

OXFORD STUDIES IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

EDITOR: DAVID SEDLEY

VOLUME XXIX

WINTER 2005

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

AUTHENTICATING ARISTOTLE'S *PROTREPTICUS*

D. S. HUTCHINSON & MONTE RANSOME JOHNSON

DURING the gold rush of the 1860s, scholars went prospecting for fragments of the lost works of Aristotle, and in 1869 a crucial discovery was announced: Iamblichus of Chalcis, it seems, had quoted from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, using it and other books as sources when compiling his own *Protrepticus*. Scholars rushed in to mine that later text.

© D. S. Hutchinson & Monte Ransome Johnson 2005

Finding the patterns in this textual labyrinth of Iamblichus has been a collaborative effort, in which many scholars in many places have given us assistance, criticism, and encouragement; to all these people we acknowledge their help and express our thanks. First in order of generation is our friend and colleague Brad Inwood, with whom we read chapters 5–12 of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* in 1999/2000, together with other members of the Greek philosophy reading group hosted by the University of Toronto's Collaborative Program in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy: Donald Smith, Max Arnott, Joe Novak, David Hitchcock, Daniel de Montmollin, and Rob Butler. An earlier version of the reasoning in this paper was presented to the B Club at Cambridge University in January 2004, and we gratefully acknowledge the encouragement and guidance we received there from Nick Denyer, David Sedley, Geoffrey Lloyd, Malcolm Schofield, Robert Wardy, Catherine Osborne, Alex Long, and Mantas Adomenas. In Tuscany in June, we were hosted by our new friends Alessandro Linguiti and Francesco Ademollo at a seminar in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Florence, where we greatly benefited from their comments and those of Glenn Most and Walter Leszl. Antonio Carlini discussed *Protrepticus* matters with D.S.H. in Pisa, and introduced him to the Biblioteca Laurenziana in Florence, whose Director Franca Arduini facilitated research on Laur 86,3, the unique independent witness to the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus. At the University of Victoria in October 2004, we presented a paper to a conference on the Aristotelian tradition, where useful scepticism and support came from many, especially Taneli Kukkonen, Miira Tuominen, Richard Bodéüs, Marguerite Deslauriers, and Victor Caston. Several scholars have given us the benefit of careful study of draft materials, including Phillip DeLacy, Jonathan Barnes, Stephen Menn, Rob Bradizza, Chris Young, Margaret Cameron, David Gallop, John Bussanich, Michele Alessandrelli, and four anonymous reviewers for Hackett Publishing Company. Support for M.R.J.'s research came from the Killam Foundation by way of a postdoctoral fellowship in philosophy at the University of British Columbia, and from Green College, which provided direct support as well as being a perfect place to bring us together to share ideas and friendship.

The 136 years since then have seen dramatic rises and spectacular falls in the stock of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. The ore has proved to be more difficult to extract than expected, and currently the work languishes amidst widespread scholarly scepticism and sharp disagreement; indeed, some scholars consider the nuggets attributed to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* to be nothing but fool's gold. This is because no clear resolution has yet been found, despite several periods of intensive research and several ambitious publications, to a number of key hermeneutical questions: Where did Iamblichus start and stop using Aristotle text(s) as a source? Did Iamblichus simply quote the text of Aristotle, or did he take liberties? Did Iamblichus work from memory, or did he make an accurate copy? Did Iamblichus work sequentially, earlier passages quoted earlier, and later ones later? Did Iamblichus use the *Protrepticus* only, or other works of Aristotle as well?

In this paper we venture answers to these questions, based on the relevant comparative structural analysis: we study Iamblichus' method of quoting Plato, someone for whose surviving books we have excellent manuscript evidence. Our guiding initial hypothesis is that Iamblichus employed the same method of constructing his book when he was quoting Aristotle as when he was quoting Plato. In Section 1 we review the status of the question; in Section 2 we present the results of our study of the Plato quotations; and in Section 3 we apply these results to the chapters in which Iamblichus used Aristotle as a source, and find that the above initial hypothesis is amply confirmed. In Section 4 we summarize our conclusions.

The method of literary construction used by Iamblichus for both the Plato and the Aristotle chapters is to assemble into each chapter one or a few pure blocks of quotation in a natural sequence, marking them off from each other by thin comments of his own. The blocks of quotation are solid and pure, in that no passages are removed from them and no extraneous passages are added to them, though they are sometimes carefully modified. The sequence of quotation blocks is natural, in that Iamblichus never returns to a work he has earlier been quoting from, nor does he ever return to any earlier part of a work he has been quoting from.

When we deconstruct chapters 6–12 of Iamblichus' book in the light of this newly discovered construction method, a number of powerful conclusions emerge: the seven chapters contain fourteen separate blocks of quotation, each apparently a pure block of quo-

tation from Aristotle, marked off by thin comments by Iamblichus; the blocks of quotation may or may not have been carefully modified, but Aristotle's line of thought has apparently not been modified at all; several internal references and connected themes link the material in the seven chapters together and guarantee that they all come from the same work of Aristotle; the protreptic contents of several blocks guarantee that this one work was his *Protrepticus*; and, finally, the natural sequence of quotations mirrors and preserves the sequence of passages in Aristotle's original work.

Our scrutiny of the Plato quotations will also show that Iamblichus must have been making careful copies from good manuscripts, so his quotations of the *Protrepticus*, when used with appropriate caution, have an evidential status which is equivalent to that of a manuscript of Aristotle's lost work. Newly authenticating these quotations is as good as finding a trustworthy new manuscript. Yet we must at the same time recognize that this newly trustworthy witness is also an incomplete one, whose testimony contains lacunae: when Iamblichus selected fourteen blocks to quote from, he skipped over the material in the thirteen gaps between the blocks, as well as the beginning of the book and (probably) the end.

It is difficult to exaggerate the significance for Aristotle studies of what is at stake in these claims. Our knowledge of virtually every theme and topic in Aristotle's thought is enhanced when we confidently take into consideration the *Protrepticus* evidence. For example, every recent study of Aristotle's *ergon* argument that has not taken account of the *Protrepticus* evidence in chapter 9 rests on a defective, or at least incomplete, basis of evidence,¹ and likewise for the discussions of pleasure that have not studied the subtle argument at the end of chapter 11. This lost work, even in this partial survival, is rich in stirring expressions of Aristotelian insight into central questions concerning reason and the human good.

Unlike Plato, all of whose published dialogues survive, Aristotle had the misfortune to have all of his published works perish. And then, when these large blocks of quotation were rediscovered in 1869 by Bywater, the doubts and confusions of scholars condemned the work to a second death. But this second loss is reversible, and much will be gained when these newly authenticated fragments

¹ This includes the analysis of the other two versions of the argument, in *Eudemian Ethics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, in ch. 3 of D. S. Hutchinson, *The Virtues of Aristotle* (London, 1986).

bring the twice-lost *Protrepticus* back into the classroom, where future generations of students and scholars are likely to continue to sharpen our focus and deepen our appreciation of the totality of Aristotle's philosophy. This is probably our only chance to have any real access to any of Aristotle's published works, barring future papyrus discoveries of substantial extent, and hence our only chance to assess his thought through both of his main channels of written expression: specialized treatises written originally for an inner circle of listeners, and lively works of philosophy written for a wider external or 'exoteric' public of readers.

Readers whose primary interest is in Aristotle's *Protrepticus* will want to read subsections 3.1 to 3.8, if only because these sections include new translations of all of the Aristotle material that might be recovered from this part of Iamblichus' work; but they should also look at subsection 2.8, which summarizes the Plato chapters. Those sceptical about our reasoning will want to scrutinize the rest of Section 2 as well. Both sets of readers may want to orient themselves first with Section 1, a brief historical overview of the status of the scholarly question, and finish with Section 4, which summarizes the results of the whole study, draws general conclusions, and takes fresh stock of the status of the question.

1. Status of the question, p. 196; 2. The Plato chapters (13–19), p. 203; 2.1. Preliminary remarks, p. 203; 2.2. Chapter 14: quotations from *Theaetetus*, p. 206; 2.3. Chapters 15 and 16: quotations from *Republic* 7, p. 213; 2.4. Chapter 17: quotations from *Gorgias*, p. 218; 2.5. Chapter 18: quotations from *Gorgias*, p. 220; 2.6. Chapter 13: quotations from *Phaedo*, p. 224; 2.7. Chapter 19: quotations from *Gorgias*, *Menexenus*, *Laus* 2, p. 235; 2.8. Summary and conclusions about the Plato chapters, p. 240; 3. The Aristotle chapters (6–12), p. 242; 3.1. Preliminary remarks, p. 242; 3.2. Chapter 7, p. 244; 3.3. Chapter 8, p. 252; 3.4. Chapter 9, p. 258; 3.5. Chapter 10, p. 262; 3.6. Chapter 11, p. 265; 3.7. Chapter 6, p. 269; 3.8. Chapter 12, p. 278; 4. Summary, conclusions, and new status of the question, p. 281.

1. Status of the question

In the ancient world, the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle was probably his most famous work, and perhaps one of the most famous works of

philosophy by any author.² We are certain that Aristotle wrote a work with that title; the title appears in all three lists of Aristotle's works that have survived from antiquity.³ It is also clear from reports naming the book that in it Aristotle set out arguments with this conclusion: φιλοσοφῆτέον, 'one should do philosophy'.⁴

Beyond that, nothing is certain. For example, how long was the *Protrepticus*? The lists disagree as to how many books it had: two of the lists say one, another three; perhaps it was sometimes written on two rolls. Was it a dialogue? It is listed among other dialogues, but none of the testimony or fragments tells us that it was, nor does any solid evidence seem to preserve any actual dialogue. The bulk of the evidence now available to us is lodged in the pages of Iamblichus, who seems to have quoted from the work at times, but without giving any indication of where and when he was quoting, or from what work, to make matters worse, he took various liberties with the works of Plato that he also exploited. These problems, compounded with confusions of their own making, have made scholars quite

² We have a number of well-known reports about the book being read in antiquity. Zeno said that Crates, while sitting in a shoemaker's workshop, read the *Protrepticus*, aloud to the shoemaker (Stob. 4.32.25). Cicero evidently looked to it in writing his own exhortation to philosophy: 'Nor... are the arguments unknown which Cicero used in his *Hortensius*, which he modelled on a protreptic pattern' (*Hist. Aug.* II. 97.20–2 Hohl). Cicero's book had, in its turn, an influence on Augustine, who says in his *Confessions*: 'I had already come across a book by a certain Cicero... That book of his contains an exhortation to study philosophy and is entitled *Hortensius*. The book changed my feelings... I longed for the immortality of wisdom with an incredible ardour in my heart... "Love of wisdom" is the meaning of the Greek word *philosophia*; this book kindled my love for it' (3.4.7–8, trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford, 1991)). Another passage shows that Augustine was aware that some of the content of Cicero's book was borrowed from Aristotle (see below, pp. 256–7). Boethius also exploited an idea in Aristotle's work, either directly or indirectly (via Cicero's *Hortensius*), at *Cons.* 3.8 (see below, p. 255).

³ *Προπρεπτικὸς α'*, D.L. 5.22, title 12; *Προπρεπτικὸς α'*, *Vita Herculii*, title 14; 'His book in which he exhorts to philosophy, three books. In Greek entitled *προπρεπτικὸς φιλοσοφίας*', notes Prolemy-el-Garib, title 1–2, trans. in I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg, 1957), 222.

⁴ Alexander's is the earliest report, and is possibly the source on which the subsequent reports are based: 'if someone were to deny that you should do philosophy, then, since "to do philosophy" means not only to investigate this very thing—whether you should do philosophy or not (as he [sc. Aristotle] says in the *Protrepticus*)—but also to pursue philosophical contemplation, we will utterly refute the proposal by demonstrating that each of these is the proper business of human beings' (Alex. *Apbr. In Top.* 149.9–15 Wallies; cf. *Suda*, s.v. φιλοσοφείν, Φ 414 Adler). The other reports are: David, *Prolegomena to Philosophy*, 9.2–12 Busse; Elias, *Prolegomena to Philosophy*, 3.17–23 Busse; Olymp. *In Alc.* 144 Creuzer; Anonymous scholion to Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, found in the margin of fo. 263^v of a manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, Cod. Par. gr. 2064.

uncertain whether any particular passage in Iamblichus is a reliably accurate version of Aristotle's work.

Because of such uncertainties, the *Protrepticus* has fallen into neglect and, because it is the most important of the exoteric works (and it remains the most extensively preserved), its fall has taken with it most of the other exoteric works of Aristotle. But from the 1860s up to the 1950s there was much enthusiasm for the project of compiling the fragments of the exoteric works of Aristotle, and of possibly even recovering and reconstructing them. A pioneer of this work was V. Rose, at first in his collection *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus* (1863), and then in his collection of fragments for the fifth volume of the Berlin edition of Aristotle (1870).⁵

In 1869, when Ingram Bywater, in the second volume of the *Journal of Philology*,⁶ argued that large parts of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* contained extracts from Aristotle's lost work, scholars became interested in that work specifically. By 1886 Rose had published eleven groups of fragments over seventeen pages of his Teubner edition of the fragments.⁷ This was the edition that Werner Jaeger used in expounding his hugely influential interpretation *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*,⁸ based in large part on a reading of the *Protrepticus*. Inspired by Jaeger's highly productive use of this material, R. Walzer produced a collection of the fragments of Aristotle's dialogues, adding many new fragments and documenting many persuasive parallels to the extant works of Aristotle.⁹ On the basis of Walzer's edition, W. D. Ross published a first translation and then an edition of the *Protrepticus* (in his *Select Fragments*, vol. xii of the Oxford Translation of Aristotle).¹⁰ Things seemed to be going well for the *Protrepticus* and the fragments of Aristotle in the first half of the twentieth century. The

acme was in 1957 at the Symposium Aristotelicum at Oxford devoted to discussing the connections between Aristotle's early works and the Academy.¹¹ Some members of the Symposium decided to collect all the evidence and fragments of Aristotle's dialogues in order to produce completely new editions. Ingemar Düring, who had already published articles on the *Protrepticus*,¹² was charged with producing a comprehensive edition. Although Düring was a staunch anti-developmental, he nevertheless saw tremendous value in what could be recovered, particularly in the Iamblichean material.

It was at this point, mid-twentieth-century, that things went badly wrong for the effort to recover the *Protrepticus*. Sceptics had always been uneasy with Bywater's use of the lost and reconstructed *Hortensius* of Cicero as evidence for the lost *Protrepticus* of Aristotle, and the material in Iamblichus seemed to be infected at times with so many Neoplatonic intrusions that it might all be just a production of his. W. G. Rabinowitz published a monograph,¹³ the first part of a projected two-part series, that aimed to expose as fool's gold all of the flecks that had been panned by Walzer, Ross, and others, not to mention the earlier work of Bignone,¹⁴ who feverishly compiled and commented on what he perceived to be dozens of fragments from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, fragments whose links to solid reports that explicitly mention Aristotle and his work are sometimes rather tenuous.

The publication, soon afterwards, of Düring's *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*¹⁵ was aimed in part at refuting Rabinowitz, but was ultimately counter-productive in the effort to answer growing scepticism. There are many reasons for this, but foremost was the fact that Düring, assuming that Iamblichus

⁵ V. Rose (ed.), *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus* (Leipzig, 1863); id., 'Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta', in *Opera omnia Aristotelis*, v (Berlin, 1870), 1463–589.

⁶ I. Bywater, 'On a Lost Dialogue of Aristotle' ['Lost Dialogue'], *Journal of Philology*, 2 (1869), 55–69.

⁷ V. Rose (ed.), *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1886; repr. 1966).

⁸ W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* [Entwicklung] (Berlin, 1923); all references are to the English translation by R. Robinson (Oxford, 1948).

⁹ R. Walzer (ed.), *Aristotelis dialogorum fragmenta* (Florence, 1934).

¹⁰ W. D. Ross (trans.), *Select Fragments = The Works of Aristotle*, xii (Oxford, 1952);

W. D. Ross (ed.), *Aristotelis fragmenta selecta* (Oxford, 1955).

¹¹ I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century: Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum Held at Oxford in August, 1957* [Mid-Fourth Century] (Göteborg, 1960).

¹² I. Düring, 'Problems in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*' ['Problems'], *Eranos*, 52 (1954), 139–71; id., 'Aristotle in the *Protrepticus*', in *Autour d'Aristote: recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à A. Mansion* (Louvain, 1955), 81–97.

¹³ W. G. Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of its Reconstruction*, vol. i [Sources] (Berkeley, 1957).

¹⁴ E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* [Perduto] (2 vols. Florence, 1936); id., 'Nuove testimonianze e frammenti del *Protreptico* di Aristotele', *Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica*, 64 (1936), 225–37.

¹⁵ I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction* [Attempt] (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 12, Göteborg, 1961).

had rearranged the material for his own purposes, himself further fragmented the text (by dividing it and labelling 110 fragments of unequal length), and arbitrarily reordered the fragments according to his own conception of its philosophical point and rhetorical genre. This rendered the work essentially unusable. Despite this, however, it is still being translated into several modern languages.¹⁶ Düring's edition is much of the reason why the *Protrepticus* has not been greatly used by Aristotle scholars in the ensuing decades, with some notable exceptions.¹⁷ The Munich dissertation of Gerhart Schneeweiss,¹⁸ which followed Düring's method of reorganization but went further by interspersing passages from extant works of Aristotle, was no more successful.

Rabinowitz's negative thesis was ruinously criticized by many eminent reviewers,¹⁹ so much so, apparently, that he never carried out his intention²⁰ to assay the rest of the fragments attributed to Aristotle, which included almost all of what was contained in Lam-

¹⁶ First into English, by Düring himself, and also by A. H. Chroust, *Aristotle: Protrepticus. A Reconstruction* (Notre Dame, 1964), and then by J. Barnes and G. Lawrence in a section entitled 'Fragments: Dialogues', in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation* [Revised Aristotle] (2 vols.; Princeton, 1984), ii, 2403–17. Düring also translated his rearranged *Protrepticus* into German, in *Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles* (Frankfurt a.M., 1969), and it was translated into Italian by E. Berti, in *Aristotle: Protreptico. Esortazione alla filosofia* (Turin, 2000), into French by J. Follon, in *Aristote: Invitation à la philosophie* (Paris, 2000), and into Romanian by B. Minca and C. Partenie, in *Aristotle: Protreptical* (Bucharest, 2005). However, the most recent Italian translation, by M. Casaglia, rejects the rearrangement of Düring and returns to Ross's arrangement, in *Aristotle: Protreptico. Esortazione alla filosofia* (Florence, 2001).

¹⁷ G. E. R. Lloyd, *Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought* (Cambridge, 1968), 33–41; D. Sedley, 'Is Aristotle's Teleology Anthropocentric?' ['Teleology Anthropocentric?'], *Phronesis*, 36 (1991), 179–96; S. Menn, 'The Origins of Aristotle's Concept of *énergia*: *énergia* and *dúnaui*' ['Origins'], *Ancient Philosophy*, 14 (1994), 73–114; A. W. Nightingale, *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Natural Context* (Cambridge, 2004), ch. 5; M. Johnson, *Aristotle on Teleology* (Oxford, 2005).

¹⁸ G. Schneeweiss, 'Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles' ['Der Protreptikos'] (diss. Munich, 1966). We have not yet been able to consult the freshly published translation of the *Protrepticus* by Schneeweiss (2005).

¹⁹ Including: W. Spoerri, *Gnomon*, 32 (1960) 18–25; P. Moraux, *L'Antiquité classique*, 27 (1958), 460–4; S. Mansion, *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 56 (1958), 316–20; D. Furley, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 89 (1959), 178–80; D. J. Allan, *Classical Review*, NS 9 (1959), 124–7; P. Wilpert, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 42 (1960), 101–6; E. Berti, *La filosofia del primo Aristotele* ['Primo Aristotele'] (Padua, 1962), 2nd edn. (Milan, 1997), 397–8, 407–8, 411–13.

²⁰ 'I therefore propose to review in chapter ii all the *testimonia* and the first five fragments listed in Walzer's collection, as the first step of a study which will eventually bring all the fragments under review' (Rabinowitz, *Sources*, 22).

blichus' *Protrepticus*. In fact, Rabinowitz studied only a single set of Iamblichus' excerpts of Plato (but not the relevant one), and he studied only one²¹ of the alleged fragments of Aristotle, and so his work is of limited importance to the hypothesis of this paper and to the passages on which we concentrate our argument: Iamblichus' excerpts of Plato and Aristotle.

In 1965 Helmut Flashar made some progress towards an understanding of Iamblichus' method of quotation in an important article,²² in which he argued that the key to isolating the Aristotle material from its Iamblichean encasement was to study the way that Iamblichus had used Plato in the same work. Since we have a solid and independent manuscript tradition for the Plato material, we can judge Iamblichus' fidelity to his source, and learn about his method of quotation, by studying how he quoted or modified Plato's dialogues. Remarkably, no one, not even Düring or Rabinowitz, had done this systematically.

