ἡγεμονικωτέρας.


41.29 ψυχὴ μὲν σῶματος βέλτιον (ἀρχικῶτερον γάρ), ψυχῆς δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ διάνοιαν: Cf. VI 38.15-16: ψυχὴ μὲν σῶματος ἀμείνον (ἀρχικωτέρον γάρ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ).

41.30 ψυχῆς δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ διάνοιαν: For the bipartite conception of the soul see Rees, Bipartition, 117-118. Key texts on bipartition include: Pol. 1254a24-b24 esp. b4-8, and NE 1.13.1102a26-28, and de An. 3.432a24-26.

41.31 κελεύει καὶ κωλύει: Cf. τὰ μὲν λαμβάνομεν τὰ δὲ φεύγομεν (56.11) and τὸ μὲν φευκτὸν τὸ δὲ ἄριστον (45.13).

42.1-2: ἀρετὴ τοῦ τοῦτο τοῦ μέρους, ἀναγκαῖον εἰναὶ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην: Mansion, 'Contemplation', 71-72; Vendruscolo, Due Frammenti, 305.

42.2-3 ἀπλῶς τε πᾶσι καὶ ἡμῖν: Cf. Pol. 1323b17.

42.3 οἶμαι: Dirlmeier argues that this is a reference to Plato (commentary on NE 1168b35; NE 551 and 553). Rep. 443d, Leg. 959ab, Alc. I. 130c. Seems like an artifact of dialogue.

42.3-4 καὶ γὰρ ἄν τοῦτο, οἶμαι, θείη τις, ὡς ἦτοι μόνον ἢ μάλιστα ἡμεῖς ἐμεῖς τὸ μόριον τοῦτο: Cf. NE 1166a17, 1168b28-1169a3, 1177b31-1178a3. Monan follows Nguyen, p. 200 in arguing that there is a vacillation between two opposing psychologies in the Protrepticus; see also Mansion, p. 73. For the phrase τὸ μόριον τοῦτο cf. Rep. 442c; Tim. 90c. NE 1177b34; PA 641a22.

42.5-23 attribution and voice: Vendruscolo, Due Frammenti, 306-308, argues at length for seeing 42.5-23 as an intervention of Iamblichus, which interrupts the argument begun at 41.15 and concluding at 43.5. Against that there is nothing anachronistic in the section, it is argumentatively progressive (not a mere summary or navigational comment), and solidly Aristotle in both style and purpose. It would not be at all typical for Iamblichus to compose such an austere and purely Aristotelian argument, and this does not fit his usual pattern of paraphrase.

42.5 ἦτι τοίνυν: See note above at VII 41.15. This probably indicates that something has dropped out. See Vendruscolo, Due Frammenti, 305. One possibility is that it is replacing the question of an interlocutor, who was asking “What is the virtue of the rational part of the soul?” Düring invented some Greek to serve the purpose of smoothing out what he took to be a transition in a continuous oratorical letter (thus his B58; cf. Berti, Protr. (2000), 90). Against this, see Hartlich, 261.
42.5 πέφυκεν ἐργὸν ἑκάστου: Cf.: “It is a property of intelligence to be essentially the natural virtue of the rational faculty” (Top. V 6.136b10).

42.5-6 μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: In the Eudeman Ethics VII 13 Aristotle gives an example of incidental final causes, “One might raise an aporia. One can use each thing for that which it is naturally, and otherwise, and either intrinsically or incidentally. For example, one might use the eye for seeing, and also for skewing seeing by squinting, so that one thing is seen as two. These are uses of the eye as an eye, but it is possible to use it in another way, incidentally, for example if one could sell or eat it” (1246a26-31). See also Physics I 3 (195a33-b2).

42.6 καθ’ αὐτό: Kiessling’s conjecture, printed in Pistelli and Des Places, is necessary to restore the technical term of Aristotle as used, for example, in the definition of nature in Physics 2.1: οὐσίας τῆς φύσεως ἀρχής τινός καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινείσθαι καὶ ἤρεμεῖν ἐν ὧ ὑπάρχει πρώτως καθ’ αὐτό καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (192b20-22). For other cases of καθ’ αὐτό in opposition to κατὰ συμβεβηκός see Bonitz 212a7-11. Düring strangely comments “Aristotle seems to apologize for introducing a term from his own technical jargon” (Attempt, 236); but this seems to misconstrue the λέγομενον. Aristotle is not calling attention to the terminology, rather the point is logical: when the natural function of a certain thing is accomplished “most beautifully” then it must also be said to be good.

42.7-8 ταὐτὴν τε ἀρετὴν θετέον κυριωτάτην: Aristotle argues that all things that have a use and a function have a dominant virtue, namely the best or most excellent activity of its function (in EE II 1, 1219a; and NE I 7, 1097b25-33).

42.8-9 καθ’ ἂν ἐκαστον αὐτὸ τοῦτο πέφυκεν ἀπεργάζεσθαι: See Mansion, 71.

42.9-11 συνθέτου καὶ μεριστοῦ πλείους καὶ διάφοροι εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι τοῦ δὲ τῆν φύσιν ἀπλοῦ: Top. I 7.103a8-11, PA I 4.645b25, HA I 6.490b16. Cael. 286b16; NE 7.8.1154b21. For ἀπλοῦ see Meteor. 378b31, EE 1233b38. Düring detects a reflection of the Pythagorean doctrine that evil is on the same side of the table of opposites as the unlimited (cf. NE II 8.1108b28). If so, this could suggest either that a Pythagorean character (such as Heraclides of Pontus) is speaking, or that another character (i.e. Aristotle in his own voice) is engaging a Pythagorean idea in order to secure agreement from such a character.

42.11-13 μὴ πρὸς τί τῆν οὐσίαν ἔχοντος μίαν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τῆν καθ’ αὐτὸ κυρίως ἀρετὴν: NE 1096a21; Bonitz 642b15.

<VII 42.13-23: commentary>

42.13-23 attribution and voice: The speech continues building on the previous argument, and is in the same voice, which we perceive as classically Aristotelian.

42.13 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀπλοῦν τι ζωὸν ἔστιν ὁ ἀνθρώπος: As Berti points out (Arist., 496-497) the preceding argument at 41.22-42.13 has been about the ergon of a part of the soul, not about the ergon of the whole human being as a kind of animal. He concludes that Iamblichus has altered his source. But Aristotle does seem to generalize the point at 42.5-13, where he speaks not just of virtue but of the ergon. Further, a similar leap of logic is present in the parallel passages on the ergon argument in the NE and EE. Thus it is not necessary to assume that Iamblichus has modified the conclusion in the present passage, although that is certainly possible, and perhaps likely in this case. Vendruscolo adduces further considerations for this interpretation (Due
Frammenti, 306-308). Among the strongest of his arguments is the fact that the assumption made in this lemma contradicts the basic idea of the original diairesis at 41.15-18 ("part of us is soul, part body; and the one rules, the other is ruled; the one uses the other, which supports it as a tool").

One should of course keep in mind the contextual and rhetorical differences of the ergon arguments in the Corpus. In NE I 7.1097b30-1098a20 and X 7-8, Aristotle is less interested in proving that some activity is conducive to all the possible ends of human life (pleasure, virtue, and wisdom), or in determining how one might maximize these, and is more interested in determining which activity is the highest and fully human, to the exclusion of all other activities. Thus pleasure and virtue are all but eliminated in this effort, and theoretical wisdom is championed as the paramount end of human life. In the Protrepticus we see instead a co-option of these endoxically agreed upon goods into the framework of motives for the activity of philosophy.

A version of this argument is preserved by Alexander in Prior An. 4.33-5.1 (see Rashed, Lecteur, 7-8). See also [Ar.] Rhet. ad Alex. 1421a5-25.

42.14 καὶ κατὰ λόγον καὶ νοῦν τέτακται αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐσία: This clause may seem to clumsily gloss the immediately preceding condition: απλα/ου ... εὔντος (11-12) since something that is simple (as opposed to something complex) should not have parts. Further, the term νοῦς is not present in the rest of the passage, and so this could in theory be an interpolative gloss. See also V 34.5-36.18 and VIII 48.11, 11.56.13, and 59.18 (all of which are in Iamblichus' voice; see also below VIII 48.16, quoting Anaxagoras). Vendruscolo, Due Frammenti, 307 and n. 42 interprets the passage as authored by Iamblichus for these reasons. Against this is the fact that Aristotle indicates that he is using simple and complex in this context to discuss situations where something has either one or multiple ends. A simple thing has its substance and its parts oriented towards a single end; a complex thing has its substance and its parts oriented towards multiple ends. The usage of the term νοῦς here, and in the later references to Anaxagoras, is not at all problematic from the standpoint of Aristotle in EN VI or X.