Even more remarkably, Flashar himself did not do it completely; he gave only an outline account²³ of the Plato excerpts in his article, and based his comments on the 'exhaustive comparison' that had been made in an essay written for a seminar by a graduate student of his named A. Schnauffer. Our present work is the first complete study of the Plato excerpts in Iamblichus, and the first complete analysis of the Aristotle section in the light of such a study. Our more complete study yields more solid results.

Before presenting the results of this study, a word about what we do not touch on in this article. We shall not be expounding or evaluating any of the alleged fragments other than the material preserved in these seven chapters (6–12) of the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus. We believe that this material can be recovered and authenticated independently of the other evidence which has sometimes been called into play, including the preceding chapter (5) of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*.²⁴ Also excluded is the evidence derived

²¹ And he studied this single passage with arguments that were less than cogent; see below, pp. 274–5.

²² H. Flashar, 'Platon und Aristoteles im Protreptikos des Iamblichos' ['Platon und Aristoteles'], *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 47 (1965), 53–79, repr. in P. Moraux (ed.), *Frühschriften des Aristoteles* (Darmstadt, 1975), 247–69, and in Flashar, *Dieckel: Ausgewählte Kleine Schriften* (Amsterdam, 1989), 297–323.

²³ 'Auch hier kann eine solche Untersuchung nicht in allen Einzelheiten ausbreitet werden' ['nor can such an investigation be laid out in all its details here'] ('Platon und Aristoteles', 57).

²⁴ Whether it contains any material that can reliably be attributed to Aristotle

from chapters 26–7 of the next work in the Pythagorean sequence of Lamblichus, the *De communium mathematica scientia*.²⁵ Hard-won experience has taught us that these other two stretches of text were composed by Lamblichus using significantly different techniques of literary construction.

Nor do we here deal with any of the evidence not supplied by Lamblichus: the various papyrus fragments that have been attributed to the *Protrepticus*, the scattered evidence that has been variously used to reconstruct Cicero's protreptic dialogue *Hortensius*, and the various and numerous alleged fragments or reflections or echoes of the work. We believe that the simultaneous treatment of all of these (extremely diverse) kinds of evidence has obscured the picture and confused the scene. By focusing exclusively on the quoted blocks of Lamblichus evidence, independently and analytically, we hope to stake out solid ground in what Glenn Most has called the swampiest of the 'many swamps in Aristotelian studies'.²⁶

Not only is it possible to establish chapters 6–12 as authentic quotations before attempting to authenticate the other alleged fragments, it is also necessary: in order to evaluate any alleged fragment of a work as authentic, one needs ideally a large and solid body of independent evidence about that work. Without chapters 6–12, the *Protrepticus* simply cannot be substantially resurrected except by a miraculous future papyrus discovery; with these chapters, we get not only the lion's share of the currently available evidence, but also a large and solid body of evidence which will serve, in future

research, to anchor arguments about the other evidence. These chapters are the key to settling the disputes.

Of course, the recovery of Aristotle will be worthwhile only if the material recovered is philosophically interesting; but that is virtually the only thing about the *Protrepticus* that has never been in dispute.

2. The Plato chapters (13–19)

2.1 Preliminary remarks

Our source²⁷ is the second book of Lamblichus' series of nine (or ten) books²⁸ *On Pythagoreanism*. John Dillon has said that

very little in these books is original to Lamblichus. They are chiefly centos of passages from earlier writers, including Plato and Aristotle, and they have been found useful mainly on that account (large parts of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* have been discerned, with great probability, in Lamblichus' work of the same title, and a nameless 5th century B.C. Sophist is discernible in the same work). All Lamblichus contributes is introductory and bridge-material, useful chiefly from the stylistic and terminological standpoint.²⁹

Lamblichus' *Προτρεπτικός ἐνὶ φιλοσοφίας* (hereafter, *Protrepticus*) contains twenty-one chapters, designed and titled by Lamblichus himself. Lamblichus even composed his own chapter headings, possibly the first for an ancient book of philosophy.³⁰

²⁷ Jamblique, *Protreptique*, ed. E. Des Places (Paris, 1989); all page and line numbers refer to this edition.

²⁸ There are various possible titles for this series of works; see D. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity* (Oxford, 1989), 32–3. Of the works in the series, the extant ones are: (1) *Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου*; (2) *Προτρεπτικός ἐνὶ φιλοσοφίας*; (3) *Περὶ τῆς κοινῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης*; (4) *Περὶ τῆς Νικολάου ἀριθμητικῆς ἐπιστήμης*; the remaining five or six books are lost.

²⁹ J. Dillon, 'Lamblichus of Chalcedon (c. 240–325 A.D.)' [*Lamblichus*], *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, 36.2 (1987), 862–909 at 876.

³⁰ A. Segonds in Des Places' edition of Lamblichus' *Protrepticus* (see n. 27) informs us (155) that Lamblichus' 'Képhalaia sont peu-être le plus ancien exemple authentique, dans un texte philosophique, de ce genre littéraire; cf. H. D. Saffrey-L. G. Westerink, in Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, 1 (Paris, 1968), p. 130 n. 2.' Saffrey–Westrink (129 n. 2) report that Syrianus treats the chapter headings in the DCM of Lamblichus as authentic (*In Metaph.*, 101. 29–102. 25 Kroll). Chapter headings in ancient books were studied by H. Mutschmann, 'Inhaltsangabe und Kapitelüberschrift im antiken Buch', *Hermes*, 46 (1911), 93–107. For the headings in Porphyry's *Isagoge* and later commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories*, see J. Barnes (trans.), *Porphyry: Introduction, with a Commentary* (Oxford, 2003), xvii n. 35.

is a controversial issue, well summarized by Berti: 'It was already included among the Aristotelian extracts by Bywater, who made the series begin with it; then it was rejected by Hirzel and Rose, admitted by Hartlich, rejected again by Jaeger and thus by Walzer and Ross, admitted, lastly, by Nuyens, Festugière, Décarie, and Düring. Against attributing it to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* are the fact that Lamblichus presents it as a Pythagorean doctrine, and the occurrence of a few terms of clearly Stoic origin' ('*Primo*' *Aristotele*, 447). D. J. Allan studied the chapter closely, and argues for attributing the chapter to Posidonius, to whom a *Protrepticus* is attributed in Diogenes Laertius (7. 91, 129); see 'A Passage from Lamblichus in Praise of the Contemplative Life', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 57 (1975), 246–68.

²⁵ N. Festa (ed.), *Lamblichus: De communium mathematica scientia* [DCM] (Leipzig, 1891; suppl. U. Klein, repr. Stuttgart, 1975). Nor do we deal here with the related parallels in Proclus' *Commentary on Euclid*, which arguably derive from his reading of Lamb. DCM 26–7.

²⁶ G. Most, 'Some New Fragments of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*?' [*New Fragments*], in *Studi su codici e papiri filosofici: Platone, Aristotele, Ierode* (Studi e testi per il Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, 6; Florence, 1992), 189–216 at 205.

We can describe the contents of these chapters in three groups. Chapters 1-4, altogether about fifteen pages in the Budé edition of *Des Places*, contain an introduction (including methodological remarks), a chapter of common sayings or *γνώμαι*, a chapter on specifically Pythagorean *γνώμαι*, and a chapter of protreptic arguments which Iamblichus calls 'esoteric' in the sense of being native to an inner Pythagorean tradition; he attributes these, probably incorrectly, to the Pythagorean philosopher Archytas, in his work *On Wisdom*, 'right at the beginning' (ch. 4, 48. 26-7). Chapters 5-20, about seventy-six Budé pages, contain what Iamblichus calls 'mixed protreptic', an odd term which turns out to mean protreptic material borrowed from other writers, chiefly Plato and, it seems, Aristotle, organized by Iamblichus to fit in with his Pythagorean protreptic scheme. Iamblichus makes a point of saying (ch. 1, 41. 3-8) that his synthetic and syncretic work is very much open to protreptic arguments from every philosophical tradition: 'For protreptic will incite to philosophy itself and to philosophizing in general, according to every system of thought, no particular school being expressly preferred, but all being accepted according to their peculiar merits, and ranked higher than mere human studies, by a common and popular mode of protreptic.' Chapter 21, about twenty Budé pages, contains thirty-nine sections, each consisting of one of the Pythagorean maxims or *σύνβολα*, with brief commentary.

Two things are immediately evident from this arrangement. First, the bulk of Iamblichus' work is made up of quotations taken from other writers, especially Plato and Aristotle, it seems, but also the so-called Anonymus Iamblichi (in chapter 20).³¹ Secondly, Iamblichus has presented all of this material as if it was all already Pythagorean in content, and he has placed the least officially Pythagorean material within a shell of Pythagorean scholasticism. Iamblichus himself describes in his first chapter his plan for the book and his methodology of using sources:

After this we must use a sort of 'middle' method, neither thoroughly popular nor yet utterly Pythagorean, but not completely removed from each of these two modes either. In this way, we will organize the common and universal encouragements to philosophy, so as to present them separately from Pythagorean dogma, at least by way of this mode, but we will mix

³¹ For the Anonymus Iamblichi, see *Anonimo di Giamblico: La pace e il benessere. Idee sull'economia, la società, la morale*, trans., intro., and comm. by M. Mari with a preface by D. Musti (Milan, 2003).

in, in the most opportune way, the most authoritative opinions of these men as well, so that it becomes familiar what the mode of the Pythagorean protreptic is, at least by way of this mediate mode of argument. (Iambli. *Protr.* ch. 1, 41. 8-17; cf. ch. 21, 131. 16-132. 15)

We see expressed his commitment to gathering protreptic arguments from various sources, compiling 'common and universal' encouragements to philosophy, 'according to every system of thought, no particular school being expressly preferred'.

Here is a synopsis of the Plato material used in the later chapters of Iamblichus' book. The words 'opening' and 'closing' refer to short passages, not from Plato but written by Iamblichus, at the beginnings and endings of his chapters (generally of one sentence, but sometimes several); 'bridge' refers to a short transitional passage, not from Plato but written by Iamblichus. These will be carefully studied in what follows.

- Ch. 13. *Opening*—*Phaedo* 64 A-69 D—*bridge*—*Phaedo* 82 B-84 B—*bridge*—*Phaedo* 107 C-D—*closing*.
- Ch. 14. *Opening*—*Theaet.* 173 C-177 B—*closing*.
- Ch. 15. *Opening*—*Rep.* 7, 514 A-517 C—*closing*.
- Ch. 16. *Opening*—*Rep.* 7, 518 B-519 B—*closing*.
- Ch. 17. *Opening*—*Gorg.* 492 E-494 A—*closing*.
- Ch. 18. *Opening*—*Gorg.* 504 A-505 B—*closing*.
- Ch. 19. *Opening*—*Gorg.* 506 C-508 A—*bridge*—*Menex.* 246 D-247 B—*bridge*—*Menex.* 247 E-248 B—*bridge*—*Laus* 2, 660 E-661 C—*closing*.

Two general features are immediately evident from this catalogue: each chapter is designed as a vehicle to contain one or a few Plato blocks; the blocks of Plato are selected from several works, distributed unevenly across the chapters of Iamblichus.

To go into a little more detail on chapter design: each chapter is designed to contain Plato material, within bookends consisting of thin opening and closing passages written by Iamblichus; the Plato material in any chapter is discontinuous from the material in other chapters; the chapters have either one block of Plato quotations, or up to four discontinuous blocks, in which case they are separated from every other by a bridge passage written by Iamblichus. In this chapter design, passages written by Iamblichus always indicate a gap in the continuity of the citation, and any two discontinuous citations are always separated by passages written by him.

To go into a little more detail on selection of material: the twelve

blocks of Plato quotations come from six works, placed unevenly into the seven chapters: 13 = *Phaedo*, 14 = *Theaetetus*, 15 + 16 = *Republic* 7, 17 + 18 = *Gorgias*, 19 = *Gorgias* + *Menexenus* + *Laus* 2. One chapter contains more than one work, and two works occupy more than one chapter. Two works contribute one block only (*Theaetetus*, *Laus* 2), but the other four contribute two or three blocks, either across two or three chapters (*Republic* 7, *Gorgias*) or within a single chapter (*Phaedo*, *Menexenus*). When moving from block to block, *Lamblichus* uses works one by one, not returning to a work once he has moved on to another; and, within a work, he follows the work in its natural sequence, not going back to earlier passages in a work after he has already quoted later passages.

But here is the crucial question for us: how faithful to Plato are these twelve blocks of quotation? Are they literal quotations, or modified quotations, or paraphrases, or passing references, or some other kind of new tissue made of old patches and threads cut from the ancient book? To answer this crucial question we need to make a comparison of the two versions, Plato's and *Lamblichus*', collating them passage by passage, word by word, and letter by letter, and then noting and explaining all the differences. This is a complex and laborious job, but not an impossibly huge one, as the relevant part of the text is only about thirty pages long. In the comparisons below, we give the results of our study, beginning with chapter 14, described in excruciating detail, with every single difference between the two versions referred to and displayed, in both Greek and English. Other chapters will be described and explained more rapidly, but still with all the differences noted and referred to at least schematically.

2.2. Chapter 14: quotations from *Theaetetus*

With those preliminaries offered, let us roll up our sleeves and report the results of the collations, starting with chapter 14. Conclusions about this chapter are to be found on p. 213, for those readers who have little interest in the details; and summary conclusions drawn from all seven Plato chapters are to be found in subsection 2.8, on p. 240.

Consider the following abbreviated version of chapter 14. We shall use boldface to express our scholarly comments, and we shall

represent *Lamblichus*' words in italic and Plato's unmodified words in roman typeface.

Chapter 14. It's necessary also to construct the protreptic starting from the way of life of the men who are 'chieftains' in philosophy, following the precepts of Pythagoras. So, to begin with, the fellows who are like this, I suppose, grow up not knowing the market place (... here follows a long section in which Lamblichus continues to follow Theaet. 173 c 9–177 a 7 ...) In the end, the things he says do not satisfy even himself, that famous eloquence of his somehow dries up, and he is left looking nothing more than a child. *So if this is how things stand, and the most divine and most successful way of life appears to be that of those who lead their lives in philosophy, there's nothing else to be done except to embrace philosophy with a noble spirit.* (*Lamb. Protr. ch. 14, 100. 21–105. 27*)

Lamblichus has begun and ended this chapter in his own voice,²² but otherwise followed his source text closely. This 'close following' of Plato is, however, not exact quotation, but rather a particular sort of modified quotation, as there are certain alterations deliberately introduced into the text by *Lamblichus* to erase the dialogue frame and efface the speakers. Let us examine each of these types of difference carefully.

The famous speech that *Lamblichus* has excerpted in this chapter is also a self-contained speech in its original context in Plato's *Theaetetus*; in form it is an *epideixis*, in this case a display of the suitability of the philosopher's stance towards the public political world, containing the unforgettable image of Thales observing the heavens above and falling down a well. It is preceded by an open choice of what topic to speak about (173 c) and concludes with a decisive putting aside of the topic; after his rhetorical climax 'left looking nothing more than a child', Socrates says (177 b 7–8), 'But we had better leave it there; all this is really a digression.' Into this self-contained *epideixis* Plato has written minimal interventions²³ on the part of Theodorus, so as to keep the illusion of dialogue

²² Even when writing in his own voice, he borrowed a colourful word from the local environment, *chamaeleon*-wise (e.g. 173 c 8 *κορυδαίων* 'chieftains').

²³ The interventions are minimal in the sense that they consist either of pure unqualified question ('what do you mean?' at 174 a 3 and 176 e 2) or else pure unqualified assertion ('very much so', 'what you say is true', 'that's just like how it happens' at 177 a 9, 174 b 8, 175 b 7), apart from this unexpected profession of faith (176 a 2–4): 'Socrates, if your arguments convinced everyone else as much as they convince me, there would be more peace and less wickedness on earth.' This is not to say that the dialogue frame is of minimal importance for Plato's work; on the contrary, it is so important that Plato needs to keep reminding us of it. But it was

ticking over while the speech takes place, and it is exactly these interventions that Lamblichus has removed in his modified quotation.

Consider this first case, laid out in comparative fashion: first, a wider passage from Plato in translation, with a narrow passage highlighted in bold, showing the zone of alteration; next, this narrow passage in Greek; then, the corresponding narrow passage in Lamblichus in Greek; finally, the corresponding wider passage from Lamblichus in translation, showing the zone of alteration highlighted in bold. What is not highlighted has not been modified in any way.

... (the philosopher), geometrizing upon earth, measuring its surfaces, astronomizing in the heavens above, tracking down by every path the whole nature of each entire existing thing, not condescending to anything that lies near to hand. **What do you mean by that, Socrates? For instance, they say Thales was studying the stars, Theodorus, and looking upwards, when he fell into a well...**

πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; — ὥσπερ καὶ Θαλὴν ἀστρονομίζοντα, ὃ θεόδωρε, καὶ αὐτὸν βλέποντα

(*Theaet.* 174 A 3–5 ≈ *Protr.* 101. 14–15)

ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ Θαλὴν ἀστρονομίζοντα καὶ ἀναβλέποντα

... (the philosopher), geometrizing upon earth, measuring its surfaces, astronomizing in the heavens above, tracking down by every path the whole nature of each entire existing thing, not condescending to anything that lies near to hand. **For instance, they say Thales was studying the stars and looking up, when he fell into a well...**

The dialogue exchange is excised with surgical precision, doing no harm to the surrounding organ of argumentation, leaving no scar tissue: nobody would be able to tell from this quotation, as modified by Lamblichus, that there was originally a quick exchange of words between speakers at the highlighted point; even an appropriate connecting particle δὲ is supplied, to stitch together the interrupted words of Socrates.

A second example will further illustrate this surgical technique of dialogue excision:

... (the punishment for injustice) is not what they suppose—corporal and not important for Lamblichus' work, indeed counter-productive to it, in much the same way that modern interpreters of the speech prefer not to be distracted by the dialogue. For a detailed recent study of the speech, see D. Sedley, *The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus* [Midwife] (Oxford, 2004), 62–86.

capital punishment—things which they might entirely escape, in spite of their crimes. It is a punishment from which there is no escape. **And what is that? One of the patterns established in reality, my friend, is of what is godly and highly successful, and another one is of what is godless and utterly miserable...**

τίνα δὲ λέγεις; — παραδειγμάτων, ὃ φιλᾷ, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστώτων
(*Theaet.* 176 B 2–3 ≈ *Protr.* 105. 6)

παραδειγμάτων γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστώτων

... (the punishment for injustice) is not what they suppose—corporal and capital punishment—things which they might entirely escape, in spite of their crimes. It is a punishment from which there is no escape. **For one of the patterns established in reality is of what is godly and highly successful, and another one is of what is godless and utterly miserable...**

Simple excisions of content-neutral speech exchanges such as the above also take place twice more (174 B 7–C 1, 175 B 7–8) in Lamblichus' modified quotation of *Theaetetus*. But sometimes the surgery is a little more elaborate, not a simple deletion of the interlocutor's words, but a partial exploitation, as here:

... they will listen to us as clever men and rascals listen to certain fools. **Indeed, very much so, Socrates. I know it, my friend; but there is a certain one thing...**

καὶ μάλα δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες. — οἷδ' αὖτε τοι, ὦ φίλοι, ἐν μέντοι τι

(*Theaet.* 177 A 9–B 1 ≈ *Protr.* 105. 17)

καὶ μάλα δὲ ὑμέτερον φρονούντες. ἐν μέντοι τι

... they will listen to us as clever men and rascals listen to certain fools, **and think themselves very much superior; but there is a certain one thing...**

A slightly more complex case is the following one, which exploits the whole of a significant comment by the interlocutor Theodorus, the only one of his utterances that was not a neutral question or neutral assertion:

... (only philosophers are able) to tune the strings of common speech to the fitting praise of the way of life of gods and of successful men. Socrates, if your words convinced everyone as they do me, there would be more peace and less evil among them. But it is not possible for evil to be destroyed, Theodorus; some opposite...

εἰ πάντας, ὦ Θεόδωρε, πείθεις ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων αὖ εἰρήνη καὶ

κακὰ ἐλάττω καὶ ἀνθρώπους εἶη. — ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατὸν, ὃ θεόδωκε — ἡμεναρίον γάρ τι

Theaet. 176 A 2–6 ≈ *Protr.* 104. 3–7

οἶμαι δὴ οὐν, εἰ πείθονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς τοῖς, πλείονα αὖ εἰρήνην καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω καὶ αὐτοὺς ἔσεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὐν κακὰ οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι δυνατὸν ἡμεναρίον γάρ τι. . . .

. . . (only philosophers are able) to tune the strings of common speech to the fitting praise of the way of life of gods and of successful men. And so I think, if people were convinced by this, there will be more peace and less evil among them. Now then, it is not possible for evil to be destroyed, some opposite . . .

Notice that in this case Iamblichus removes the address to Theodorus, as of course he needs to, to efface the speakers. He also does this in the other places where Socrates addresses his silent listener, simply excising 'sir' and 'my good man' from the text (177 B 4, 176 B 2), and effecting a simple replacement here:

Of the two types, **Theodorus**, this is the man who has been brought up in real freedom and leisure, the one you call a philosopher, to whom it is no disgrace to seem naïve . . .