42.14-15 οὐκ ἄλλο ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἡ μόνη: This expression contains elements of a transitional formula frequently used by Iamblichus: cf. XX 95.6; and μόνος (27.4, 28.15, 29.8-9, 30.2) and versions of οὐ/δε/ίς ἄλ/λος ἡ (30.9, 34.1-2, 77.27-28, 82.6, 85.25).

42.16 τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀντων ἀληθεύειν: cf. 37.26-38.3, 39.9-11, 40.20-41.2 (= DCMS 82.22-83.2), 51.6-15, 54.22-55.6, 58.10-14, 59.7-17.

42.17 συμπεριφορᾶς: Kiessling conjectured συμπεφυκός, presumably because there is no obvious nominative word with which it agrees; but presumably a word like ὄριον or μέρος is presupposed; see next note.

42.18-19 ἀεὶ τούτων τὸ βέλτιστον ἔργον ἐστίν: Since this is a rather bald statement, scholars have been attracted by the idea of repairing it, a minimal suggestion being that of Düring: βέλτιστον <το> ἔργον. This is worth considering, but perhaps more explicable and more interesting is de Strycker’s conjecture of a larger loss, due to homoioteleuton: βέλτιστον <αὐτοῦ τὸ κυριώτατον> ἔργον. If this had been the original form of the argument, it would be the precise premise needed to support the next inferences that Aristotle performs, from the “most authoritative function” at 42.22 to the “most authoritative end” at 42.25.
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42.20-21 ἔργον τῆς διανοίας ἢ τοῦ διανοομένου τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν: Vendruscolo (1998, 37) speculates that Aristotle’s text probably specified that the rational part (ὑμῖν or μέρος) of the soul was meant. Such an addition would facilitate agreement with the nominative neuter ςμμετφυκος above in line 17, and obviate the need for Kiessling’s conjecture there.

42.22 βέλτιον δὲ οὐδὲν ἐξομεν λέγειν ἔργον τῆς διανοίας ἢ τοῦ διανοομένου τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν ἁληθείας: Metaph. 983b1; 988a19; 993b30.

42.23-23 ἁληθεία ἀρα το όυτίστατον ἔργον ἐστι τοῦ μορίου τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς: Kiessling’s conjecture, printed in Pistelli and Des Places, is not to be resisted, because the reference is clearly to “this part” of the soul, and the textual erosion of τοῦ μορίου τοῦτο would be very easy to explain.

42.23-43.5: commentary

42.23-43.5 attribution and voice: The argument continues its progression from the last section, and the voice of the speaker is also continuous, and thus we attribute this section to Aristotle and "Aristotle".

42.23 τοῦτο δὲ δρά: Refers to πέφυκεν ἀποτελεῖσθαι (42.18) where the product (ἔργον) (42.20) is said to be truth (ἀληθεία) (42.22). Cf. Bonitz 205a42-51. Pol. II 2.1261a22; III 13.1284b5, 15. Vendruscolo (Due Frammenti, 309) argues this line of reasoning contradicts the argument that follows at 43.5-12 to the effect that this science is theoretical rather than productive. But even theoretical science, given that it is an activity, has a product in the sense of a function (i.e. truth). And of course theoretical sciences very often do contribute to practical goods (as Aristotle argues). The crucial point is that activity of the theoretical sciences need not be practically useful in order to be valuable, because the truth they produce is valuable in and of itself, whether or not it also happens to be useful for some other end. The activities of the productive and practical sciences are only considered valuable insofar as they contribute to some other activity or product.


42.26 θάτερον διὰ θάτερον: Similar language is used to describe the subalternate or subordinate sciences in the Posterior Analytics I 13: θάτερον ὑπὸ θάτερον (78b35-36). The context there is theoretical sciences, in which an empirical science is subalternate to a mathematical science, as harmonics is to arithmetic; optics to geometry; and mechanics to stereometry. It is interesting to see similar logic employed here in the ethical sphere where one thing is valuable “through” another. See McKirahan, ‘Subordinate Sciences’.