οὗτος δὲ ἐκάρτου τρόπος, ὃ θεόδωκε, ὃ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ πεποιημένον, ὃν δὲ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ὃ ἀνεμέσσην εἰρήβει δοκεῖν

Theaet. 175 D 7–E 2 ≈ *Protr.* 103. 22–4

οὗτος δὲ ἐκάρτου τρόπος τῆς ζωῆς ὃ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ πεποιημένον, ὃν δὲ φιλόσοφον καλεῖν, (ὃ) ἀνεμέσσην εἰρήβει δοκεῖν

Of the two types of **life**, this is the man who has been brought up in real freedom and leisure, the one to call³⁴ a philosopher, to whom³⁵ it is no disgrace to seem naïve . . .

This completes our inventory of the modifications implemented by Iamblichus to flatten to monologue by erasing the dialogue frame and effacing the speakers, each of them executed with as little change to the text as possible. There is only one further modification in the chapter, of the opening words, so that they flow on more smoothly from the opening sentence written by Iamblichus:

³⁴ As the translation indicates, the text of Iamblichus has suffered corruption here: in H. Pistelli's earlier edition (*Iamblich Protrepticus* (Leipzig, 1888)), he had supplemented δὴ (δε) ('the one that should be called a philosopher'), whereas Des Places emended καλεῖν to καλεῖς ('the one you call a philosopher'), on the basis of the Plato text and a late Iamblichus manuscript.

³⁵ Another corruption, the supplement is taken from the Plato text and a late Iamblichus manuscript.

And, to begin with, those fellows, I suppose, from childhood onwards . . .

οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων πᾶσιν

Theaet. 173 C 9 ≈ *Protr.* 100. 23–4

οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοί που ἐκ νέων πᾶσιν

So, to begin with, **such fellows**, I suppose, from childhood onwards . . .

And with this trivial modification we have exhausted all the changes that Iamblichus has brought to the text of this part of Plato's *Theaetetus*. Each of them is of a sort that does not alter Plato's line of thought, introduce any new ideas, or even introduce any significantly different ways of expressing Plato's original ideas. The 'close following' of one text by Iamblichus is a matter of pure quotation, except for strictly limited modifications, and these only in order to flatten to monologue. The block of quotation is solid and pure, in that nothing significant is taken away and nothing at all is added to it; and the sequence is natural, in that Iamblichus has naturally quoted it in order, earlier to later.

Now we can go further: when Iamblichus does quote Plato's *Theaetetus*, we can ascertain that he quotes with rigorous literal accuracy. We collated the version found in the Iamblichus manuscript³⁶ to the versions found in the Plato manuscripts and other witnesses³⁷ to see what manner of witness it is. Generally the Iamblichus version contains a fair quantity of normal erroneous³⁸ variants, of the sort and at the rate one usually finds in manuscripts

³⁶ We relied on the recent edition by Des Places for the readings of F, the only independent manuscript. The manuscript was accurately collated by its first editor Pistelli, as both Düring and Des Places have confirmed from their own collations. D.S.H. visited the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana in May 2004 to consult the manuscript and do partial collations; the manuscript remains clearly legible and we reconfirm that it has evidently been collated to a high degree of accuracy. Many thanks to the Laurenziana's Director Franca Arduini, to Sabina Magrini, and to our mutual friend Antonio Carlini.

³⁷ We relied on the recent edition of Plato, *Theaetetus*, in *Platonis opera*, vol. 1, ed. E. A. Duke et al. (Oxford, 1995) [1995 OCT]; translations from *Theaetetus*, here and hereafter, after Levet (in J. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (eds.), *Plato: Complete Works* [Complete Plato] (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1997)). We relied on the 1995 OCT edition for reports of the main variants in the Plato witnesses.

³⁸ For the sake of simplicity in the analysis that follows, let the OCT editors' choice define as being 'erroneous' any reading not preferred by them; certainly it might be that the editors will have chosen the incorrect variant here and there, but the pattern would change little if we were to re-examine every decision made by them. (In subsect. 2.6, however, we do subject the variants in chapter 13 (*Phaedo*) to this extra degree of scrutiny, which confirms that it makes little difference; we have

(... excerpt from *Rep.* 7, 514 A 1–517 C 4 ...) it is necessary to see this for the one who is going to act sensibly either in private or public. If this is the function of education, and if the difference between it and lack of education is that great, what else would it befit us to do than to embrace education and philosophy, and renounce those things considered to be greatly desirable by the majority, since those things have no influence on success worthy of the name? (*Iamb.* *Protr.* ch. 15, 105. 28–110. 2)

This and the next chapter are notable in that the opening sentence is not even an addition to the Plato passage but a transformation of its beginning. The closing sentence, which is similar to that of chapter 14, is of a sort that will become familiar to us.

The Myth of the Cave is presented by Plato in the form of a one-sided dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon, which causes Iamblichus to modify the quotation in various ways so as to suppress the speakers and the context of the discussion. So, for example, Iamblichus combs out from this passage every single 'I said' and 'he said' that had originally punctuated the dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon in Plato's text.⁴⁴ Also suppressed are an address to Glaucon, a rhetorical question to him, and a reference to what he sees (517 A 8, 515 E 7, 514 B 5), as well as references to the 'present' discussion and to what has 'just' been said.⁴⁵ Sometimes Iamblichus suppresses dialogue by simply excising the words of Glaucon (514 B 8, 515 E 4, 516 B 3, 516 B 7), but at other times by transforming the words of Glaucon into an assertion that expresses their content.⁴⁶

The most significant alteration is the deletion of two lines at 517 B 5–7, in which Socrates expresses a rather particular speaker's attitude to Glaucon; in the exposition of doctrine designed by Iamblichus, this would have struck a jarring and disorienting note. The original version in Plato's text reads: 'you won't mistake my intention—since that's what you want to hear about. Maybe God knows whether they are in fact true, but the appearances appear like this to me; in the intelligible realm, etc.' Here is the version after the deletion and transformation of Iamblichus: *he won't mistake the truth. And this is surely how it appears; in the intelligible realm, etc.*

⁴⁴ 'I said' 514 A 1, 515 A 5, 515 E 5, 515 C 1, 515 C 4, 516 E 3, 517 A 8; 'he said' 515 A 4, 515 A 9, 515 C 3, 515 D 8, 516 A 4, 516 C 3, 516 E 1, 516 E 6, 517 A 7.

⁴⁵ 516 A 3 and 517 B 1; both changes are reported by both of the OCT editors (J. Burnet (ed.), *Platonis opera*, vol. iv (Oxford, 1902), and S. R. Slings (ed.), *Platonis Respublica* (Oxford, 2003)) as if they were variant readings, whereas they are more likely to be the product of deliberate intervention on the part of Iamblichus.

⁴⁶ 515 A 4, 515 A 9–B 1, 515 D 8, and 516 A 4, causing textual problems at 107, 24–5.

Notice that even in this relatively large intervention, Iamblichus takes care to make use of as much of Plato's thought and language as possible, stripping away only the words that express a personal attitude.

But for some reason Iamblichus does not feel any strict need to eliminate all the dialogue. At 515 B 2–C 3 we find preserved four pairs of comments, four by each speaker, in what is, evidently and suddenly, a dialogue between two speakers. Beyond the deletions of 'he said' (noted above), the only change (515 B 10) is from 'By Zeus, not I!' to 'Nothing else', a less enthusiastic and personal response than that given by Glaucon. In a later and longer section (516 C 7–517 C 4) we have even more fidelity to the text, with no changes introduced by Iamblichus beyond the deletions of 'I said' and 'he said'. The result has a flowing modern feel to it:

Do you think he would ... go through any sufferings, rather than share their beliefs and live as they do?—Yes, I think he would rather suffer anything than live like that.—Consider this too, then. If this man went back down into the cave and sat down in his same seat, wouldn't his eyes be filled with darkness, coming suddenly out of the sun like that?—Certainly.—Now, if he had to compete once again with the perpetual prisoners in recognizing the shadows ... (516 D 4–E 8, trans. Reeve, "unmodified")

It would be hard to say that this should even count as an alteration, still less a degradation of the text. In fact, the above translation of Plato's text by Reeve serves equally precisely as a translation of Iamblichus 108. 22–109. 4, since Reeve has systematically done to Plato's text what Iamblichus does occasionally—remove the 'he said' and 'I said' but preserve everything else.

Both ancient and modern scholars can look to Plato himself for a justification of this procedure:

One conscious deviation from strict accuracy, however, will be obvious at a glance. The *Republic* is largely in reported speech. Socrates is relating a conversation he had in the past. But I have cast his report as an explicit dialogue in direct speech, with identified speakers. In the *Theaetetus*, Plato has Euclides adopt a similar stratagem. 'This is the book,' he says to Terpsion; 'You see, I have written it out like this: I have not made Socrates relate the conversation as he related it to me, but I represent him as speaking directly to the persons with whom he said he had this conversation.' (Reeve, viii)

⁴⁷ Plato, *Republic*, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 2004).

Lamblichus generally goes further than Reeve in modifying the text of Plato, but his intention was similar: in order to sharpen the focus on the essential protreptic ideas, it can be useful to purify the central texts of Platonism and free them from the bonds of their sometimes distracting narrative embodiment.⁴⁸

However great the degree of intervention that Lamblichus makes in this Myth of the Cave material, his version is strictly structured: he quotes a pure block of text, nothing added, nothing significant taken away; and he follows a natural sequence, moving from *Theaetetus* to *Republic* 7, and from earlier to later in both texts.

Just as in chapter 15, Lamblichus opens chapter 16 not by crafting his own sentence, but by barely modifying the first line of the passage he is excerpting. He suppresses the 'I said' at 518 B 7 and brings forward the backward-looking comment 'if this is true':

Chapter 16. Now then, again, if this is true, it is necessary to think about these things in some such way as this. Education is not what some people advertise it as being (. . . **an excerpt from Rep. 7, 518 B 8–519 B 5.** . . .) the things towards which it (sc. the vision of the soul) is presently turned. So now then, now that we have reached this point, and it is manifestly evident what kind of function philosophy has, it is also immediately clear that it is valuable. For to strip away the becoming from the soul, and to purify its activity which is capable of reasoning, are very appropriate to it. So 'this is the best mode of life, to practice justice and the rest of virtue in living and also in dying'. So we would follow this, if we wanted to be successful in reality. (Lamb. *Protr.* ch. 16, 110. 3–111. 17)

The closing in this case is not a single sentence but a little paragraph of concluding remarks by Lamblichus that show many typical traits: they are meta-textual, enthusiastic, and often adorned with memorable words or phrases from the author, as in the case of the quotation in the penultimate sentence (from *Gorg.* 527 B 3–5).

Lamblichus continues quoting *Republic* 7 in chapter 16, but from

⁴⁸ Reeve's claim, that this enhances readability and intelligibility, has been enthusiastically received by some early readers whose opinions are printed on the book's back cover. Reeve's brilliant decision to cast the dialogue into direct speech produces a compelling impression of immediacy unmatched by other English translations currently available' (Lloyd Gerson). 'In this version, Socrates' narration of his conversation with Glaucon and Adeimantus et al. is converted so far as possible into dramatically gripping and effective direct speech. Its increased accessibility promises to make it the number-one choice for undergraduate courses' (John Cooper). Lamblichus may well have thought that he was doing a similar service for the students for whom he compiled his book, by offering them enhanced versions of the great passages.

a little later, the passage that indicates that teaching philosophy is not like putting sight into blind eyes, but turning the student around, converting the student, whose mind then gazes in the right direction to gain understanding; this passage is evidently highly appropriate to Lamblichus' collection of protreptics. The only changes are intended to remove the dialogue (all of it this time): excision of 'I said'; excision of Glaucon's short comments; and excision of an insignificant speech exchange.⁴⁹ Some stretches of dialogue in other chapters required more transformation on the part of Lamblichus, especially when Socrates' interlocutor contributed important ideas to the discussion, but in this case it sufficed to make several simple excisions only. Again, the block of quotation is solid and pure, and the sequence is natural: Lamblichus moves from an earlier passage in book 7 to a later one, and within the passage preserves the natural order. So much for the deliberate modifications.

Now let us ask about the accidental differences, the variants found in the various manuscripts. After pooling together the results from both chapters 15 and 16, in which Lamblichus quotes from *Republic* 7, we can investigate the family affiliation of the Plato manuscript used by Lamblichus. In addition to a possible correction⁵⁰ and a few dozen errors not shared by others,⁵¹ there are a few that are shared by others, perhaps suggesting affiliation with the family of F, but these are too few and too weak for this to be a confirmed result.⁵² Yet the Lamblichus version does some service to readers and editors of *Republic* 7 at a few places, especially at 515 B 4–5, a serious crux where the preferred text in the two key variants is that of Lamblichus, not that of the main manuscripts. Here too, it seems that Lamblichus (or his scribe) was working carefully from a decent copy of Plato's text of the *Republic*, as he did with the *Theaetetus*.

⁴⁹ 518 C 4, 518 D 3, 519 A 7; 518 C 3, 518 D 8, 519 A 6; and 518 D 1–2 [cf. γέγονε, καί].

⁵⁰ 518 D 7 δεικνύμενος [αὐτὸν] δέει μὴ γὰρ ὁμοθυμαδόν.

⁵¹ Most of these are recorded in Slings' OCT apparatus (at 514 B 5, 514 B 9, 515 C 5, 515 D 6, 516 B 1, 516 C 8, 516 E 8, 517 A 2, 517 A 4, 517 B 8, 517 C 3, 518 B 7, 518 C 1, 518 C 5, 518 C 9, 518 D 5, 519 A 2, 519 B 2), but other variants are recorded only in the Lamblichus apparatus (106. 24, 107. 8, 107. 13, 108. 21, as well as spelling differences), as well as one variant that ought to have been recorded in the apparatus critics of Plato, as it is a candidate reading: 516 B 6 οἷος (τρεῖς) ἔστιν 108. 8.

⁵² 516 B 6 [καί] μὲτα I + F (but this could be deliberate on Lamblichus' part) || 515 C 4 τῶν (τρεῖς) δεικνύων I + FD (but this may be agreement in truth, not error) || 514 B 7 δεικνύων A] δεικνύων I + D; δεικνύων F || 516 D 7 (εἰ) κενὸν I + F || 518 C 5 ψ] δ I + F (but these are trivial and non-probative).

2.4. Chapter 17: quotations from Gorgias

Now let us turn to chapter 17, in which Lamblichus quotes from *Gorgias*. The speech in question is the crucial speech analysing hedonism by means of the metaphors of sieves (insatiability of desire) and leaky jars (recurrence of need). It is a medium-sized speech, broken in the middle by a brief exchange between Calicles and Socrates (another fruitless stand-off), and surrounded fore and aft by several lines of significant dialogue. This is how it ends up, nested in the context of Lamblichus:

Chapter 17. But if it's necessary to remind the listeners of this invocation from the ancient arguments, stories of the priests and others, and the Pythagoreans, then let's start this too from this point. It is right to say that those who have no need of anything are successful, and that those whose desires are unlimited have a terrible way of life. (. . . Lamblichus continues with this modified quotation of Gorgias 492 e 3-494 a 6. . .) The one has his success in his being filled up as much as possible, for which it is necessary for there to be a lot going out and for there to be certain large holes for the effluent, which is nothing else than living the way of life of some stone curlew, but the other, having been filled up once for all with his own proper goods, remains always independent for all time. Something of this sort is also a time-honoured invocation to the discipline of virtue. (Lamb. Prot. ch. 17, 111. 18-113. 21)

Here again, at beginning and end we see the voice of Lamblichus, providing a sentence or two of opening and closing, sentences that make comments about the text quoted, meta-textual notations. Note that Lamblichus has also stitched a half-sentence on to the end of the version, to smooth the transition to the conclusion, and to end on a positive hortatory note. What remains is entirely a close following of Plato's text, especially the middle section 492 E 7-494 A 2.

When we look closely, we also find two sentences (translated above), the one after the opening and the one before the closing, that paraphrase the opening and closing dialogues that bookend the speech. These examples are instructive of how Lamblichus transforms into continuous prose a section of lively Platonic dialogue. The first of the above paraphrasing sentences corresponds to this in the original version by Plato (492 E 3-7): 'So then, is it not right to say that those who have no need of anything are successful?—No, for in that case stones and corpses would be the most successful.—

But then the ones that you say are have⁵³ a terrible way of life, too.' When we compare this with the version in Lamblichus (above), we see that he has effaced the dialogue, as well as dispensed with the reference to corpses and stones; he has also made more explicit the reference of 'the ones that you say are', which the reader of Plato can fill in by recent context, but Lamblichus' reader cannot. Still, little of the idea or of the language is lost in Lamblichus' careful paraphrase.

The same holds for the later paraphrasing sentence, which corresponds to these sentences in the original (494 A 3-B 7):

When I say this, do I persuade you at all into conceding that the orderly way of life is better than the one lacking in self-control, or do I not?—You do not persuade me, Socrates: the man who has filled himself up has no pleasure any more, but, as I was saying just now, that's living like a stone when he's been filled up and experiences neither joy nor pain; no, living pleasantly consists in this: having as much as possible flowing in.—Therefore isn't it surely necessary that if there's a lot flowing in, there should also be a lot going out, and that the holes for the effluent should be big ones?—Certainly.—Now you're talking about the way of life of some stone curlew, not a corpse or stone.

As we can see by comparing with his version (above), Lamblichus has deleted the initial exchange about whether Calicles is persuaded, and carefully paraphrased the rest of the dialogue, keeping the same words as much as possible, preserving them in unmodified forms whenever possible. But he also evidently felt it nearer or in some other way necessary to eliminate here again the objection that Calicles has raised to Socrates, couched in terms of 'stones and corpses'. So here is a loss of information, relative to the Plato text, albeit a small one. Generally there is more modification in these lines than we have seen before, since the original was in the form of a conversation, which does need more modification to render the prose that Lamblichus' book requires. And yet we find no alteration of the line of thought, except in a detail deleted in order for the line of thought to be simplified.

The rest of chapter 17, the bulk of it, consists in a slightly modified quotation of the speech by Socrates to (or at) Calicles on the

⁵³ Reading at 492 E 7 καὶ ὅν γε, suggested by Badham on the basis of the Lamblichus version, and adopted in Dodds's edition, rather than καὶ ὅς γε (all manuscripts), the reading adopted in Burnet's edition. See E. R. Dodds (ed.), *Plato: Gorgias. A Revised Text, with Introduction and Commentary* [Gorgias] (Oxford, 1959), ad loc.

topic of pleasure (sieves and jars), with just the same kinds of modification to erase the dialogue frame as we saw in the *Theaetetus* material of chapter 14 above: deletion of a content-neutral speech exchange (493 B 4, C 4-5, C 7-D 1, D 5-6). No other deliberate modifications take place in the chapter. The block is solid and pure, and the sequence is natural; Lamblichus moves on to *Gorgias* after *Theaetetus* and *Republic* 7 (not retracing his steps), and he quotes each block of text in order.

As for accidental variants and the quality of Lamblichus' quotations as a witness to the text of Plato, we need to postpone the analysis until we can pool the data from the *Gorgias* quotations in chapters 18 and 19 (subsections 2.5 and 2.7 below), since evidence of manuscript affiliation becomes clearer over larger stretches of text. For now, the following comment by Dodds, in his landmark edition of Plato's *Gorgias*, suffices to indicate that Lamblichus is a valuable witness:

Lamblichus, the Neoplatonist philosopher, pillaged the *Gorgias*, along with other classical works, to provide material for his *Protrepticus*, an exhortation to the philosophical life. Sometimes he paraphrases and abbreviates; and even where he transcribes he does not present his quotations as quotations, but adapts them to the form of a 'protreptic', eliminating whatever might betray their origin in a dialogue. As a rule, however, he makes only such changes as are necessary for this purpose, so that the value of his evidence is not greatly impaired, though he has a bad name for negligence and lack of scruple.³⁴

Dodds values Lamblichus as a witness to the text of *Gorgias* for all the same reasons as we found above for concluding that he is a valuable witness to the text of *Theaetetus* and *Republic* 7.

2.5. Chapter 18: quotations from *Gorgias*

But for now let us carry on with our analysis, and consider what happens in chapter 18:

³⁴ Dodds, *Gorgias*, 64, referring to H. Alline, *Histoire du texte de Platon* (Paris, 1915), 152, for the 'bad name for negligence and lack of scruple'. It would appear that Alline was relying on C. G. Cobet, 'Platonica', *Memmosyne*, NS 2 (1874), 241-82, in which an alarming number of variants in the text of Lamblichus were listed unsystematically at 261-78; the methodological error in Cobet's work was not to separate the accidental variants from the deliberate alterations of Lamblichus, which had the effect of exaggerating the impression of unreliability.

Chapter 18. But akin to this is another approach, which makes an inference by analogy from what appears clearly in the body to what is both good and bad for the soul, and separates us from the bad things and alienates our choice from the shameful, and calls on us to embrace the good things with all our strength, and gets our thought accustomed to the fine in every way. For example, if the affections and the diseases of the body are to be avoided, much more so are those of the soul, and if the disease of the body produces the kind of life not worth living for us, then much more so does injustice, being a disease of the soul, make life unendurable for the one who has it, and if the unbalanced condition of the body destroys in us the perfection of the soul, when that by which we live is in a faulty condition and at war with itself, it will not be possible to live out one's life correctly. So let's proceed to that point in the following way. Just as being organized and orderly makes our bodies good, and being disorganized makes them bad, similarly with the soul, too (. . . here Lamblichus continues with this modified quotation of *Gorg.* 504 A 8-505 A 12 . . .) So getting disciplined is better for the soul than lacking self-control, as most people think,³⁵ and to be orderly and organized is superior to being disorderly and disorganized, hence in every way one should train for justice and self-control as opposed to the opposite states. And this must be our state as well. (Lambli. *Protr.* ch. 18, 113, 22-115. 21)

The first comment that needs to be made is about the opening and closing sections in the voice of Lamblichus: whereas the closing is very similar to the closing of chapter 17 (a half-sentence of transition plus a short sentence of explicit protreptic), the opening section shows a phenomenon that we have not seen before, an extended opening discussion occupying several sentences. Typical of the voice of Lamblichus here are the following features: it is meta-textual, in that it points to a stretch of text while giving a reason to take it seriously ('So let's proceed to that point in the following way', 114. 6-7); it is also repetitious, in that it paraphrases the argument which is just about to follow; it also uses long parallel constructions with distinctive vocabulary, referring to a line of argument as an 'approach' (ἐφ' ὁδός) that alienates, embraces, and invites (ἀλλοτριοῦσα, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, παρὰ κέλαινευσμένη, 113. 22-7); and it expresses its points in hyperbolic and enthusiastic ways that are not strictly supported by the argument, e.g. 'with all our strength'

³⁵ The text seems to be corrupt here, as this is precisely *not* the sort of thing that most people (οἱ πολλοί) believe. Des Places says it might be preferable, following Plato, to insert a 'not': 'as most people (don't) think'. Alternatively, we suggest the conjecture of *παλαοί*: 'as the ancients think'.

(113. 27), 'in every way' (113. 28), 'destroys in us the perfection of the soul' (114. 4).

In other respects this chapter resembles chapter 17, in that it consists of a central target section, in which Lamblichus has slightly intervened to flatten to monologue, surrounded by sections before and after, which he has turned into monologue by a larger degree of modification. The main difference between these two chapters is that here Lamblichus has been obliged to modify more heavily overall, as the section he chooses to excerpt from Plato has no real speeches, only active dialogue between Socrates and Callicles (a rather intractable interlocutor), into which he needs to intervene more extensively. Whereas chapter 14 reworks material that was a real speech in Plato's book with no real dialogue, chapter 18 reworks a real dialogue with no real speech, and chapter 17 reworks a real speech surrounded on both sides by dialogue.

We can best appreciate the types and degree of intervention by making the following fully explicit comparison (504 A 8-D 7, trans. after Zeyl in *Complete Plato*):

So if a house gets to be organized and orderly it would be a good one, and if it gets to be disorganized it would be a bad one?—I agree.—This holds true for a boat, too?—Yes.—And we surely take it to hold for our bodies, too?—Yes, we do.—What about the soul? Will it be a good one if it gets to be disorganized, or if it gets to have a certain organization and order?—Given what we said before, we must agree that this is so, too.—What name do we give to what comes into being in the body as a result of organization and order?—You mean 'health' and 'strength', presumably.—Yes, I do. And which one do we give to what comes into being in the soul as a result of organization and order? Try to find and tell me its name, as in the case of the body.—Why don't you say it yourself, Socrates?—All right, if that pleases you more, I'll do so—and if you think I'm right, give your assent; if not, refuse me and don't give way. I think that the name for the states of organization of the body is 'healthy', from which health and the other bodily excellences come to be in it. Is this so, or not?—It is.—And the name for the states of organization and order of the soul is 'lawful' and 'law', from which people become law-abiding and orderly, and these states are justice and self-control?—do you assent to this or not?—Let's say so.—Hence that orator, the good and skilful one, will be looking at these when he applies to people's souls whatever speeches he makes...

Next the version in Lamblichus, with the dramatic conversation stripped away (114. 7-22):

So just as if our bodies get to be organized and orderly they would be good ones, and if they get to be disorganized they would be bad ones, so too, in the same way, a soul which gets to be disorderly will be bad, and one in which obtains a certain organization and order will be good. Now then, in the body the name of what results from organization and order is 'health', whereas, on the other hand, to what results in the soul from organization and order is given the name 'lawful' and 'law'. For just as in the body the name for its states of organization is 'health', from which health and other excellences of the body come to be in it, so in the same way the states of orderliness of the soul are called 'law', from which we become organized and orderly people; and these states are justice and self-control. Hence those who take any care for their own souls will be looking at these when they apply to people's souls whatever speeches they make...

This passage in the version of Lamblichus is a condensed paraphrase which lacks certain elements, not only the empty responses of Callicles, but also the banter of Socrates directed towards Callicles, as well as the analogical reasoning with which Socrates begins his line of argument (houses, boats, therefore similarly for bodies), and the back-reference to the earlier part of the dialogue. But all the essential elements, and almost all the words, that are to be found in the Plato passage are preserved in the version of Lamblichus, despite this significant truncation and compression.

In the paraphrase that finishes the modified quotation we find the same combination of truncation and compression together with accuracy to Plato's argument, thought, and words (505 B 1-12):

And about the soul, my good friend, isn't it the same way? As long as it's corrupt, being foolish, lacking in self-control, unjust, and irreligious, it should be kept away from its appetites and not be permitted to do anything other than what will make it better. Do you agree or not?—I agree.—For this is no doubt better for the soul itself?—Yes, it is.—Now isn't keeping it away from what it has an appetite for, disciplining it?—Yes.—So getting disciplined is better for the soul than lacking self-control...

Next, the modified version in Lamblichus (115. 11-17):

And yet about the soul, too, it's the same way: as long as it's corrupt, being foolish, lacking in self-control, unjust, and irreligious, it should be kept away from its appetites and not be permitted to do anything other than what will make it better. For this is no doubt better for the soul itself. Hence keeping it away from what it has an appetite for is to discipline it. So getting disciplined is better for the soul than lacking self-control...

This example needs no further comment, except to reinforce the point that Iamblichus does not modify the text in any way that is not necessary for his purpose of flattening to monologue. The more unlike a speech the Plato section is, the more modification he finds necessary; but he never makes more modifications than necessary.

The centre of the chapter is a group of four comments by Socrates (504 D 5–505 A 9) united into one block of continuous prose mostly by the removal of one address to Callicles (504 E 6) and of four pairs⁵⁶ of comments, in which Socrates demands that Callicles answer and he gives one-word answers (504 E 4–5, 504 E 9–505 A 1, 505 A 3–5, 505 A 9–11). And Iamblichus needed to bring about one more change, from singular to plural, in the verbs of 504 D 5–9, in order to generalize the point from what 'that orator, the good and skilful one' would say (in Plato's version) to what 'those who take any care for their own souls' would say (in Iamblichus' version); otherwise this comment would reveal the wider narrative frame of the *Gorgias*.

So we see that chapter 18 shows a relatively high degree of modification in the quoted blocks; but here again, the blocks are pure and the sequence is natural, as Iamblichus continues to quote from *Gorgias* in the natural order.

2.6. Chapter 13: quotations from *Phaedo*

This chapter displays a rather more complex mixture of elements and construction techniques. The most important new phenomenon is the use of two bridge passages to connect disparate excerpts from Plato's *Phaedo*; and we shall see this phenomenon again in chapter 19, where Iamblichus uses three bridge passages to connect four excerpts from three disparate works. Another important new phenomenon is a page at the end consisting of a pastiche, with scraps of several Plato texts woven in, a new kind of literary texture which differs from the block quotations that we have seen so far; but this odd literary texture is confined to one page.

Here is an outline of the greater part of the chapter, with indications of where Iamblichus is using block quotations, as well as the pastiche page at the end:

⁵⁶ Not quite four pairs: all four answers are removed, and three of the four demands, but Iamblichus has retained, perhaps by oversight, the demand at 504 E 9–10 ἐόντι, ταῦτα;

Chapter 13. But if, with the conceptions about philosophy, we need to call in some other assistance as well as this one,⁵⁷ let's get going and let's proceed in that way, starting with these. Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy correctly are practising nothing other than dying and being dead (<... a version of *Phaedo* 64 a 4–69 d 2...>) as they say about the initiation rites: 'many wave the wand of Bacchus, but true believers are scarce', and these are, in my opinion, none other than those who have practised philosophy. If therefore philosophy alone, because of its nature, causes perfect virtue and purification of the soul, that alone is worthy of being embraced. But those who have not practised philosophy and passed away in absolute purity may not lawfully come to join the family of gods (<... a version of *Phaedo* 82 a 10–84 a 3...>) the soul, coming to join its kin and its kind, will be released from the evils of the human condition. From this approach it is clear that philosophy brings release from human and bodily bonds and a liberation from the accidents of birth in time, and leads to that which truly is, and to a knowledge of truth itself, and purification of souls. But if in this above all things there is true happiness, we must cultivate philosophy most seriously, if we wish to be truly happy. And yet this point is also worth keeping in mind, that if indeed the soul is immortal, then it needs to be taken care of, not only over the course of the only time, this time, in which we call ourselves 'living' (<... a version of *Phaedo* 107 c 1–105...>) at the very outset of the journey yonder. For the better soul dwells with the gods, traverses the heavenly sphere, and receives a better allotment; but the soul which has been in contact with unjust acts and is full of impiety and sacrilege goes to subterranean dungeons to receive the fitting punishment. For these reasons, one should do everything so as to take part in virtue and wisdom in this life, for fair is the prize and great is the hope (<... a closing pastiche woven from *Phaedo*, *Apology*, and *Menexenus*...>) Let's say that such approaches, too, are ones that lead from these things to the exhortation to philosophy. (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 13, 90. 16–100. 20)

The opening sentence needs no comment, and the closing pastiche page needs so much comment that it is best postponed until later (below, pp. 233–5).

Instead, let us focus on the bridge passages, starting with the first, a single sentence at 90. 10–13: 'If therefore philosophy alone, because of its nature, causes perfect virtue and purification of the soul, that alone is worthy of being embraced.' It is a back-referring summarizing version of the intervening text, and it contains enthusiastic

⁵⁷ Reading ἐνὶ τοῦτον with the manuscript, not Scaliger's conjecture ἐνὶ τοῦτο, accepted by editors. It seems to refer to the last Aristotle excerpt that was cited by Iamblichus, just as ἀπὸ τοῦτον seems to refer to the Plato excerpts that are about to come.

language typical of Lamblichus: 'perfect virtue'; 'purification'; 'embraced'. The second bridge passage (98. 25-30) is similar: this too is a back-referring summary with some neo-Pythagorean terminology adapted from Plato; but the most important thing to notice about it is that it is a succinct and effective expression of certain ideas that are common ground between Plato and the Pythagorean tradition of Lamblichus.

Now let us look at the quoted blocks in this chapter, starting with the shortest, the third one. The only change is at the very beginning of the excerpt, where Lamblichus suppresses the dialogue frame. In Plato's dialogue Cebes had fully accepted the proof offered by Socrates of the immortality of the soul, whereas Simmias still harbours some lingering sceptical doubts, and Socrates acknowledges these doubts in his next comment (107 c 1-2): 'But this much anyway, gentlemen, is right to keep in mind, if the soul is immortal, etc.' This is a comment which Lamblichus minimally transforms (99. 2): 'And yet this point is also worth keeping in mind: that if indeed the soul is immortal, etc.'

We can use this short quotation to check the accuracy of Lamblichus' quotation against other witnesses, including Stobaeus, who quotes it as well. Whereas we see in Stobaeus three corruptions,⁴⁸ and each of the main manuscripts has a few,⁴⁹ Lamblichus has only one trivial one: 107 c 3 *τοῦτον μόνον* *μόνον τοῦτον*. On the basis of this little snapshot, it would appear that the version in Lamblichus is just as carefully preserved as the version in the main Plato manuscripts, and better preserved than some other ancient witnesses. This appearance is confirmed below (pp. 230-3), on the basis of the whole data set.

Let us carry on and proceed to scrutinize the second excerpt; the passage from 82 B 10 to 84 B 3, the conclusion of Socrates' first series

⁴⁸ Stob. 1. 49. 58 (= i. 434. 6-18 Wachsmuth-Hense): 107 c 1 *το* [δὲ] *γ'* || c 6 [αὖ] (with T) || c 6 *κακός* [κακός || d 7 *οὐκ ἐστὶ*] *οὐκ ἐστὶ*.

⁴⁹ Corruption in T—107 c 6 [αὖ] (with Stob); corruptions in W—107 c 1 [γ'] || c 3 *εἰ* *αὐτὸς*; errors in W, apparently attempted improvements—107 c 2 *ἀνακτός* (*ἐστὶν*) || c 5 *αὐτὸς* (*εἰ*); error in B—107 d 4 *καὶ λέγεται μετὰ* *καὶ μετὰ λέγεται*. (In this latter case, we prefer the reading supported by all the other witnesses but rejected by the two OCT editions. When the reading *καὶ λέγεται μετὰ* is adopted, the passage construes as follows: 'For the soul arrives in Hades having nothing else but its education and upbringing, which are indeed said greatly to help or harm the deceased, right at the start of his journey yonder' (107 d 2-5). The differing functions of *καὶ* in the two versions bring about a perceptible difference in the speaker's attitude, and the version of B is stemmatically isolated and not preferable.)

of arguments for the immortality of the soul, finishing with the unforgettable image of the soul repeatedly unpicking, like Penelope, the threads whose tissues attach us to the body. Lamblichus has brought about no unfamiliar kinds of change to this passage; he suppresses all seven of the speech exchanges between Socrates and Cebes, sometimes with slight concomitant modification to the first sentence of the speech of Socrates,⁵⁰ and he suppresses all five personal addresses.⁵¹ The only other modification effected by Lamblichus is, typically, at the beginning of the excerpt (82 B 10), where he modifies the particles for a smoother transition: *δὲ* *γὰρ*.

As for the variants or accidental changes, let us combine these with those from the remaining excerpt of 64 A 4-69 D 2, to which we now turn.

The first of three *Phaedo* excerpts is Lamblichus' version of the 'second apology' of Socrates. Lamblichus gives literal quotations of both the beginning and the end of this passage, together with Socrates' three main speechlets (65 E-67 B, 67 E-68 B, 68 E-69 D), but the rest of the 'second apology' required him to modify his quotations, as Plato has carefully written this up as primarily a private discussion, a dialogue between friends, unlike the 'first apology', which was an extended public speech addressed to people who did not know him, in a situation that did not permit discussion. So, just as in the *Gorgias* excerpts, we see here a relatively high degree of intervention on the part of Lamblichus. And these interventions are all of a familiar sort, except for two cases of a new phenomenon: a special kind of bridge passage which gives a quick paraphrase of an extended section in Plato's text. They have the effect of moving the reader onwards quickly to the next quotable passage, for which reason we can think of them as 'fast-forward' paraphrases.

Let us focus now on these 'fast-forward' paraphrases, to see how they are related to the underlying text:

Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philo-

⁵⁰ Simple suppression of speech exchange at 82 c 9-2, 82 d 8-9, 83 c 8-10, 83 e 4, 83 e 6-84 A 2; with slight modification at 83 c 4-5 *οἱ* (*δὲ*) and 83 d 3-4 *οἱ* *ἐπεί*.

⁵¹ To Socrates (82 c 9, 82 d 8); to Cebes (82 A 7, 83 E 5); to Socrates and Simmias (82 c 2). A curious oversight in Lamblichus' programme to transform the stretch of *Phaedo* to monologue is the accidental retention of *οἱ* *ἀπὸ* *ἀπὸ* (at 82 E 7), 'what I mean is . . .', an oversight which leaves a clue that the original text was a dialogue. The imperfection of Lamblichus' transformation means that we might find surviving traces of dialogue in Lamblichus' quotations of the *Protrepticus*, if Aristotle's work was a dialogue.

sophy correctly are practising nothing other than dying and being dead (<... a version of *Phaedo* 64 a 4-65 d 2...>) the soul of the philosopher utterly disdains the body and flees from it, seeking rather to become itself, alone by itself. But this will be especially clear from a contemplation of the Forms; for justice itself, and beauty, and good, and all things on which we set the seal of 'what exists', no one has ever seen with the eyes, nor by any of the other senses that act through the body, but he who is prepared to focus his mind most, and most accurately, on each topic of enquiry—he will come the closest to knowing each of them (<... a version of *Phaedo* 65 e 2-67 d 10...>) the practice of philosophers is just this: a release and a separation of a soul from a body. Therefore philosophy, since it provides us with the greatest good, namely a liberation from the bonds in which the soul is bound since its birth in time, should be pursued with the utmost seriousness. This so-called 'bravery' is to be expected most of all in those who are in that condition (<... a version of *Phaedo* 68 c 5-69 d 2>) as they say about the initiation rites: 'many wave the wand of Bacchus, but true believers are scarce', and these are, in my opinion, none other than those who have practised philosophy. (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 13, 90. 18-96. 10)

The first of these fast-forward paraphrases boils down the ideas in 65 d 4-E 1, where Socrates opens a new phase of his 'second apology' by referring to Plato's theory of Forms. In the original it comprised seventy-two words, but in the boiled-down version only forty. The paraphrase is accurate to the thought, but not to the expression of it. Iamblichus not only thoroughly suppresses the dialogue, but he also adds a meta-textual comment: 'But this will be especially clear from a contemplation of the Forms.' When we consider this fast-forward bridge paraphrase we must recognize that, without the survival of Plato's full text, we would probably not have recognized it as partly paraphrase, and not entirely quotation.

Now let us look at the second 'fast-forward' paraphrase. This time, Iamblichus chooses to condense a larger section of text, including a longish speech by Socrates (67 e 5-68 b 6) that Iamblichus could have quoted without modification. But he carefully steps around the whole section (67 d 12-68 c 4), as it contains both a backward reference to an earlier claim in the frame narrative and also something else that is awkward for Iamblichus: here it is not so much an exhortation for people to become philosophers as an exhortation for philosophical people to embrace death cheerfully and confidently. In all, Iamblichus suppresses this 158-word speech as well as the preceding exchange of speeches (thirty words) and the succeeding two speech exchanges (seventy words). This ends

up being just the following single-sentence fast-forward paraphrase comprising twenty-one words (94. 17-19): 'Therefore philosophy, since it provides us with the greatest good, namely a liberation from the bonds in which the soul is bound since its birth in time, should be pursued with the utmost seriousness.' The compression ratio here is more than 12:1, whereas for the first fast-forward paraphrase it was less than 2:1. This should teach us the lesson that if we find a fast-forward paraphrase in the Aristotle section, we shall probably not be able to make any reliable estimate of how much of Aristotle's text Iamblichus chose to speed through with condensed paraphrase.

When we isolate and remove these two fast-forward paraphrases, what remains is a set of quotations modified in ways that are all familiar to us by now, modified quotations copied carefully from an ancient manuscript of Plato. The 'second apology' in Plato's *Phaedo* is a very complicated and artful construction, in which Plato transforms this apology in genre from a rhetorical monologue delivered to strangers into a persuasive conversation carried on between intimate friends and associates. The resulting dialogue and banter in Plato requires Iamblichus to engage in a high degree of transformation, of several types, severely in certain passages. Readers who begin their study of the Platonic excerpts in chapters 13-19 with this passage (the first in chapter 13) would naturally get an impression of a bewildering quantity of alterations, an impression which leads to the feeling that Iamblichus' version is very free. But this impression would be misleading, and the feeling mistaken: Iamblichus' version does not take liberties, and is in fact a highly disciplined exploitation of Plato. The many (sometimes complex) modifications in Iamblichus' version are executed with surgical precision for precisely one purpose—to reduce a literary dialogue to dogmatic monologue while preserving all the thought and as much as possible of the language of Plato.

The simplest kinds of modification here are simple excisions of Socrates' addressing of Simmias by name (65 A 4, 66 A 7, 67 B 3, 67 E 5, 68 C 5, 69 A 6) and simple excisions of the bare agreements uttered by Simmias.⁶² Iamblichus suppresses every remark by Simmias, and most of these cases require modification of the beginning of the sentence of Socrates that follows the suppressed remark of

⁶² 'That's right', at 65 c 10, and 'it seems so', at 65 A 3 and 67 d 11, this latter stimulated by Socrates' 'isn't that right?', a question also excised by Iamblichus.

Simmas.⁶³ Sometimes Iamblichus suppresses both of two adjacent remarks by Simmias, but he usually takes care to transform and preserve the contents of the intervening comment by Socrates,⁶⁴ with one exception, in which the intervening comment by Socrates is unusable for Iamblichus, as it refers back beyond the beginning of the 'second apology' and recalls the narrative frame of Plato's work.