42.26-27 βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ μᾶλλον αἵρετον δι’ ὀπερ αἵρετόν ἐστι καὶ θάτερον: Top. 116b5, 118b20. Rhet. 1362a21. Isocrates denies that we do anything “for itself”, arguing that we are always concerned with ends: “But in all our works we do not remember the beginning, as much as we get a perception of the ending; for most of the things that we do in the business of life we do not for themselves, rather we take the trouble for the sake of their results” (Dem. 47).

42.28-29 ὑγεία δὲ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν: Top. 116b30. MM 1184a3-14.
43.1-2 οὐκοῦν τῆς φρονήσεως, ἢν φαμεν δύναμιν εἶναι τοῦ κυριωτάτου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν: Who does the third person of the main verb φαμεν and the expression ἐν ἡμῖν refer to? Is this an artifact of dialogue? Compare above 41.16 τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν; and below in XII (60.4-5). Further, the particle οὐκοῦν seems to awkwardly introduce a conclusion, immediately after the elaboration of a premise at 42.25-29. The overall conclusion is apparently below at 43.5 (ἀρσ). It could be interpreted as part of the progressive argument that concludes there; cf. Pol. 1281a29. Another alternative is to see this as an artifact of dialogue, parallel to cases such as: 33.7/Rep. 591c; 33.18/Rep. 591d; 66.6 / Phd. 68c8 (see Vendruscolo, Due Frammenti, 310n49).

43.2 αἵρετώτερον οὐδὲν: Cf. Pol. 1323b19-21.

43.3-5 τὸ γὰρ γνωστικὸν μέρος καὶ χωρὶς καὶ συγκείμενον βέλτιόν ἐστι πάσης τῆς ψυχῆς, τούτου δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἀρετὴ: In the Metaphysics, Aristotle states that theoretical knowledge is “more of the nature of wisdom than the productive sciences”: “We have said in the Ethics [book vi] what the difference is between art and science and the other kindred faculties; but the point of our discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things. This is why, as has been said before, the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any perception whatever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of wisdom than the productive” (Metaph. I 1.981b25-2a1, ROT). See also MM 1185a5, EE 1220a5, NE X 7-8. Léonard (‘bonheur chez Aristote’, app. III) states that the phrase τὸ γὰρ γνωστικὸν μέρος is a reminiscence of Statesman 259-261. See also: NE 1144b28, 1178a22; and compare EE 1246b33-36.

43.5-14 attribution and voice: In this section we reach the conclusion for which "Aristotle" has been arguing in the previous two sections.

43.5 ἀρσ: This really is the conclusion of the argument; cf. the proleptic conclusion above at 43.1 (οὐκοῦν).

43.6-7 τῶν κατὰ μέρους λεγομένων ἀρετῶν: Aristotle denies that the activity we are looking for (the one identical with our function as humans and most conducive to our success) is any of the so-called “parts of virtues”, because the individual virtues are all connected with productive knowledge. The background here is Plato’s Protagororas, where it is asked: “Does each also have its own unique power or function? In the analogy to the parts of the face, the eye is not like the ear, nor is its power or function the same, and this applies to the other parts as well: they are not like each other in power or function or in any other way. Is this how it is with the parts of virtue?” (330a, trans. Lombardo and Bell). Aristotle says that the virtues particular to the rational soul are wisdom, philosophy, aptitude for learning, memory, etc. These are distinct from the virtues of the irrational part of the soul, such as
temperance, justice, courage, etc. (see, e.g., MM I 5, 1185b4-8). Productive knowledge is exemplified by the arts, such as building and medicine, which aim to produce something other than themselves, namely houses and health. Theoretical knowledge, on the other hand, has no other product or end other than its own activity: “With regards to theoretical science …there is no other part of astronomy or physics or geometry except knowing and contemplating the nature of the things which are the subject of those sciences, though nothing prevents them from being in a way incidentally useful to us for much that we cannot do without. But the end of the productive sciences is different from science and knowledge” (EE I 7, 1216b10-8).

43.10 ei ga r estai: Why the future tense? Düring’s cryptic remark “logic future” does not help; see though K. Brink, Stil und Form der pseudo-aristotelischen Magna Mor., 34.

43.10 poi t t i kē: see below on 43.15.

43.13 φαμέν: For the third-person, see above φαμέν and note on 43.1-2. Düring glosses this “in the Academy we used to say that”. But that would seem to require an imperfect tense, whereas here we have the present. (And this may reflect the setting of the dialogue, and perhaps be a clue to its dating.) See also φαμέν in chapter IX at 53.7.

43.15 ἀδυνατον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην poi t t i kēν: The diction here is solidly Aristotelian, e.g. Metaph. ὅλων ἐπιστήμην poi ὑ τικήν (982b11); cf. 1013b6, Phys. 195a6; PA 640a30. Einarson argues that this is a direct contradiction of Euth. 289b-292d where Socrates argues that wisdom is productive and has some exterior end.

43.17 πλήν εἴ τι τῶν εἰρημένων: Flashar (Fragmente, 189) comments that this expression “ist so incohärent, dass Jamblichos hier stark verkürzt haben dürfte.” But it seems to us to be a fairly clear reference to the candidate "parts" of virtue and success (τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστι καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας) mentioned just above by the speaker in lines 12-13.

43.20-21 τὸ φρονεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν: Compare Topics VI 3.141a7: “Xenocrates says that intelligence defines and observes reality.”

43.21 ἔργον τῆς ἀρετῆς: Düring thinks this is erroneous for ψυχῆς; cf. XI 58.3-4. But there is no manuscript support for his emendation; and the phrase “function of virtue” is used by Aristotle, EE II 1.1219a19-20; see Bobonich, ‘Philosophers Rule?’, 167n15.

43.23 οἶμαι: May be evidence of dialogue, since such expressions suggest a more personalized approach that we expect from the works of the Corpus; see also the third-person forms above at 43.1-2 and 13.

43.23 καὶ τὸ τοῖς ὀμμασιν ὀραν: NE I 6.1097b29-31; Metaph. I 1. Düring, ‘Ar. in the Protrepticus’ 94.

43.25-27 attribution: This sentence stitches together two well-developed arguments that are otherwise not in immediate logical proximity, and it baldly states an argument instead of developing one. For these reasons, Düring regarded it as a sentence crafted by Iamblichus intended to convey the content of a stretch of Aristotle’s argument without quoting it (1961, 242, he speaks of “suppressed sentences”). But there is nothing alien to Aristotle in the diction or grammar, and its terminology links it with other texts that we consider Aristotelian. So while admitting the probability that something has dropped out, we decline to completely anathematize these words. We leave it in plain text, however, to...
43.25, 27 ἀγαπᾶμεν ... ἀγαπῶσιν: See in VIII ἄγαπητον at 46.19, 21.
43.26-27 τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ γιγνῶσκειν: The same conjunction appears above at 41.7.

43.27-44.9 attribution and voice: Whether or not one sees a sufficient connection to the preceding sections, we seem here to have resumed the voice of the character "Aristotle" and do not seem to have Iamblichean modification here.

43.29-44.1 δῆλον ὅτι μᾶλλον οὕτως βουλήσεται ὡς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῦτο: Cf. Pol. VII, δῆλον ὡς ... διαθέσεις ταύτας (1323b13-16).

44.4 καὶ ἔλοιπο γνωσθὲν βάττον: = καὶ γνωστὸ τούτῳ βάττῳ ἄν ἔλοιπο according to Düring (Attempt, 242).

44.9-17: commentary>

44.9-17 attribution and voice: The same speaker in the same voice seems to continue by offering a different kind of a fortiori argument. This section sets the argument up by stating commonplaces that presumably all interlocutors would agree to.

44.9-10 τὸ γε ζῆν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι διακρίνεται τοῦ μὴ ζῆν: Cf. below in X: “for we should be almost entirely motionless if deprived of it [sc. sight]” (56.22-23). In de An. I 2 Aristotle adds motion as a definitive predicate of the species animal, κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι (403b26-7); self-motion and perception of coextensive powers. In NE IX 9, Aristotle adds that humans are distinguished further by intelligence, τῶν ζήν ὁρίζουσιν τοὺς ζῶσις δυναμείς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀνθρώπους δὴ αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοησίας· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀναγεννᾶ, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· τῷ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίος τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν (1170a16ff.); cf. EE VII 12, το αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν (1244b26ff). Düring (Attempt, circa 245) writes “it is extremely interesting that Aristotle has commented on this passage in the Eudemian Ethics. For how is it possible to doubt that 1244b30 ἐν τῷ λόγῳ refers to our passages B74 [= 44.9-13] and B80 [=56.22-57.7]?” (Although Düring also refers to the passages as “very Epicurean”, 1961, 245). In support of Düring’s interpretation is the fact that no corresponding argument can be found in either the EE itself or the NE; and at the same time the passages of the Protrepticus referred to seem to fit very well. For a full translation of the passage, see appendix to this chapter. For a discussion of the Eudemian Ethics passage and the light it casts on the relationship between the Protrepticus and the ethical works, see our essay “Protreptic Aspects of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”.