The main remaining type of modification in chapter 13 is the transformation of the many rhetorical questions into assertions. An instructive and simple example: 'Do sight and hearing in human things have any truth? Aren't even the poets always harping on such themes anyway, that . . .' (65 B 1-3). With surgically minimal changes,¹ the translated result is this: 'Sight and hearing in human beings do not have any truth, for the poets are always harping on such themes, that . . .' (91. 19-21). The only remaining significant change brought about by Iamblichus to Plato's 'second apology' is at the beginning, where he suppresses a wry discussion between Simmias and Socrates about how most people would agree that death is a deserved fate for philosophers (64 A 6-C 3), a discussion that Iamblichus cannot use, as it refers backwards to Plato's narrative frame. The only remaining detail to note is tiny: at the very beginning of his exposition (90. 18), Plato's connecting particle *γάρ* has no function, so Iamblichus omits it.

The foregoing analysis has accounted for every one of the deliberate changes that Iamblichus made to the text of Plato's *Phaedo*. Despite the great complexity of Plato's 'rhetorical dialogue' construction, which forces a correspondingly complex set of transformations on Iamblichus, the underlying principles and purposes of all these changes are simple and familiar to us from other chapters we have studied so far. The blocks are pure and the sequence is natural, however, despite this relatively high degree of intervention.

If the version of Plato's *Phaedo* that we find in Iamblichus was derived from a fair copying of an ancient manuscript of Plato, as was

⁶³ The simplest case is 65 E 6-7, in which Iamblichus deletes Simmias' 'very much so' and alters the next sentence of Socrates from a question to a statement: 'then would that be done . . . to 'then that would be done . . .'. Many other cases, of slightly more complexity, are to be observed: 64 C 8-D 2, 64 E 2-4, 64 E 7-8, 65 A 7-4, 65 A 8-10, 65 B 6-9, 68 C 7-8, 68 D 1-2, 68 D 4-5, 69 A 5-6.

64 D 5-0, 65 C 1-4, 66 A 7-B 1, 67 D 3-6; the exception is 67 B 3-C 4.

⁶⁵ 65 B I aspell ouk || B 2.7 ra yel' ra yap. Similar deft transformations of rhetorical questions to assertions can be observed at 64 C 4-8, 64 D 2-4, 65 B 9, 64 D 11-12, 65 B -2, 67 C 5-D 2, 68 C 5-6, 68 C 10-12.

Iamblichus' version of other texts of Plato, then we should expect it to behave like a manuscript and show typical patterns of erroneous readings; and this it does. First, in respect of reliability, the version of Iamblichus, with eighteen errors,⁶⁶ is comparable to those of the main manuscripts: B with fifteen errors,⁶⁷ T with eight,⁶⁸ and W with twenty-two.⁶⁹ By contrast, an ancient manuscript, the Petrie papyrus (P. Lit. Lond. 145),⁷⁰ is much denser in errors, with at least twenty showing up in a much shorter stretch of text (82 D-84 A). So the manuscript of Plato's *Phaedo* that Iamblichus used seems to have been of a good quality, not as erroneous as the Petrie papyrus, and certainly no less reliable than it.

Yet the true value of a witness to a text is not its reliability, but its ability to preserve good ancient readings lost in other witnesses; and this ability depends on its relative genetic position. Can we find evidence of this? Yes, with care we can discern a complex relationship. We find ten cases of B agreeing with W against T agreeing with Iamblichus, and seven cases of TW against B agreeing with Iamblichus; but virtually no cases⁷¹ of BT vs. W and Iambli-

⁴⁶ The errors of the Iamblichus manuscript are two reorderings of short groups of words (83 c 7, 107 c 3), five corruptions involving articles or particles (66 b 3, 67 a 8, 69 a 3, 83 a 4, 83 c 6), and eleven other cases of small-scale and normal corruptions (65 c 8, 66 b 2, 66 b 5, 66 c 4, 66 e 3, 66 e 5, 69 a 3, 82 c 4, 82 c 4, 82 d 3, 83 e 1); not counted are several cases where the change may have been deliberate at 65 b 9, 68 d 8, 69 b 7, 69 b 8, not counted is the case which is erroneously reported as a variant in the 1905 OCT, whereas it is actually a deliberate change (82 d 2 [*ῥέ Κεφς*]), as well as various orthographical differences, especially iotacism and initial *σ*.

as various other examples of errors with particles (64 D 5, 65 A 4, 67 D 9, 68 D 2, 84 B 1). The errors of B are five errors with particles (65 C 5, 67 A 6, 67 D 5, 69 A 10, 69 B 6, 69 B 8, 82 C 3), seven other normal corruptions (65 C 5, 67 A 6, 67 D 5, 69 A 10, 69 B 6, 69 B 8, 82 C 3), and three other cases where B's erroneous reading was selected by Burnet in his OCT edition (the first two were reversed in the 1995 OCT): 69 B 6 [καί] B, Burnet 1995 OCT; 107 D 4 *ἀνεγείρα μεγίστη* B, Burnet, and 69 C 2 [η] *ἀνδρεῖα* B, Burnet 1995 OCT; see above, n. 59.

⁹⁵ The errors of T are two *homoioteleuta* and six small-scale corruptions: 64 B 1995 C 1, see above; 64 B 1995 D 5, 67 B 4, 69 A 6, 107 C 6, 9 *Βασιλευ* [κα οὖν βασιλευ] || 83 C 6 *νηθρια* [σφοδρα η λυπηθηκα]; and 66 B 3, 66 C 2, 66 D 5, 67 B 4, 69 A 6, 107 C 6.

²⁶ The errors of W are eight cases of attempted improvement or correction (65 C 8, 66 C 8-9, 68 D 2, 83 A 4, 83 B 4, 83 E 6, 107 C 2, 107 C 3), seven cases of reorderings (83 D 8, 83 D 9), and seven cases of other small-scale corruptions (68 C 8, 83 A 6, 83 C 2, 83 D 2, 84 A 5, 107 C 1, 107 C 5).

⁷⁰ A. Carlini and C. Strachan, *Studi dell'Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere*, 129 (1992), 147-67.

⁷¹ 69 B 8 εγγ BT + Stob.] εγε I + W and C (Tub. gr. Mb 14), an easy mistake that evidently happened more than once || 67 A 1 η ψχγτ error. BT] error η ψχγτ I + W + Plutarch; both are possibly correct, and the corruption (in either direction) could easily have happened twice.

chus. When we look at the seven cases of Lamblichus + B vs. TW, we find that these all seem to be mistakes of TW;⁷² so this gives no evidence of genetic affiliation between B and the manuscript used by Lamblichus, only an affiliation between T and W. The ten cases of Lamblichus and T vs. BW are of a different nature: whereas two of these errors are shared by B and W,⁷³ the others are Lamblichus + T in probable or possible error, often of a subtle nature, so that they are all such as to appear to be candidate readings to a competent editor (and in several cases the 1995 OCT has chosen the alternative that Burnet rejected).⁷⁴

The likeliest explanation for this pattern of agreement of Lamblichus with B at times and with T at times (but not with W) is that T is related by contamination to the Plato manuscript used by Lamblichus; an ancestor of T had two ancestors: a descendant of the common ancestor of BTW, and a manuscript in the family of the one used by Lamblichus. This would explain why there are no egregious errors shared in common between them, only undecidable or disputable or subtle errors that might slip through a process of correction. The oldest Plato manuscript B seems also to have benefited from contamination in its descent, which explains why its agreements with I seem always to be correct, and with TW showing an error that was removed in the B family by contamination and also absent from the manuscript used by Lamblichus. All the data are easily explained on this genetic hypothesis, including three cases where B alone seems to preserve the correct reading (66 B 4, 82 C 1, 83 D 10); all the variants are explained, down to the last iota.⁷⁵

⁷² 65 C 7 μηδὲ μῆτε TW || 66 B 6 (rou) τοουτου TW || 68 D 6 μεγαλων μεγιστων TW || 68 D 12 αλογον αρονον TW || 68 B 3 γε (nou) TW || 68 B 4 ομων (εωα) TW. The only apparent case of B agreeing with Lamblichus in error seems to us to be incorrect *selectio* on the part of the OCT editors: rather than accepting *ruēs* into the text and reporting the variant as 69 C 4 ου φωνοι [ruēs] εωα I + B + Stob., as Burnet and the 1995 editors do, it would be better to regard the *ruēs* as an insertion: ου φωνοι (ruēs) εωα TW.

⁷³ 82 C 3 οι φλοσοφοι I + T + Π2 | οι φλοσοφοι BW || 83 C 2 κωνων I + T | κωνων BW. ⁷⁴ 65 E 9 τωα BW + 1995 OCT | om. I + T, del. Burnet || 66 A 7 και BW | om. I + T || 67 D 1 δεγμα BW + 1995 OCT | (εκ) δεγμα T + I; del. εκ Burnet || 69 C 8 [αε] I + T || 83 B 7 και λων και φων BW + 1995 OCT | και λων T + I, del. και φων Burnet; three cases where both OCT editions seem to us to have made the wrong choice: 64 D 4 [ε] και πων BW, both OCT edd. || 64 C 7 χυπος δε τμ, ψυχμ (αρο) του εμματος BW, both OCT edd. || 65 B 3 αει ημω I + T | ημω αει BW, both OCT edd.

⁷⁵ 64 D 4 αρων T seems to have been a (successful or unsuccessful) correction for αρων I + BW, or else the αρων in T and Lamblichus' Plato manuscript lost its iota again en route to being copied to the Lamblichus MS F.

Given the genetic position of the manuscript that Lamblichus used, we can expect it to play an occasionally valuable role in establishing the text of Plato; and this it does.⁷⁶

This has been the most painstaking study of any chapter's genetic affiliations, in that we used both OCT editions and we independently judged which variant to select, not necessarily following the judgement of the editor. The result of this study indicates a definite place in the ancient stemma of the manuscripts of Plato's *Phaedo* for the manuscript used by Lamblichus. It is the same place in the stemma that had been discovered for it in A. Carlini's study of the manuscript tradition of Plato's *Phaedo*.⁷⁷ We could not have reached this result twice, independently, unless Lamblichus' version had been a literal manuscript-to-manuscript fair copy.

Now it is time to tackle the page-long concluding section of chapter 13, in which we see a new phenomenon, a sort of pastiche of passages from Plato, woven together in a new way. In the first of three paragraphs (below) there are two quotations from later in Plato's *Phaedo*, perfectly literal, but then in the second paragraph Lamblichus appears to quote from memory parts of a longer section from Plato's *Apology*, and finally in the concluding paragraph strings together two short pithy comments, one from later in the *Apology*, the other from the *Menexenus*. This is how it looks in translation, with the words not borrowed from Plato in bold for increased contrast:

⁷⁶ The most significant case is probably 83 B 7-8, where the original text ἐπειδὴ τις σφόδρα ἡδὴν ἢ λυπηθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ ἐπισημῶς ἐστὶν ἀποφασίζουσα, to accidental loss or transposition; this text is preserved in Lamblichus and Stobaeus and Π2, but corrupted in three separate ways in BW, as the 1995 OCT editors correctly have it: [γ λυπηθῇ] B; και λυπηθῇ W; η φοβηθῇ η λυπηθῇ T (Burnet had chosen the transposed word order of T, and then deleted the words missing in B). Similarly at 83 C 6 Lamblichus and Π2 preserve the original reading ἡδὴν αὖ σφόδρα η λυπηθῇ, in the face of a transposition in BW and an omission in T. At 84 B 1 Lamblichus and B preserve the cluster of words αἰεταὶ οὐρανὸν δεῖν in the original order, it seems, against two or three independent transpositions of order, in W, T, and Π2. At 69 A 8, where Burnet had printed [και] μελέω with the note και om. I + Stob., the 1995 editors print, more perspicuously, μελέω, with this apparatus entry: μελέω I + Stob.] και μελέω BTW, another case where the version of Plato's text consulted by Lamblichus was free, it seems, from a corruption common to the three main manuscripts of *Phaedo*. Finally, we may note two cases involving a single letter, where Lamblichus preserves the correct reading against BTW: 69 C 3 κωδωνων I + Stob.] κωδωνων TW and probably B || 65 A 5 μερεκε I | μερεκε(ν) BTW.

⁷⁷ A. Carlini, *Studi sulla tradizione antica e medievale del Fedone* [Tradizione del Fedone], (Rome, 1972), 98; the two results are independent, because we did not consult Carlini's work until after we had finished our own analysis.

For these reasons, one should do everything so as to take part in virtue and wisdom in this life, for fair is the prize and great is the hope. And for these reasons any man should be confident for his own soul who in his life said goodbye to the other pleasures, the ones concerning the body and its ornamentation, thinking of them as being both alien and bringing about rather the other result, but devoted himself to the ones concerning learning, ornamenting his soul not with an alien thing but with its own ornaments: self-control, and justice, and courage and liberality and truth, thus awaiting his journey into Hades, to make the journey whenever Fate calls.

Now then, these things being so, one should not take care of as much wealth as possible, nor honour and glory, but understanding and truth, and the soul, so it can be the best possible. For nor should one be setting the lowest value upon the most precious things, or rating inferior ones more highly. And nor should one care for one's body or for one's wealth so intensely as for the greatest possible well-being of one's soul. For it is not wealth that produces goodness; rather, it is from goodness that wealth and all other benefits for human beings accrue to them in their private and public life.

One should fix one's mind on this one single truth: nothing will be able to harm a good man, either in life or in death, nor are his affairs neglected by the gods, so that all the good things that conduce to success are dependent on himself, and the one whose preparation makes him closest to this would be the one who lives out his life in the greatest possible happiness. Let's say that such approaches, too, are ones that lead from these things to the exhortation to philosophy. (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 13, 99. 20–100. 20)

While the middle paragraph is a decent paraphrase of the main ideas of Socrates' self-reported 'usual sort of message', the first paragraph juxtaposes against each other two (exact) quotations that were separate in Plato's *Phaedo* ('one should do everything, etc.' 114 C 6–9; 'for these reasons, etc.' 114 D 8–115 A 3), and the third paragraph juxtaposes against each other two quotations that were originally from separate works ('fix your minds, etc.' *Ap.* 41 C 9–D 3; 'all the good things etc.' *Menex.* 247 E 7–8). In other words, these are not pure blocks of quotation, and we must admit that Flashar is correct to say that 'the reader of Iamblichus who doesn't know the *Phaedo* could hardly be in a position to notice a gap here'.⁷⁸

If this sort of phenomenon were to take place in the Aristotle section, then we would be unable to disentangle the words of Iam-

⁷⁸ Flashar, 'Platon und Aristoteles', 61.

blichus from those of Aristotle in any reliable way. We cannot rule out the possibility of this sort of passage cropping up in the Aristotle chapters, even though it happens only once in all the Plato chapters. This is the only page in the Plato chapters which justifies the scepticism and uncertainty which has surrounded the recovery of Aristotle's work out of Iamblichus'; the general rule of Iamblichus' approach, however, is quite different, consisting as it does of pure quotations or quotations modified with care and discipline.

2.7. *Chapter 19: quotations from Gorgias, Menexenus, and Laws 2*
Finally, we turn to the last chapter, in which Iamblichus quotes a third passage from Plato's *Gorgias* and then two from *Menexenus* and another from *Laws* 2, before his closing remarks. This is how it looks in outline:

*Chapter 19. Someone might also make distinct progress on the subject on the basis of goods in the soul, by indicating the one of them that is perfect and in charge of happiness. For to the degree that the soul surpasses the body, to a still higher degree are its goods superior, and the bodily ones are despicable, while those of the soul will be honourable and dignified. And so the good is not the same as what the pleasant is (... a version of *Gorg.* 506 c 6–508 a 8 ...) for you neglect geometry. So in general this is how it is with the happy life. And what follows next is that people choose to die a noble death instead, if they have the power to live on ignobly, rather than subject children and (their) descendants to reproach (... a version of *Menex.* 246 d 1–247 e 7 ...) and public recognition on one's own part. For it's from one's own resources that one should acquire⁷⁹ all the things that are good and bring one fame and happiness. 'Nothing too much' has long been thought an excellent adage (... a version of *Menex.* 247 e 5–248 a 4 ...) neither too much distressed nor too much afraid if dying should be in the present, or suffering any other human frailty. For it is indeed necessary to hold this opinion earnestly, that the good man, because he is self-controlled and just is successful and happy (... a version of *Laws* 2, 660 e 2–661 c 5 ...) but if he survives, for only the briefest possible time, the evil is less ... Then, if the goods are most attached to the life of virtue, and it's then that they are goods in reality, and enjoyment accompanies doing philosophy only, then for the sake of all these things this life should be chosen by those who wish to be successful in reality. (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 19, 115. 22–121. 6)*

By now, the voice of Iamblichus will seem familiar to us, in both the opening and the closing sentences, as well as in the three in-

⁷⁹ Conjecturing ἀρτῶσαι for ἀρχεσθαι.

tervening bridge passages. To differing degrees, each of these five interventions preserves some material from Plato, but their main function is to provide connections between passages, often by heavy use of thin inferences.

When we consider the deliberate transformations brought about to the *Gorgias* passage by Lamblichus, we must keep in mind that it was already transformed by Plato. This is an odd passage in which Socrates speaks both parts of a sham dialogue, after Callicles baulks and drops out. Callicles' only contribution is 'Say on, sir' (507 A 4). This is removed by Lamblichus, but he had to invest far more effort than this to transform the dialogue-reported-in-monologue into plain one-dimensional monologue. This effort involved him in a moderate amount of the usual sorts of transformation: he changes a rhetorical question and excises the direct addresses to 'my friend' or 'Callicles' (506 C 7-8 and 507 A 3, 507 C 1, 507 E 6, 508 A 3), and he depersonalizes and smoothes out the beginning and the end of the passage (506 C 6-8, 508 A 7-8), as well as the beginnings of a few sentences (506 E 4, 507 A 5). Lamblichus suppresses all the unproductive contributions⁸⁰ made by the imaginary interlocutor (Socrates) who is being taken by the hand of the imaginary philosopher (Callicles) in the dialogue-reported-in-monologue of Socrates. The remaining modifications are all clearly motivated by the need felt by Lamblichus to depersonalize the discussion: he suppresses three speech exchanges, i.e. three pairs of comments,⁸¹ and he excises two comments whose only function in Plato's text is to remind readers that Socrates and Callicles are locked in a stalemate of opposing convictions.⁸² On the other hand, he apparently felt no need to excise the backward reference at 507 C 1 ('as we have explained'), as this would not necessarily jar with the readers of Lamblichus' book. Where there is no clear need to modify the quotation, Lamblichus leaves it unmodified.

With this analysis, we have finished with all three of the *Gorgias*

⁸⁰ 506 C 9, 506 D 2, 506 D 4, 506 E 4, 506 E 5, 507 A 1, 507 A 7, 507 B 4; the only odd case is at 507 A 7, where Lamblichus suppresses *πάλιν γὰρ*, but replaces it with *πολλὰ ἀνέγχετο*, the *previous* comment of the interlocutor at 507 A 1; this would appear to be a mistake made in the course of a deliberate modification.

⁸¹ 506 D 8, 507 A 2-4, and 506 E 2, with the content of this latter exchange replaced by an empty confirmation invented by Lamblichus: 'as someone who argued decently would say'.

⁸² 507 C 5-7 'the one you were praising', 507 C 8-9 'so this is how I set down the matter and I say that this is true'; 508 A 4-6: 'I believe you don't pay attention to these facts, etc.'

quotations, in chapters 17, 18, and 19, and we can now pool together the variants brought to light by our collations to determine the genetic affiliation of the *Gorgias* manuscript used by Lamblichus. Our results turn out to be extensions of the ones noted by Dods in his edition. The text used by Lamblichus 'seems closer to the second family than the first; it shows striking agreement in error with F at 493 B 5 and at 505 B 4 and B 7, beside which a minor agreement in error with BTW at 492 E 8 is less probative'.⁸³ Adding to this is more evidence in Dods's apparatus criticus of significant agreement in error between F and Lamblichus,⁸⁴ buttressed by a more complete account of the insignificant agreements in error between Lamblichus and other witnesses.⁸⁵ So the text used by Lamblichus does indeed belong to the second family, and could have been represented in Dods's stemma (*Gorgias*, p. 67) as finding its place there. The consequence of this location in the stemma means that we should expect that Lamblichus is capable, at times, of being the only variant carrier with a correct reading, when F has the same (or a different) erroneous reading as BTW. And this does happen; not only does the witness of Lamblichus often support the correct reading against two or more manuscripts,⁸⁶ but also at one place (492 E 7), as Dods pointed out, 'his paraphrase points to what I believe to be the true reading, lost in the direct tradition', and at another place he offers a reading which Dods finds preferable to that of all four main manuscripts: 506 E 1 [τ] BTW F. This indefinite τ is definitely not insignificant.