44.11-13 καὶ ταύτης ἔξαιρομένης ὁ πρὸς ἔστιν ἄξιον ζῆν ἄξιον ἀναιρουμένον του ζῆν αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν: The same thought expressed differently at Protr. V 35.14-1. See also the use of ἀναιρουμένου at VI 38.10-14. For ἄξιον ζῆν compare: τῷ τοιοῦτῳ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον (NE 1117b11).
The comparison of the intrinsic value of theoretical wisdom with vision is the means by which Aristotle introduces his *Metaphysics* I 1, “All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things” (980a21-25, trans. Ross—see Ross’ note ad loc.). Jaeger considered this stretch of the *Protrepticus* to be the source of the *Metaphysics* I 1: “the famous introduction to the *Metaphysics* is in essence nothing but an abbreviated version of his classical exposition of the material there ... We find that the introductory chapter of the *Metaphysics* is simply a collection of material extracted from this source for the purpose of a lecture” (69). But Düring is right to say “another” instead of “abbreviated”.

Compare the pseudo-platonic definition: “perception: fluctuation in the soul; movement of the mind via the body; an announcement for the benefit of human beings, from which arises a non-rational ability in the soul to recognize things through the body” ([Pl.] Def. 414c., trans. DSH).

44.13-14 τῆς δὲ αἰσθήσεως ἢ τῆς ὑπεράγιας διαφέρει δύναμις τῶν συμπτώματος εἴναι: The same speaker as in the preceding sections seems to here reach the overall conclusion of the argument: that intelligence is the most valuable and sought after thing for human beings. This is followed in 44.26-45.3 by an unnecessary repetition of one of the warrants for the argument, which may very well be paraphrase by Iamblichus.

44.15-16 αἰσθησις δὲ πάσα δύναμις ἐστὶ γνωριστική διὰ σώματος: Compare the pseudo-platonic definition: “perception: fluctuation in the soul; movement of the mind via the body; an announcement for the benefit of human beings, from which arises a non-rational ability in the soul to recognize things through the body” ([Pl.] Def. 414c., trans. DSH).

44.17-26 attribution and voice: The same speaker as in the preceding sections seems to here reach the overall conclusion of the argument: that intelligence is the most valuable and sought after thing for human beings. This is followed in 44.26-45.3 by an unnecessary repetition of one of the warrants for the argument, which may very well be paraphrase by Iamblichus.

44.19 αἰσθησις γνώσις τις: see below at 45.3: ἐπιστήμη τις and in XII, σοφία τις (XII 59.27-28). With all of these should be compared the highly parallel passage (with possible cross-reference) in *EE* VII 11 containing the words: γνώσιν τινα (1244b28-29: quoted in full in appendix to this chapter). The Platonic background can be found in: *Rep.* 532a; *Leg.* 661c; *Polit.* 286a; *Phaedr.* 250d.

44.20 πάλαι δὲ εἰ πομεν: For this usage, see Ross’ notes on *APO* 100b14 and *Phys.* 254a16. The point is argued at 42.23-29, and though πάλαι may seem to be a bit of an exaggeration, it can here just mean in the course of our discussion. This may be further evidence of dialogue.

44.20-21 εἰ πομεν ὁσπερ: The marginal correction in F (accepted by Düring) does not seem sufficient, and Jaeger’s ὁσ[περ] is probably necessary, since εἰ πομεν introduces indirect discourse and there is no participle or infinitive to complete the thought, only finite verbs. The awkwardness may be indicative of the fact that we are in a transitional zone of Iamblichean citation, especially given the indications of alteration of the source text with the excision of dialogue at 44.20.