Moving on to the *Menexenus* citations, we notice two chunks of earnest rhetoric taken from the inner speech that we have to imagine the dead soldiers declaiming from beyond the grave, in that absurdly patriotic funeral oration that Socrates says (236 B-

⁸³ Dods, *Gorgias*, 64.

⁸⁴ 493 A 6 *αἰεὶ* BTW] *αἰεὶ* F + Stob. + Olympiod. | 505 B 11 [τ] I + F | 507 E 5 & BTW] *γὰρ* I + Stob. + Ilz: om. F. Also adding some weight to the evidence of affiliation between F and I are several cases of agreement between them in a correct or preferred reading, against BTW in error, either between the two of them (493 E 7 and E 8) or with Stobaeus (493 A 1 and B 1) or with Ilz (504 E 7 and 505 A 6).

⁸⁵ The three cases of agreement in error between I and BTW could well be the result of correction in F (492 E 8, 493 A 7, 506 D 6); and the other three cases of agreement in error with other witnesses are scattered and insignificant: 507 C 9 & 8c] 8γ I + Stob. | 507 E 2 *ταυτα*[ς] I + B | *ἀντρέχει*(ν) I + Ilz.

⁸⁶ 493 A 1 I + F + Stob] BTP | 493 B 1 I + F + Stob] BTP | 493 C 4 I + Tr] F, BP, WB | 493 E 7 I + F] BTW | 493 E 8 I + F] BTW | 504 E 7 I + F] BTW | 504 E 8 I + F] BTW | 504 E 8 I + F] BTW | 505 A 3 I + F] BTW | 505 A 6 I + F] BTW.

c, 249 D-E) he got from the real author of Pericles' funeral oration, namely his mistress Aspasia. At the end of this inner speech, Socrates says (247 E), 'Children and parents, the dead commanded me to report those words, and I report them with all my heart.' Of those words, Lamblichus reported only some, namely the address (246 D 1-247 B 7) from the fallen fathers to their sons, exhorting them to shun wickedness, to vie with them for glory, and not to waste the treasure of honour accumulated by their ancestors, as well as a small part (only) of the address from the fallen sons to their parents, namely, about a dozen lines of preaching (247 E 5-248 B 4) that apply the Delphic apophthegm 'nothing too much' to the grief of their parents. Nothing of the material skipped over from 247 C 1 to E 5 is visible through the bridge passage, which draws its repetitive content rather from the quotation it introduces; it is only a bridge, not a 'fast-forward'.

Even though this inner speech is already a monologue, it still requires some transformation on the part of Lamblichus so that it is no longer a speech from beyond the grave from dead men hectoring their orphan sons (and bereaved parents), but an impersonal exhortation to humans in general. Lamblichus suppresses references to 'we' and 'you' and changes from second-person plural 'you' to an indefinite third-person *tis* or 'someone'.⁵⁷ He also suppresses a rhetorical claim about the fathers of the deceased and an assertion of the deceased speakers' attitude.⁵⁸ But when all is said and done, the most significant and the most typical modification was the one made at the beginning (above, p. 235) to depersonalize the start of the inner speech (246 D 1-3); compare the version above with the original version in Plato: 'Sons, that you are sons of good fathers is revealed by the present state of affairs: we who can live on ignobly choose to die a noble death instead, rather than subject you and (your) descendants to reproach.' Here again we see a different set of techniques of modification, but always limited to a limited goal: flattening dialogue to monologue and personal discussion to impersonal statement.

We are closing in on the end, the last quotation in the last Plato chapter, but before we get there, let us first study the way the chapter comes to its final conclusion in the voice of Lamblichus:

⁵⁷ 246 D 4, 246 D 8, 247 A 3, 247 A 4, 247 A 7, 247 B 1 (twice).

⁵⁸ 248 B 1-2 and 246 D 5-6, modifying Plato's 'we consider it to be' to 'for it is'.

And he who lives in an unjust and offensive way will of necessity live in a disgraceful way, and if disgracefully, then badly; so that he will also live in a way that's unpleasant and not beneficial to himself, for when we declare that the most pleasant life is the same as the life said by the gods to be best, what we say is most true. Then, if the goods are most attached to the life of virtue, and it's then that they are goods in reality, and enjoyment accompanies doing philosophy only, then for the sake of all these things this life should be chosen by those who wish to be successful in reality. (Lambli. Protr. ch. 19, 121. 1-6)

This last concluding passage is composed of two sentences of which the first half of the first one is an accurate condensed paraphrase of the line of thought to which the Athenian Stranger is struggling to persuade the others at *Laus* 2, 661 E 6-662 A 7. It is an old Socratic truth whose implausibility Plato has been commenting on since before he wrote the *Gorgias*. This paraphrase is completed by an earnest asseveration introduced by a particle only apparently inferential, and the last sentence of the chapter is a typical closing sentence: it looks like an argument, but it is in fact mostly a repetition of very general themes from the preceding passages, organized to deliver an explicit protreptic message: 'this life should be chosen by all who wish to be successful in reality'.

Before this, the last Plato quotation was introduced with only the briefest of bridge passages, 'For it is indeed necessary to hold this opinion earnestly' (119. 21). Lamblichus then proceeds to quote his last quotation, from *Laus* 2, in which the Athenian Stranger approvingly attributes to Crete and Sparta an active but unacknowledged policy of forcing their poets to represent the virtuous as happy and the wicked as wretched, no matter how wealthy or good-looking or healthy they may happen to be. Lamblichus has an interest in the thesis, but not in the poets who are obliged to preach it, so he removes the two references to the poets, at the beginning and near the end of his quotation. This is the modified version:

[Lamblichus excises 660 E 2: 'You oblige your poets to say] that the good man, because he has self-control and justice, is successful and happy . . . but if such a man survives for only the briefest time, the evil is less. [Lamblichus excises 661 C 5-8: 'I imagine you will persuade or compel the authors in your states to embody this doctrine of mine in the words, rhythms, and "harmonies" they produce for the education of their youth. Isn't that right? Look here, now,] my clear meaning is that so-called 'bad' things are good for those who lack justice but bad for those

who have it, whereas so-called 'good' things really are good for the good, and bad for the bad. (Plato, *Laws* 2, 660 B 2-661 D 3, trans. after Saunders)

The only other change is at 661 B 4-5, where Lamblichus takes Plato's meta-conversational comment and turns it into a meta-textual note: 'and you and I, presumably, argue this, that . . . becomes: 'and my argument argues this, that . . .'. Apart from the banishing of the poets from Plato's text (which has a certain ironic appropriateness, given that the general effect of Lamblichus' modifications is to remove the drama and poetry from Plato's original version), and the suppression of what 'you and I' argue, there are no modifications to report or explain. The quotation is otherwise perfectly literal. The block is pure, and the sequence is natural.

The selections from *Menexenus* and *Laws* 2 are too brief to provide a solid enough foundation for any reasoning about the genetic affiliation of the manuscripts that were used by Lamblichus.

This brings to an end our analysis of this chapter, the last in this group of seven Plato chapters, and, with it we have finished our self-imposed labours and have identified, classified, and explained every single possible difference that could be revealed by the most scrupulous possible collation between the two versions, Plato's original and Lamblichus' modified one. It is now a complete study.

2.8. Summary and conclusions about the Plato chapters

Now that we have studied every variant in every Plato chapter, we can draw some general conclusions about the techniques used by Lamblichus to produce them. At the most general level, Lamblichus simply selected and arranged into a certain order the most protreptic passages that he could find. He modifies the quotation to varying degrees, but these can all be explained in the way we have, as being various responses to the challenges presented by Plato's dramatic dialogue. It is Plato whose works vary widely in their difference from dogmatic monologue, and this wide variety of degrees of difference forces on Lamblichus a wide variety of different degrees of intervention. But here is the important negative result: this is the *only* mode of intervention that Lamblichus engages in, and there seems to be no other reason that would motivate any other kind of intervention.

Lamblichus gives an essentially faithful version of the Plato he quotes, even when he modifies it. His selection of protreptic pas-

sages from Plato is well informed and judicious, and he refrains from making any changes to the text of Plato. Even when he makes modifications to his quotation, he preserves all the thought and as much of the language of Plato as is consistent with his formal objective of flattening to monologue. No reader can be misled about Plato's ideas by reading them in the essentially faithful version of Lamblichus.

We found in each of the chapters except chapter 13 that the texture of Lamblichus' work is pure blocks of quotations in each chapter, bookended by thin comments; this describes the situation for all but one page in these chapters (99. 20-110. 20), where a set of closing comments is composed of a pastiche made up of various small bits of several works of Plato, with threads from Lamblichus as well. We found in each of the chapters (again with the above exception) that the sequence of quoted blocks is natural, from one book to another without returning, and from earlier to later within books without returning.

We studied not only the deliberate changes but also the accidental events that caused variants to crop up between Lamblichus' version and Plato's text. This has resulted in the unintended benefit of shedding some new light on the early history of the Plato texts. We saw that for the *Gorgias*, the manuscript used by Lamblichus was related to the F family against BTW; for the *Theaetetus* to W against BT; for the *Phaedo* to T, but by contamination, against BW; for *Republic* 7 there was insufficient information to confirm the suggestion of affiliation with F. It stands to reason that the various manuscripts used by Lamblichus would have various genetic relationships to the various manuscripts used by those ancient editors who compiled the missing-link hyparchetypes that spawned all our medieval manuscript tradition. This new evidence needs to be put in the wider context of other ancient witnesses to Plato's text,⁸⁹ but that would take us too far afield from the present subject.

For our purposes, the main lesson to draw from our study of variants is that we must regard the manuscript of Lamblichus (where he makes no intervention) as a manuscript copy of a manuscript of

⁸⁹ Important work in this area was done by G. Jachmann, 'Der Platontext', *Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, phil.-hist. Kl. 11 (1941), 225-389, repr. in id., *Textgeschichtliche Studien* (Königstein/Ts., 1982), 581-745; by E. R. Dodds in his *Gorgias* edition, and by A. Carlini, *Tradizione del Fedone*. The more than eighty papyrus fragments of Plato's works have been recently studied in the *Corpus dei papiri filosofici* series.

Plato. If this is how he worked in his Aristotle chapters, then we must trust the Lamblichus version as a manuscript of Aristotle's lost work, unless we are in a zone where he has modified the quotation.

3. The Aristotle chapters (6-12)

3.1. Preliminary remarks

Having completed the study of the Plato section in Lamblichus' *Protrepticus*, we are now in a position to exploit our understanding by applying it to the Aristotle section. We operate with the hypothesis that Lamblichus used essentially the same technique of quotation in the Aristotle section as he did in the Plato section, and this hypothesis yields some predictions to be tested.

The general pattern is for Lamblichus to quote pure blocks of text assembled in a natural sequence, separated by thin bookend comments in his own voice. This voice has become rather familiar to us from studying the Plato chapters, and we shall recognize it all the more easily once we know where to look for it, in the openings and closings of each chapter. We expect that these openings and closings will consist of a single sentence, but on occasion they may be less than a sentence (as in the openings of chapters 15 and 16), or several sentences instead of one (as in the closings of chapters 17 and 19). Whereas the only difficulty with the openings and closings is to know how extensive they are, i.e. one sentence or several, it is a more subtle business to detect a bridge passage or a fast-forward passage, as these could occur anywhere within a chapter, and can be discerned only by internal considerations. Our familiarity with the voice of Lamblichus will grow every time we identify another pair of sentences as Lamblichus opening or closing his own chapters.

It greatly simplifies matters to focus our initial scrutiny on the contribution of Lamblichus, not on the contribution of Aristotle. We can resolve each chapter into one or a few pure blocks of quotation if we succeed in stripping away the voice of Lamblichus, which leaves us with only one or a few questions to ask, as to the author and work from which the block might have been drawn. If we had not first stripped away the comments to reveal the blocks, we would have needed to assess each sentence or paragraph in turn (Aristotle? *Protrepticus*?), and since there are many times as many

Aristotle sentences as Lamblichus sentences, this would have been many times more laborious. And it would also have been less reliable, since we are able to become very familiar with the rather distinctive types of comments that Lamblichus makes in this book. And although Aristotle's ideas and ways of thinking are rather familiar to us, we have little direct knowledge of the style and voice(s) of any of his published works, and we have no prior knowledge of which work(s) any of Lamblichus' quotations came from. By focusing on Lamblichus first, we turn the traditional problem inside out.

Once we remove the voice of Lamblichus, we are left with blocks which are predicted to have come from Aristotle. This prediction is then independently confirmed, when possible, sometimes with multiple arguments. Though a few blocks of text (considered each on their own) could perhaps have come from another author, most blocks could have come only from Aristotle, and each chapter, without exception, contains material that could have come only from him. It is important to appreciate that our attribution of a passage to Aristotle is founded generally on two independent considerations: formally, what is not Lamblichus must always be from the single author he is consistently quoting; materially, independent testimony generally corroborates the block in question as Aristotle's in origin. This approach is possible only because we have found out that Lamblichus quoted pure blocks of Plato text in a natural sequence, and can be expected to have done so for Aristotle.

(Yet the pattern of pure blocks quoted in natural sequence is not quite strictly observed; as we saw in chapter 13 (above, pp. 233-5) Lamblichus departed, for a page or so, from sequential block quotation in favour of a looser pastiche. We return to this question in Section 4, when we take stock of what we do and do not know, and of the degree of reliability of our conclusions.)

One thing we definitely do not know is whether Aristotle's work(s) contained dialogue, as we expect that Lamblichus will have removed all, or virtually all, trace of it. We shall not generally know the degree of modification of any modified quotation, as this seems to depend, to judge from the Plato chapters, on the amount of dialogue there was in the original, the very thing we do not know. As we work through the Aristotle chapters, we refrain from claiming which of Aristotle's works are in question, until Section 4.

A beneficial by-product of our work of authentication is to provide the first modern English translation of this Aristotle material

in its context. Since the main issue is to distinguish the voices, the judicious plan is to hear both voices, in other words to translate the chapters of Iamblichus with integrity, treating them as the units they were designed to be.

Finally, a word by way of preface about what is old and what is new in our treatment of these seven Aristotle chapters. Generally, we have little new evidence to present which might establish individual sentences or passages as coming from Aristotle (or his *Protrepticus*). The improvements come about as a consequence of our structural analysis of Iamblichus' book, and of the layout of the evidence. Our procedure will be to study first the inner five chapters, and then the outer pair, as we did with the Plato chapters, as this allows readers to understand the simpler chapters first before tackling the most complex chapters, 6 and 13, which stand at the beginnings of their respective sections.

3.2. Chapter 7

Let us begin this process by discussing the beginning of chapter 7, pausing at first to assess the first sentence:

Chapter 7. Someone might see the same point more recognizably on the basis of the following. To have wisdom and cognition is in itself valuable for humans, for it is not possible to live as a human without these; and it is also useful for our way of life, for nothing good comes to us unless it is accomplished after we have reasoned and acted in accordance with wisdom. Moreover, whether living successfully consists in enjoyment or in having virtue or in wisdom, according to all these we should do philosophy, for these things come to us most of all, and in a pure way, through doing philosophy. (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 7, 71. 13-22)

Chapter 7 has an opening of a single line: ἴδου δ' ἄν τις τὸ αὐτὸ γινώσκουσιν ἀπὸ τοῦτων. Iamblichus is remarkably uncreative in the construction of his bridge passages, and we see almost the same sentence as a bridge in chapter 8: γινώσκῃ δ' ἄν τις τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦτων 'Someone might recognize the same thing on the basis of the following as well' (77. 12-13). There are certain patterns of speech indicating that Iamblichus wrote these words, patterns which are especially obvious when compared with similar patterns in the Plato sections. In the present sentence, we notice the use of the potential optative with an indefinite pronoun, and a prepositional phrase (ἀπὸ τοῦτων), in the context of a procedural comment. There are

several openings in the Plato section employing a very similar construction,⁹⁰ and further similarities with closings and bridges in the Plato section.⁹¹ The same patterns also recur in openings,⁹² closings,⁹³ and bridges⁹⁴ in the Aristotle section.

Our hypothesis is that the arguments following Iamblichus' opening are Aristotle's; and they will be immediately recognized as such. What we have is a protreptic version of the 'three lives' argument. We need look no further than Aristotle's own works to find confirmation that this argument is his: 'Whether living successfully consists in enjoyment or in having virtue or in wisdom, according to all these we should do philosophy' (71. 18-21).

In the *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle mentions that the distinction between internal and external goods was made in arguments he labels 'exoteric', meaning popular or even published.⁹⁵ All goods are

⁹⁰ The most closely parallel opening in the Plato section is in chapter 19: δύναιτο δ' ἄν τις καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀγαθῶν ἐκτελεσθεῖν τὸ ποικεμένον (chapter 19 opening, 115. 22-3). But see also: ἴδου δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦτων ἐκτελεσθῆναι οὐκ αὐτοῖς (chapter 13 opening, 90. 17-18); ἀρχαῖα μὲν καὶ τοῦτου ἐντελεῖν (chapter 17 opening, 111. 21; compare the chapter 9 opening, below, p. 258); μετρίαν δὲ καὶ ἐνὶ θάτερα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (chapter 18 opening, 114. 6-7).

⁹¹ The closing of chapter 13: τοιαῦται ἔστωσαν καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦτων ἐνὶ τῇν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν προσηρπῆ ἐφόδοι (100. 19-20).

⁹² Throughout the Aristotle section, in many opening sentences, Iamblichus frequently uses the preposition ἀπὸ in connection with the arguments that follow: ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπαγίων πᾶσι φανερῶν (chapter 8 opening, 75. 15-16); ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς φύσεως βουλήματος (chapter 9, 79. 7-8); ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν (chapter 10 opening, 84. 9); ἀπὸ τῆς ὁγῆς εὐδαιμονίας (chapter 12, 89. 8). Two of the chapters in the Aristotle section open with the potential optative or subjunctive moods: εἴθε οὖν λέγουμεν (chapter 6 opening, 67. 23); ὁγῶν ἂν γένοιτο ἐντελεῖν (chapter 11, 86. 11-12).

⁹³ The closing of chapter 8: οὕτως ἄν τις τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνομένων ἐφόδους συγκεφαλαιώσαντο δεύτως εἰς προσηρπῆν (79. 3-4).

⁹⁴ Two bridges: ἐκ τῶνδε μειομένης τις ἄν (chapter 6, 70. 22); γινώσκῃ δ' ἄν τις τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦτων (chapter 8, 77. 12).

⁹⁵ The expression ἐν τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς λόγοις refers to arguments in writings intended for a more popular audience, as the arguments in the *Protrepticus* self-evidently were. Philoponus and Simplicius both tell us that the expression refers to arguments that are neither strictly demonstrative nor intended for students, but rather for the majority of people out of a desire to persuade them by means of more commonly held beliefs (Philop. *In Phys.* 705. 22 Vitelli; Simplicius *In Phys.* 605. 34 Diels). Aristotle uses the expression in the following places: *Phys.* 4. 10, 217^b 31; *Metaph.* M 1, 1076^a 28; *NE* 1. 13, 1102^a 26; 6. 4, 1140^a 3; *EE* 1. 8, 1217^a 22; 2. 1, 1218^b 34; *Pol.* 1. 5, 1254^a 33; 3. 6, 1278^b 31; 7. 1, 1323^a 22. In some cases it is possible that he is referring to multiple works, this seems to be the case in the *Metaphysics* passage, where he refers to arguments against the Forms that we have reason to believe were made in multiple works. In the *Physics* passage, on the other hand, the reference to plural ἑξωτερικῶν λόγων is to arguments, not multiple works, about time. Similarly, the reference in *Politics* 3. 6 is obviously to a single treatment of

either outside or inside the soul, and of these those in the soul are more desirable; this distinction we make even in the exoteric arguments. For wisdom, excellence, and pleasure are in the soul, and some or all of these seem to all to be the end' (*EE* 2. 1, 1218^b32-6).

According to *Eudemian Ethics*, then, the 'three lives' argument is supported by the division of goods into those of the body and of the soul. In the section of the *Rhetoric* devoted to advice on the construction of a protreptic speech, Aristotle highlights this distinction between internal and external goods (1360^b24-9). And so we are not surprised to find it in the continuation of the argument in chapter 7 of *Lamblichus' Protrepticus*:

Furthermore, part of us is soul, part body; and the one has authority, the other is under authority; the one uses, the other supports it as a tool. Further, it is always with reference to that which has authority and uses it that the use of that which is under authority, i.e. the tool, is co-ordinated. And of the soul one part is reason (which by nature has authority and judges our affairs), the other part is a follower and is naturally under authority. And everything is well disposed when it is in accordance with its own proper virtue, for to obtain this is good. (*lambl. Protr.* ch. 7, 71.22-72. 3)

Still more external support, this time from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is available to show that this exact distinction was drawn in popular arguments: 'Some things are said about it [the nature of the soul], adequately enough, even in the exoteric arguments, and we must use these; I mean that one element in the soul is irrational and one possesses a rational principle' (*NE* 1. 13, 1102^a26-8).

Now the argument in the *Protrepticus* continues with a discussion of the reason why it is the proper virtue and the goods of the soul that should be valued and chosen:

Moreover, it's when a thing's most dominant and most honourable parts have their virtue that it is well disposed, therefore the natural virtue of that which is better is naturally better. And that which is by nature more authoritative and more commanding is better, as a human is over the other animals; thus soul is better than body (for it is more authoritative), as is the part of the soul which has reason and thought, for this kind of thing is

the various kinds of rule, not to multiple works or books about kinds of rule. The remaining references in the ethical-political works may also be to arguments in individual works. For a different account, which has the expression refer to arguments not peculiar to the Peripatetic school, see H. Diels, 'Über die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles' [*'Exoterische Reden'*], *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 19 (1883), 477-94.

what prescribes and proscribes and says how we ought or ought not to act. Whatever, then, is the virtue of this part necessarily is the most valuable virtue of all, both for everything in general and for us; in fact, I think one might actually take this position, that we are this part, either alone or especially. (*lambl. Protr.* ch. 7, 72. 3-72. 14)

Here we can offer very solid confirmation that these are Aristotle's ideas, from the *Politics*, where Aristotle gives an extended version of the whole argument that we see here, and refers to it having been made in the popular version of the arguments:

Considering that much has been given an adequate treatment also in the exoteric arguments concerning the best life, we will now only repeat what is contained in them. Certainly no one will dispute the propriety of that partition of goods which separates them into three classes, viz., external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, or deny that a successful man must have all three. . . . whereas external goods have a limit, like some instrument, and all things useful are useful for something; where there is too much of them they must either do harm to those who have them, or at any rate be of no use, every good of the soul, the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the term useful as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects. No proof is required to show that the best state of one thing in relation to another corresponds in degree of excellence to the interval between the natures of which we say that these very states are states: so that, if the soul is more noble than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the other. Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are desirable at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them. (*Pol.* 7. 1, 1323^a21-^b21, after Jowett in *Revised Aristotle*)

The continuation of the *Protrepticus* passage gives a more extensive version of the latter part of this argument:

Furthermore, it's when the natural function of each thing is achieved, not as a result but in itself, that it is called finest, and then it should also be called good, and one should take the most dominant virtue to be the one by which each thing naturally accomplishes this very thing. So that which is composite and divisible into parts has many different activities, but that which is by nature simple and whose being is not relative to anything else necessarily has a single virtue in itself, in the strict sense.

So if a human is a simple animal whose being is ordered according to reason and intellect, there is no other function for it than only the

most precise truth, i.e. having the truth about existing things, but if it is naturally composed of several capacities, it is clear that, of the several things it can naturally achieve, the best of them is always their function, e.g. of the doctor health, and of the pilot safety. And we can name no function of thought, or of the thinking part of our soul, better than truth. Truth therefore is the most dominant function of this part of the soul. And it does this simply with knowledge, and it does this more with more knowledge; and the most dominant end for this is observation. For when of two things one is valuable because of the other, the one on account of which the other is valuable is better and more valuable; for example, pleasure is better than pleasant things, and health than healthy things, for the latter are said to be productive of the former. Thus nothing is more valuable than wisdom, which we say is a capacity of the most dominant thing in us, when disposition is judged against disposition; for the cognitive part, both apart and in combination, is better than all the rest of the soul, and its knowledge is a virtue. (*Iambl. Protr.* ch. 7, 72. 14-73. 17)

Notice that the version of the argument in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* is not only more extended but also has a more protreptic focus. This, of course, stands to reason if Iamblichus was quoting from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. But the main point in each version of the argument is that wisdom (and hence philosophy) is the proper virtue of the highest part of us, that among the three goals of life it is the most valuable, and that we should do philosophy, whether or not the ultimate conclusion is explicitly drawn in the *Eudemian Ethics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, or *Politics*.

Thus in no fewer than three extant works we have Aristotle's own word that the argument contained in chapter 7 of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* was published in a more popular and accessible form. Iamblichus apparently quoted this argument directly from the work that contained it, and appears not to have altered it, beyond offering his customary one-line introduction.

In the extant ethical works, Aristotle uses the 'three lives' argument as a framework for focusing on the kind of life that is better than others because of its independence and its appropriateness to the kind of things we humans are. But in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle advises the speech-writer to construct a protreptic speech with reference to pleasure and virtue, since all are agreed that these are things at which everyone aims (1360^b 14-18 and 1362^b 2-12). And so in the *Protrepticus*, whose audience is necessarily diverse and unlikely to be predisposed to the contemplative life, Aristotle pre-

fers to co-opt the goals of his various readers: philosophy conduces to each of the goals of life—pleasure, virtue, and wisdom. We have just seen him advance the argument about wisdom; now here is what he goes on to say about virtue:

Therefore its function is none of what are called 'parts of virtue', for it is better than all of them and the end produced is always better than the knowledge that produces it. Nor is every virtue of the soul in that way a function, nor is success; for if it is to be productive, different ones will produce different things, as the skill of building (which is not part of any house) produces a house. However, wisdom is a part of virtue and of success, for we say that success either comes from it or is it.

Thus according to this argument too, it is impossible for this to be productive knowledge; for the end must be better than the thing which comes to be, and nothing is better than wisdom, unless it is one of the things we have named and none of those is a function distinct from it. Therefore a certain observational knowledge is what one should name this kind, since it is surely impossible for production to be its end. Hence wisdom and observation are a function of the virtue, and this of all things is the most valuable for humans, comparable, I think, to seeing for the eyes, which one would choose to have even if there wasn't anything different that was going to result from it beyond the vision itself. (*Iambl. Protr.* ch. 7, 73. 17-74. 7)

Here it is interesting to observe that Aristotle in part eliminates virtue as the ultimate goal of life (since the soul's highest function is none of the individual virtues), and in part co-opts the goal of virtue for the cause of wisdom (by making wisdom the highest virtue of the soul). He pursues a similar strategy with respect to pleasure in the sequel, which will take us to the end of the chapter:

Again, if we like sight for its own sake, this gives sufficient witness that everybody ultimately likes wisdom and cognition. Again, if someone likes a particular thing because something else coincides with it, it is clear that he will wish more for that which has more of it: for example, if someone happened to choose walking because it's healthy, and it occurred to him that running is more healthy for him, and possible, he will choose this even more, and would choose it as soon as he recognized that. Further, if true opinion is similar to wisdom, since having true opinions is valuable in that and in so far as it is similar to wisdom on account of its truth, if this exists more in wisdom, then wisdom will be more valuable than having true opinion. But yet, living is distinguished from not living by sense perception, and living is defined by its presence and power, and if this is removed life is not worth living, as though life itself were removed along with sense percep-

tion. But among the senses the capacity of sight is distinguished by being the most distinct, and for this reason as well we value it most; but every sense perception is a capacity for becoming familiar with things through a body, just as hearing perceives the sound through the ears. Therefore, if living is valuable because of the perception, and the perception is a kind of cognition, and we choose it because the soul is able to have familiarity by means of it, and we've always said that of two things the more valuable one is always the one which has that more, and of the senses vision is necessarily the most valuable and honourable, and wisdom is more valuable than it and all the others, and more valuable than living, then the wisdom of truth is more dominant; hence all humans pursue wisdom most. *For in liking living we like having wisdom and familiarity; for we value life for no other reason than for the sake of perception, and above all for the sake of vision; for we evidently love this capacity exceedingly; for it is, compared with the other senses, virtually a sort of knowledge.* (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 7, 74-75, 13)

It appears here that Iamblichus has truncated or even altered the argument at lines 74. 7-9, where we read: 'again, if we like sight for its own sake, this gives sufficient witness that everybody ultimately likes wisdom and cognition'. The connection between enjoyment and perception has not been explicitly drawn in a way that would complete the 'three lives' argument announced earlier in the chapter. Of course, the connection between perception and pleasure is not hard to draw. At any rate, it is clear that Aristotle has pursued a co-option strategy, arguing that pleasure is valued because of sense perception, that vision is the most valued of sense perceptions, and that vision is valued because it is akin to cognition and knowledge and wisdom. This conclusion is detectable in the final sentences of the chapter, but we regard these lines as Iamblichus' words because they are insufficiently progressive and excessively enthusiastic: 'exceedingly', 'virtually a sort of', etc. The excessive repetition of the inferential particle *γὰρ* in a conclusion is a construction of Iamblichus' that we see also in the Plato section.⁹⁶

In 74. 20-1 the idea is expressed that life is to be identified with perception. This is a traditional view, and Aristotle discusses it in *NE* 9. 9 (1170^a16ff.) and *EE* 7. 12 (1244^b26ff.), adding in *DA* 1. 2 (403^b25-7) that motion is also critical. Aristotle's thought that 'if this is removed life is not worth living, as though life itself were removed along with perception' is echoed later in chapter 10:

⁹⁶ Compare the endings of chapters 16 and 19, which consist of repetitive pseudo-conclusions strung together by particles only apparently inferential.

'for we should be almost entirely motionless if deprived of it [sc. perception]' (86. 4-5). Aristotle appears to refer to one or both of these statements at the outset of a portion of the *Eudemian Ethics* that seems in some way directly related to the *Protrepticus*:

The matter [about the relationship between self-sufficiency and friendship] is clear if we grasp what life is, in the active sense and as an end. It is manifest that life is perception and knowledge, and that consequently social life is perception and knowledge in common. But self-perception and self-knowledge are highly desirable for each individually (and it is owing to this that the desire for life is implanted by nature in all, for living must be deemed a sort of knowing). If therefore one were to abstract the knowledge and make it itself by itself (though this is not evident in the argument as we have written it, but in practice it is evident), there would be no difference between this knowledge and another person's knowing instead of oneself; but that is like another person's living instead of oneself, whereas perceiving and knowing oneself is more desirable, as is reasonable. For two things must be connected together in the argument that life is desirable and that good is desirable, and as a consequence that it is desirable for ourselves to possess a nature of that sort. If, therefore, of the pair of corresponding series of this kind one is always in the class of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are generally speaking constituted by their sharing in the 'determined' nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be of a certain sort—since, then, we are not each of these things in ourselves but only by participation in these faculties while perceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one becomes perceptible in that way and in that respect in which one had earlier perceived; and when knowing one becomes knowable)—hence owing to this one wishes always to live because one wishes always to know; and this is because one wishes to be oneself the object known. (*EE* 7. 12, 1244^b23-1245^a10, trans. after Solomon in *Revised Aristotle*)

If this parallel suffices to support the authenticity of the second block, then two blocks have been proven to be Aristotle's. These two blocks appear to be one block but condensed by having content briefly alluded to in a 'fast-forward' paraphrase. If this is right, what we have in this chapter is one block of quotation, demonstrated by multiple proofs to be Aristotle's words (perhaps modified, especially if they were originally contained in a dialogue), drawn from his 'exoteric arguments'. As to which work contained these arguments, the best candidate is the *Protrepticus*, but this attribution has not yet been solidly proven, and to assert it would be premature.

3.3. Chapter 8

So let us proceed to recover further quoted material, resuming with the beginning of chapter 8.

Chapter 8. Still, it is no bad idea to call the subject to mind, reasoning on the basis of the common conceptions, too, from what manifestly appears to everyone. So then, this, at least, is quite clear to everyone, that nobody would choose to live in possession of the greatest wealth and power of all people if they nevertheless lacked wisdom and were raving mad, not even if they were going to live enjoying the wildest pleasures, in the way that some people out of their minds lead their lives. Thus everybody, it seems, avoids being unwise most of all. Now wisdom is the opposite of being unwise, and of these opposites the one is to be avoided, the other is valuable. So, just as being sick is to be avoided, so is being healthy valuable for us. (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 8, 75. 14-24)

Here again it is clear that the first sentence was written by Iamblichus, as it contains a number of tell-tale traits: it is a procedural comment, designed to motivate a reading of the argument to come; no progressive argument is entered into, and we are left on a very general level, with no detailed or particular considerations; finally, it is organized around the idea of the basis of evidence, claiming to derive the arguments 'from the common conceptions [*ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν*]'.⁹⁷ We see none of these traits in the successive sentences, which contain a clear progressive argument on the basis of substantial particular premisses. Hence we should make the separation of voices after the first sentence (75. 14-16), and regard the next sentences as being a quotation (modified or not) from Aristotle. As for what appears to be the Aristotle content, we can see that the style of reasoning is consistent with Aristotle's, but we lack evidence to authenticate him definitely as the source of this particular block.

After these first eight lines of quotation, we read the following, starting with a bridge passage in the voice of Iamblichus:

Wisdom, it seems, according to this argument too, is the most desirable of all things, and not for the sake of anything else that results from it, as the common conceptions give witness. For even if someone had everything, but was suffering from mental illness, that way of life would not be valuable, for none

⁹⁷ The term 'common conceptions' is anachronistic, or at least does not occur in the extant works of Aristotle, though it is common currency from the Hellenistic period to the end of antiquity, thanks especially to the influence of the Stoics and Euclid.

of his other goods would be of any benefit. Hence everybody, in so far as they have some perception of being wise and can have a taste of this thing, think the other things to be nothing, and this explains why not a single one of us would put up with being drunk or childish up to the ends of our lives. So, on account of this too, though sleep is extremely pleasant, it is not valuable, even if we were to suppose that all of the pleasures were present to the sleeper, because the images during sleep are false, while those of the waking are true. For sleep and waking are no different from each other except that then the soul often gets the truth, but when sleeping is always thoroughly deceived; for the phantom in dreams is actually entirely false. And the fact that most people avoid death also shows the soul's love of learning; for it avoids what it does not recognize, what is dark and not clear, and naturally seeks what is evident and recognizable. This is the main reason why we say one should honour those who have caused us to see the sun and the light, and revere our fathers and mothers as causes of the greatest of goods; and causes they are, it seems, of our having any wisdom and sight. It is for the same reason that we also enjoy what we are acquainted with, both things and people, and call 'friends' those with whom we are familiar. (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 8, 75. 25-76. 26)

Here at the beginning we have a typical bridge passage, indicated by the procedural agenda and the tag *αἱ κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ* ('the common conceptions'). We predict that what follows, for twenty-four more lines, was written by Aristotle. To confirm this we may compare the following from the *Eudemian Ethics*:

For there are many contingencies such as to make men throw away their life, such as sicknesses, overwhelming pain, and storms, so that it is clear that, even if it was desirable at first, if one were given the choice, one would choose not to be born, for these reasons anyway. Further, the life we lead as children is not desirable, for no one in his senses would put up with returning again to living like that. . . . We may say the same of the pleasure of sleeping. (*EE* 1. 5, 1215^b18-1216³, after Solomon in *Revised Aristotle*)

In the version found in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*, death, madness, sleep, and puerility were used to illustrate why one should pursue wisdom, since wisdom is somehow the opposite of what is avoided in each of these. These are treated together briefly in the context of the 'three lives' argument of *Eudemian Ethics* 1. 5 (and individually elsewhere in the corpus),⁹⁸ but it appears that in Aristotle's original book there was a more elaborate set of endoxic arguments for

⁹⁸ Aristotle makes a similar argument about the prospect of lifelong childhood in *NE* 10. 2 (1174^a1 ff.) and *MM* 1. 4, 1185^a2; on the emptiness of sleep cf. *NE* 1. 13, 1102^a2-11; 10. 8, 1178^b18-20; *EE* 1. 5, 1216^a2-10.

this conclusion (what Iamblichus calls an argument 'from common conceptions'). This kind of argument is obviously perfectly suited to a popular work, comprising, like the material from chapter 7, clearly 'exoteric arguments' meant for popular consumption.⁹⁹

Chapter 8 continues with citations from Aristotle, punctuated by two more bridge passages and a closing sentence authored by Iamblichus. Let us look at the next block and bookend:

*These things, then, might show distinctly that we like what's recognizable and evident and what's clear; and if we like what's recognizable and what's distinct, it is clear that we also like recognizing and being wise, likewise. In addition to these, just as with property, it is not the same possession that is for the sake of living, and of living well, for humans; so too, with wisdom: we do not, I think, need the same wisdom for merely living and for living nobly. Now then, much allowance is made for the many who do this (they pray to be successful, but like it if they can just stay alive), but anyone who thinks that there is no need to endure living in every way already thinks it's ridiculous not to bear every burden and exert every effort so as to possess this wisdom that will know the truth. (Iambli. *Protr.* 8, 76. 26-77. 11)*

We do not have much to say about what appears to be the Aristotle quotation, other than pointing out the obvious consistency of this line of reasoning with his criticism of wealth-getting as the end of human life during his discussion of the 'three lives' argument in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 5 and elsewhere. As for Iamblichus' bridge passage, it is typical in diction, grammar, and extraneousness, in contrast to the words it precedes. The same is true of the bridge passage which introduces the following fascinating block:

One might recognize the same thing from the following as well, if one observed the human way of life in the clear light of day. For one will discover that all the things that seem great to people are an optical illusion. This makes it also right to say that the human creature is nothing and that nothing is secure in human affairs. For strength, size, and beauty are laughable and of no worth—and beauty seems to be the sort of thing it is by our seeing nothing accurately. For if one were able to see as keenly as they say Lynceus did, who saw through walls and trees, how could such a sight seem bearable, seeing what bad things they are composed of? And honours and reputations, objects of more striving than the rest, are full of indescribable nonsense; for to those who behold anything eternal it is

⁹⁹ In the section of the *Rhetoric* devoted to the construction of protreptic speech, Aristotle recommends the discussion of goods understood as opposites of bad things (*Rhet.* 1. 6, 1362^b29 ff.).

silly to take seriously those things. What is great or what is long-lasting in human affairs? No, it is owing to our weakness, I think, and the shortness of our life, that even this appears sizeable. (Iambli. *Protr.* 8, 77. 12-27)

Both bridge passages are easily identifiable by the potential optative construction, as well as the summary nature of their contents; and the second of these bridges is very similar to the opening of chapter 7, discussed above. The prediction that what remains when these are removed is Aristotelian can be confirmed through an external parallel. Boethius evidently wove the main idea of the second block into the fabric of his *Consolation of Philosophy*; he must have remembered it, either directly or mediated through another source,¹⁰⁰ from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*:

If, as Aristotle says, men had had the eyes of Lynceus, so that their sight could pierce through obstacles, would not the body of Alcibiades, so fair on its surface, have seemed most foul when its inward parts were seen? So it is not your own nature, but the weakness of the eyes which see you, that makes you seem beautiful. (Boeth. *Cons.* 3. 8 = Arist. fr. 10a¹⁰¹ Ross)

Boethius gives no indication as to which work featured Lynceus and his keen eyes, but he does declare it to be a work of Aristotle. Continuing with Iamblichus, we read, at the end of chapter 8, a pure quotation from Aristotle up to the closing sentence supplied by Iamblichus:

So who could look at all this and think themselves successful and happy, if, right from the start, we are naturally put together as if for punishment, all of us, as they say in the initiation rites? For the ancients have an inspired saying that says that the soul 'pays penalties', and we live for the atonement of certain great failings. For the conjunction of the soul with the body looks very much like a thing of this sort; for as the Tyrrenians are said often to

¹⁰⁰ In this text, the keen eyesight of Lynceus is applied to the beautiful young Alcibiades, a scenario that seems also to be derived from a passage in [Plato], *Alcibiades*, in which Socrates says to Alcibiades, 'your beauty is just beginning to bloom; I shall never forsake you now, never, unless the Athenian people make you corrupt and ugly... the "people of great-hearted Erechtheus" [sc. Athenians] might look attractive on the outside, but you need to scrutinize them in their nakedness' (132 A). It is not clear whether the *Hortensius* contained a mention of Alcibiades, since either Cicero or Boethius was capable of constructing this scenario, in which the keen eyesight of Lynceus sees through the beauty of Alcibiades; the latter person apparently did not make an appearance in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, at least not here.

¹⁰¹ This is not actually a 'fragment' of Aristotle's book, but a bit of evidence about that book (obviously, as it is in Latin); the same goes for the 'fragment' from Augustine which we discuss below.

torture their captives by chaining corpses right onto the living, fitting limb to limb, similarly the soul seems to be extended through and stuck onto all the sensitive members of the body.

So nothing divine or happy belongs to humans apart from just that one thing worth taking seriously: as much intelligence and wisdom as is in us, for, of what's ours, this alone seems to be immortal, and this alone divine. And by being able to share in such a capacity, our way of life, although naturally miserable and difficult, is yet so cleverly managed that, in comparison with everything else, a human seems to be a god. For 'intelligence is the god in us'—whether it was Hermotimus or Anaxagoras who said so—and 'the mortal phase has a portion of some god'. We ought, therefore, either to do philosophy [*φιλοσοφῆν*] or say goodbye to life and depart from this world, since all of the other things anyway seem to be a lot of nonsense and foolishness. *In this way one may get the requisite summary of the approaches from the conceptions¹⁰² by which people are exhorted to feel the need to do philosophy observationally, and to live as much as possible the way of life in accordance with knowledge and the intellect.* (Iambl. *Protr.*, ch. 8, 77, 27–79, 6)

Obviously we should make the separation of voices before the last sentence (79, 3–6), and regard the previous sentences as being a quotation (modified or not) from Aristotle. The abrupt descent, from the rhetorical high point 'we ought, therefore, either to do philosophy or say goodbye to life and depart from this world' down to the dry and earnest verbiage of Iamblichus, is palpable, especially if the passage is declaimed out loud. The comment of Iamblichus is meta-textual, with distinctive diction: 'get the requisite summary', 'approaches', '(common) conceptions'.