44.24-25 ἢ φρόνησις κυριωτέρα τῆς ἀληθοῦς δοξῆς: The manuscripts have τῆς ἀληθείας in place of τῆς ἀληθοῦς δοξῆς, but the notion that intelligence is superior to truth is prima facie odd. Düring, following Jaeger’s supplement τῆς ἀληθείας <ὑσι>, translates “since it has a stronger grasp of truth.” But even if the Greek could be translated that way, this would not seem to fit the context. A better solution is to supplement with δοξῆς, in which case the argument would continue the line
of reasoning just above at 43.25-44.9 where Aristotle considers a comparison between intelligence and true opinion: ἐὰν τοῦτον ἔστιν ἀληθῆς δόξα φρονήσει ὁμοίου (44.5). The closest parallel outside the Protrepticus is Politics III 4.1277b25-30, where Aristotle argues that intelligence is the only virtue unique to rulers, whereas those who are ruled lack intelligence and have only true opinion. Again, Aristotle could hardly hold intelligence superior to truth, and in fact it is because of its relation to truth that in other texts Aristotle argues that φρόνησις is inferior to σοφία, e.g.: “it would be thought absurd if, being inferior to wisdom, it (sc. intelligence) were to be more authoritative (κυριωτέρο) than it (sc. wisdom)” (NE VII 12.1143b34; cf. EE 1218b12-13; 1246b9).

44.25-26 πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὸ φρονεῖν μάλιστα διώκουσι: 1153b30. Euthyd. 278e.

45.26-45.3 attribution and voice: One would expect an Iamblichean closing at this point, but the passage is remarkably free of his formulaic constructions and technical terms. It seems to link it to the discussion above (esp. 44.19) and XII (esp. 59.27-28). Nevertheless it comes after the overall conclusion has been reached, and is not sufficiently progressive. We are led to suspect that this is Iamblichus repeating some of the argument as a means of concluding the chapter.

45.1-2 ὑπερβαλλόντως φαίνονται φιλούντες: Cf. NE 1118a6-7.

45.3 ἐπιστήμη τις: compare, a few lines above, γνώσις τις (44.19); and in XII, σοφία τις (XII 59.27-28).
Appendix to VII: a passage about perception, cognition, and living in Eudemian Ethics VII 12 that seems to refer to Protrepticus (see note at VII 44.9-10).

But about this difficulty we must consider whether perhaps, although the view stated is partly sound, in part the truth escapes us because of the comparison. It is clear if we grasp what life is in the active sense and as an end. It is apparent that it is to perceptive and to cognize, and that consequently social life is co-perception and co-knowledge in common. But to perceive and to cognize themselves are the thing most desirable for each person individually and it is because of this that the appetite for life is implanted in all; for to live must be put down as a kind of cognition (τὸ γὰρ ζῆν διετιθέναι γνώσιν τινα). If therefore one were to abstract and posit cognition itself by itself and not—though this has been left out, as it has been written in the argument (ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται), but it may not be left out in practices—whence it ought to be distinguished from cognition but of someone other than oneself. But that is like another person's living instead of oneself, whereas perceiving and knowing oneself is reasonably more desirable. For two things must be taken into consideration together in the argument, that life is desirable and that good is desirable, and as a consequence that it is desirable for ourselves to possess a nature of that quality. If, therefore, of the pair of corresponding series of this kind one is always in the class of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are generally speaking constituted by their participation in the determinate nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be of a certain character,--since, then, we are not each of these things in ourselves but only by participating in these faculties in the process of perceiving or cognizing (for when perceiving one becomes perceived by means of what one previously perceives, in the manner and in the respect in which one perceives it, and when cognizing one becomes cognized)--hence owing to this one wishes always to live because one wishes always to cognize; and this is because one wishes to be oneself the object cognized. To choose to live in the society of others might, therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish (first in the case of the things common to the other animals also, for instance eating together or drinking together, for what difference does it make whether these things take place when we are near together or apart, if you take away speech? but even to share in speech that is merely casual is a thing indifferent, and also neither to impart nor to receive information is possible for friends who are self-sufficing, since receiving information implies a deficiency in oneself and imparting it a deficiency in one's friend, and likeness is friendship)-- but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it pleasanter to share good things with our friends, as far as these fall to each, and the best that each can—-but among these, it falls to one to share bodily pleasure, to another artistic study, to another philosophy—-; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's friend (whence the saying 'Distant friends a burden are'), so that they must not be separated when this is taking place. Hence also love seems to resemble friendship, for the lover is eager to share the life of the loved one, although not in the most proper way but in a sensuous manner.” (EE VII 12, 1244b21-1245a26, translation a more or less modified version of the Loeb)