The prediction that the remaining material is Aristotelian can be strongly confirmed through external evidence as well. It has long been known that Aristotle wrote it, and that Cicero paraphrased it, from the following comment by Augustine:

How much better and nearer the truth than yours were the views about the generation of men held by those whom Cicero, as though led and compelled by the very evidence of the facts, commemorates in the last part of the dialogue *Hortensius*! After mentioning the many facts we see and lament with regard to the vanity and the unhappiness of men, he says: 'From these errors and cares of human life it results that sometimes those ancients—whether they were prophets or interpreters of the divine mind

¹⁰² Returning to the reading of the manuscript and rejecting Kiesling's conjectural addition *κοινὰ* as unnecessary. Plutarch omits *κοινὰ* repeatedly in reference to *αἱ κοινὰ ἔννοια* (e.g. *Comm. not.*, 1060 D, 1061 D).

by the transmission of sacred rites—who said that we are born to expiate sins committed in a former life, seem to have had a glimmer of the truth, and that that is true which Aristotle says, that we are punished much as those were who once upon a time, when they had fallen into the hands of Etruscan robbers, were killed with studied cruelty; their bodies, the living with the dead, were bound as exactly as possible one against another, so our minds, bound together with our bodies, are like the living joined with the dead.' (*Contra Jul.* 4, 15, 78, trans. Ross, *Arist. fr.* 10b)

Without entering into a discussion of Cicero's *Hortensius*, which is lost and can therefore serve only very tangentially as a source of evidence for Aristotle's book, we learn from this quotation by Augustine that Cicero paraphrased Aristotle in both the main ideas in the relevant paragraph (we are born to expiate sins, tying soul to body is torture), expressly crediting him with the truth of the matter about the second idea. Evidently this was a famous passage, and the scrupulous Cicero referenced it as Aristotle's.

We also have good reason to believe that the second paragraph (78, 12–79, 2) was written by Aristotle, for he wrote something rather similar, including a curious detail, in another work that we possess:

When one man said that intelligence was present, as in animals, so throughout nature, as the cause of the world and all its order, he seemed like a sober man in contrast with the random talk of his predecessors. We know that Anaxagoras certainly adopted these views, but Hermotimus of Clazomenae is credited with expressing them earlier. (*Arist. Metaph.* 4, 3, 984¹⁵–20)

Intelligence is to be regarded as the 'god in us' because it is the source of order in us, as it is the source of order in the natural world at large. This is a view associated with Anaxagoras, but Aristotle mentions the possibility of Hermotimus, an earlier local forerunner of Anaxagoras, being the author of this idea, much as Leucippus of Abdera was thought to be a local forerunner of Democritus. Without entering into this question, we know that it is right to attribute to Aristotle precisely the uncertainty about Hermotimus that we find in the quotation by Iamblichus; so it is right to attribute the passage in this second paragraph also to Aristotle. Furthermore, it is clear in general that Aristotle, like Plato, was convinced that, through contemplation and intelligence, humans can become like

god.¹⁰³ So it must be regarded as settled that Aristotle is quoted here at the end of chapter 8.

But what work is being quoted from? The best candidate is *Protrepticus*, because of the evident protreptic purpose of the quoted material, including the formulaic conclusion 'one should do philosophy' (which we shall encounter many times in this vicinity), and its energetic rhetorical design. Yet we have to admit the possibility, advanced by responsible scholars, that some other of Aristotle's published works could have contained sections that amounted to exhortations to philosophy—his *Eudemus*, for instance, or *On Philosophy*—so the attribution to *Protrepticus* must be regarded for now as probable, not as definitely settled.¹⁰⁴

3.4. Chapter 9

Chapter 9 is a relatively simple case. It is clear that Iamblichus introduces and concludes the chapter with his customary one-line opening and closing. Here is a translation of the entire chapter, which seems to consist of one huge block quotation. We do not detect in this any bridge passages or other interventions of Iamblichus:

Chapter 9. Starting on a higher level, from the intention of nature, we proceed to the same exhortation in the following way. Some of the things that come to be come from a certain kind of thought and skill, e.g. a house or a ship (for a certain skill and thought is a cause of both of these), while others come to be not by means of any skill but through nature; for nature is a cause of animals and plants, and all such things come to be by nature. But then some other things come to be by luck as well, for of all the things that come to be neither through skill nor through nature nor by necessity, we say that most of these come into being through luck.

Now then, of the things that come to be from luck, none comes to be for the sake of anything, nor do they have any end; but the things that come into being by skill have in them both the end and the purpose (for those who have a skill will always provide you with a reason why they wrote, i.e.

¹⁰³ This is persuasively shown, though without reference to the evidence in the *Protrepticus*, by D. Sedley, "Becoming like God" in the *Timaeus* and Aristotle's "Becoming like God", in T. Calvo Martínez and L. Brisson (eds.), *Interpreting the Timaeus-Critica* (Proceedings of the IV Symposium Platonicum, Sankt Augustin, 1997), 327–9.

¹⁰⁴ See J. Brunschwig, 'Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens (à propos des fragments 60 Rose du *Protreptique*)' ["Pirates"], *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, 88 (1963), 171–90; A. P. Bos, 'Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: Are they Really Two Different Works?' *Dioryssus*, 8 (1984), 19–51.

for what purpose), and this is better than what comes to be because of it. (I mean all such things as skill is naturally a cause of, in virtue of itself and not coincidentally, for we should, strictly speaking, assume medicine to be the cause of health rather than of disease, and architecture to be the cause of houses, not of their demolition.)

Therefore everything done with skill comes to be for the sake of something, and this its end is the best thing; however, that which is by luck does not come to be for the sake of anything, for something good might happen from luck indeed, but yet it is not in so far as it is from luck and in accordance with luck that it is good; and that which comes to be by luck is always indeterminate.

But yet what is in accordance with nature does come to be for the sake of something, and is always constructed for the sake of something better than what comes to be through skill; for nature does not imitate the skill, but it nature, and it exists to help nature and to fill in what nature leaves out. For some things nature itself seems capable of completing by itself without actually needing any help, but others it completes with difficulty or is completely unable to do, for example, to begin with, even with reproduction, some seeds presumably germinate without protection, whatever kind of land they fall onto, others also need the skill of farming, and, in a similar way, some animals also attain their full nature by themselves, but humans need many skills for their security, both at first in respect of their birth, and again later, in respect of their nurturing.

Further, if skill imitates nature, from this it follows for the skills as well that everything that comes to be comes to be for the sake of something. For we should take the position that everything that comes into being correctly comes into being for the sake of something. And surely if nobly, then correctly; and everything that comes to be (or has come to be) in accordance with nature at any rate comes to be (or has come to be) nobly, since what is unnatural is foul, and a coming into being in accordance with nature comes to be for the sake of something.

And someone could see this also from each of our parts; if, for example, one inspected the eyelid, one would see that it has come to be not in vain but in order to help the eyes, so as to provide them with rest and prevent things from falling into the eye. Thus it is the same thing, both that for the sake of which something has come to be and that for the sake of which it needs to have come to be; for example, if a ship needed to come to be to provide transport by sea, that's why it actually has come to be.

Moreover, the animals are surely things that have come to be by nature,¹⁰⁵ either absolutely all of them or the best and most honourable of them; for it makes no difference if someone thinks that most of them have

¹⁰⁵ Returning to the reading of the manuscript, and rejecting Vitelli's conjectural supplement: *φύσας* (τὰ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν) (81. 5–6).

come into being unnaturally because of some corruption or wickedness. But certainly a human is the most honourable of the animals down here; hence it's clear that we have come to be both by nature and according to nature. This is the thing for the sake of which nature and the god have brought us into being. So what is this thing?¹⁰⁶ When Pythagoras was asked, he said 'to observe the heavens', and he used to claim that he himself was an observer of nature, and it was for the sake of this that he had been released into this way of life. And they say that when somebody asked Anaxagoras for what reason anyone might choose to come to be and be alive, he replied to the question by saying, 'To observe what's in the heavens,¹⁰⁷ the stars in the heavens, as well as the moon and sun', because everything else is worth nothing.

Further, if for everything the end is always better (for everything that comes to be comes to be for the sake of the end, and that for the sake of which is better, indeed the best of all), and an end in accordance with nature is that which is naturally the last to end up coming to be, when the coming to be reaches its limit without interruption, surely the first parts of a human being to reach their end are the bodily ones, and later on the parts of the soul, and somehow the end of the better part always comes later than its coming to be. Surely the soul is later than the body, and wisdom is the final stage of the soul, for we see that it is the last thing to come to be by nature in humans, and that is why old age lays claim to this alone of good things; therefore, some form of wisdom is by nature our end, and being wise is the ultimate thing for the sake of which we have come to be. Now surely if we have come to be, it's also clear that we exist for the sake of some kind of wisdom and learning.

Therefore Pythagoras was right, according to this argument anyway, in saying it's for the sake of cognition and observation that every human person has been put together by the god. But whether the object of this cognition is the cosmos or some other nature is a question for us perhaps to consider later; what we have said is enough for us for now as a preliminary. For if wisdom is an end in accordance with nature, then to be wise would be best of all. Hence, the other things we do we ought to do for the sake of the goods that come about in one,¹⁰⁸ and, of these goods, those in the body for the sake of those in the soul, and virtue for the sake of wisdom; for this is the highest of all.

To seek from every kind of knowledge something other than itself and

¹⁰⁶ Returning to the reading of the manuscript $\tau\acute{\iota} \delta\eta$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$, and rejecting Zuntz's conjectural deletions: $[\tau\acute{\iota} \delta\eta]$ and $[\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota]$ (81. 12).

¹⁰⁷ Returning to the reading of the manuscript $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\theta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\theta\alpha$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\pi\epsilon\pi\iota$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\omicron\upsilon\pi\alpha\sigma\theta\epsilon\upsilon$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\pi\epsilon\pi\iota$, and rejecting Pistelli's conjectural emendations: $[\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\pi\epsilon\pi\iota]$ and $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $(\tau\acute{\alpha})$ $\pi\epsilon\pi\iota$ (81. 18).

¹⁰⁸ Returning to the reading of the manuscript $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$, and rejecting Ross's conjectural breathing mark $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ (82. 17).

to require that it must be useful is the demand of someone utterly ignorant of how far apart in principle good things are from the necessities; they are totally different. For among the things without which living is impossible, the ones which are liked on account of something else should be called necessities and joint causes, while all those that are liked for themselves, even if nothing else results from them, should be called goods in the strict sense; for this is not valuable because of that, and that for the sake of something else, and this goes on proceeding to infinity—rather, this comes to a stop somewhere. So it is absolutely ridiculous, then, to seek from everything a benefit beyond the thing itself, and to ask 'So, what's the benefit for us?' and 'What's the use?' For it's true what we say: such a fellow doesn't seem like someone who knows noble goodness, or who distinguishes between a cause and a joint cause.

One might see that what we say is all the more true if someone conveyed us in thought, as it were, to the Isles of the Blest, for in that place there would come to be no use for anything, nor would anything benefit anything else, and only thinking and observation remains, which we say even now is an independent way of life. If what we say is true, would not any of us be rightly ashamed if when the right was granted us to settle in the Isles of the Blest, we were by our own fault unable to do so? Thus the payment that knowledge brings is not to be despised by humans, nor is the good that comes from it a slight good. For, as the expert poets say that we reap the rewards of justice in Hades, in the same way, it seems, we reap the rewards of wisdom in the Isles of the Blest:

It is not weird at all, then, if it does not seem to be useful or beneficial; for we don't claim it is beneficial but that it is itself good, and it makes sense to choose it not for the sake of something else but for itself. For just as we travel to Olympia for the sake of the spectacle itself, even if nothing more is going to accrue from it (for the observing itself is better than lots of money), and as we observe the Dionysia not in order to take something away from the actors (rather, we actually spend on them), and as there are many other spectacles we would choose instead of lots of money, so the observation of the universe, too, is to be honoured above all things that are thought to be useful. For surely we should not travel with great effort to see people imitating women and slaves, or fighting and running, and yet not think we should observe the nature of things, i.e. the truth, without payment. *Now then this is how, proceeding from the intention of nature, we made an exhortation to wisdom as being inherently good and in its own right honourable, even if nothing useful for the human way of life comes about from it.* (Iambl. *Protr.* 9. 79. 7–84. 6)

A quick inspection suffices to show that the opening and closing contributions of Iamblichus are limited to a single sentence each.

almost entirely motionless if deprived of it), so it's clear that, though the knowledge is observational, we do thousands of things in accordance with it nevertheless, accept some things and avoid others, and generally gain through it everything good. (Lamb. *Protr.* ch. 10, 84. 7-86. 9)

What we find in Lamblichus quoting is a suggestive elaboration of the familiar Aristotelian principle that art imitates nature (*Phys.* 194^a21-2, 199^a16; *Meteor.* 381^b6; *De mundo* 396^b12, cf. *Protr.* ch. 9, 80. 7-9, 18-20), applied to political science, in which the author explains the idea by means of stock examples from the arts, construction, and medicine. Doctors and trainers must know the nature of the body and its physiology in order to promote its virtues, especially health. The builder's tools, such as the plumb line, ruler, and compass, utilize aspects of nature, e.g. water and sunlight, in order to guide them in how to construct a building properly.¹¹¹ Similarly, the politician must draw from nature the principles and norms with reference to which what is good is to be done.¹¹² Aristotle here advocates a more idealistic method of political science than a strictly empirical method involving surveying existing constitutions and selecting from these the best institutions and forms of government. Whether or not this provides support for a developmental thesis, as Jaeger contends,¹¹³ Aristotle also criticizes the merely empirical method of political science at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, a parallel that suffices to attribute the non-Lamblichean material to Aristotle:

Those sophists who advertise that they teach political science seem to be very far from doing so. In fact, they are absolutely ignorant of what sort of science it is and of what sorts of things it is about; otherwise they would not class it as identical with, or even inferior to, the art of rhetoric.¹¹⁴ Nor would they think that it is easy to frame a constitution by making a collection of such existing laws as are reputed to be good ones, selecting the ones that are best as if even this selection did not call for understanding.

¹¹¹ Compare *On the Heavens*, where Aristotle says that the Pythagoreans took their emphasis on the number three 'from nature as, so to speak, a law of it' (*De caelo* 268^a13-14).

¹¹² Compare *Nicomachean Ethics* 5. 10, where Aristotle says that 'the things that are just according to humans, and not nature, are not the same everywhere, since neither are political constitutions [the same everywhere]—but only one [constitution] is everywhere the best according to nature' (1135^a3-5).

¹¹³ Jaeger, *Entwicklung* (Eng. trans.), 260-2.

¹¹⁴ This appears to be a direct contradiction of Isocr. *Ant.* 80, which is also thought by many to be a target of Aristotle's *Protreptics*.

and judging correctly were not the main issue, as it is in music. (Arist. *NE* 10. 9, 1181^a12-19, trans. after Ross in *Revised Aristotle*)

It would be excellent to learn more positively about this ideal knowledge of nature, but it would seem that much of the argumentation about the benefit of philosophy for the political life that we might expect to be contained in Aristotle's *Protreptics* does not appear here. Lamblichus seems to have substituted an uninspiring and not very relevant summary in his closing. Reasons for this, should one wish to speculate, are not hard to find.¹¹⁵

3.6: Chapter 11

Chapter 11 contains an accessible protreptic application of Aristotle's method of distinguishing, analysing, and prioritizing homonyms. Structurally, the chapter is straightforward enough, containing a fairly obvious opening and closing, and at most a single bridge passage in the middle. Here is the whole chapter:

Chapter 11. Further, that living pleasantly too belongs most of all to those who choose to live according to intellect might become clear from the following. The word 'living' seems to mean two things, one with reference to a capacity and the other with reference to an activity, for we call all those animals 'seeing' who have vision and are naturally capable of seeing (even if they happen to have their eyes shut), as well as those who are using the capacity and are applying their vision. And similarly with knowing and having cognition,¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Part of the explanation is undoubtedly sociological: the political situation in 5th-cent. BCE Athens and its ideal of the wise lawgiver was simply not applicable in 3rd cent. CE Syria, a Roman principality. Apparently, Lamblichus had acquaintances or even admirers in the imperial administration (Dillon, 'Lamblichus', 875 n. 46). What can be gleaned about Lamblichus' ethics and politics indicates that he was inclined towards an austere Platonism, rather than by Peripateticism. As Dillon points out: 'A treatise such as the "Protreptics" might be thought to give evidence of his ethical doctrine, and it is in fact useful, but not as much as might be expected. For one thing, it is largely a cento of quotations, so that one can only deduce Lamblichus' views from the authorities he uses. From these, however, one may conclude that, like Plotinus and Porphyry, he inclined to a more austere tradition of Platonism, influenced by Stoicism and Pythagoreanism rather than Peripateticism' ('Lamblichus', 902). In general, Lamblichus was absorbed with otherworldly philosophy and shows little direct interest in civic virtue and politics. Where Plotinus distinguishes between 'civic' and 'purificatory' virtues in *Ennead* 1. 2, Lamblichus distinguishes eight kinds of virtue. 'The lowest three are natural, ethical, and civic, and these are either proper to animals and children, or to humans, but with respect to their irrational element only. The rest of the virtues (purificatory, theoretic, paradigmatic, and hieratic) are focused on the assimilation of the human being to the divine (Dillon, 'Lamblichus', 902-4). But see recently D. O'Meara *Platonopolis* (Oxford, 2003).

we mean, in one case, using and observing, and in the other case, having acquired the capacity and having the knowledge. Further, if we distinguish living from not living by perceiving, and perceiving means two things—in the strict sense, for the using of the senses, but in the other sense, for the having the capacity to use them (that's why we say, it seems, even of people who are sleeping that they are perceivers)—if so, it's clear it will follow that 'living' also means two things: a waking person should be said to live in the true and strict sense, but sleeping people must be said to live because they are capable of making the transition into the process in virtue of which we say of someone that he is both waking and perceiving things.

So when some one word means each of two things, and one of the two is so called either by acting or being acted on, we shall attribute the term as applying more to this one: for example, we attribute 'knowing' to the one who makes use of knowledge more than the one who has it, and 'seeing' to the one who is applying his vision more than the one who has the capacity. (For we use 'more' not only in respect of excess in things which fall under one definition, but also in respect of what is prior and posterior; for example, we say that health is more a good than the things that conduce to health, and that what is valuable in itself by its own nature is more a good than what produces it. And yet we see, surely, that it is not by the definition of 'good' being predicable of both that it applies to each of them, beneficial things as well as virtue.) Therefore the waking person should be called more 'alive' than the sleeping one, and the one who exercises his soul than the one who merely has it; for it is on account of this that we say that he is alive, that he is the sort who is such as to act or be acted upon in this way.

Thus this is what it is to use anything: if the capacity is for a single thing, when someone is doing this very thing, and if the capacity is for a number of things, when he is doing the best of them, for example with flutes, one uses them either only when playing the flute, or especially then; for presumably this applies to the other cases. Thus we should say that someone who uses a thing correctly is using it more, for the natural objective and mode of use belong to someone who uses a thing nobly and accurately. Now the function of the soul, either alone or most of all, is thinking and reasoning. Therefore it is now simple and easy for anyone to reach the conclusion that he who thinks correctly is more alive, and he who most attains truth lives most, and this is the one who is wise and observes according to the most precise knowledge; and it is then and to those that living perfectly, surely, should be attributed, to those who are using wisdom, i.e. to the wise.

Now if for any animal, at least, to live is the same as to exist, it is clear that a wise person would surely exist to the highest degree and in the strictest sense, and most of all at that time when he is being active and actually observing the most knowable of existing things. And yet, surely

the perfect and unobstructed activity has its enjoyment in itself; hence the activity of observation would be the most pleasant of all.

Furthermore, there is a difference between enjoying oneself while drinking and enjoying drinking; for nothing prevents someone who is not thirsty, nor has been brought the drink he enjoys, from enjoying himself while drinking, not because he is drinking but because he happens at the same time to be seeing or being seen as he sits there. Thus we will say that this fellow enjoys himself, and enjoys himself while drinking, but not because he is drinking, and not because he enjoys drinking. Thus in the same way we will also call walking and sitting and learning and every process pleasant or painful, not in so far as we happen to feel pain or pleasure in their presence, but in so far as we all feel pain or pleasure by their presence. So, similarly, we will also say that they live pleasantly whose presence is pleasant to those who have it; and we will say that not all to whom it happens that they enjoy themselves while living are living pleasantly, only those to whom living itself is pleasant and who enjoy the pleasure that comes from life.

Thus we attribute living more to the one who is awake rather than to the one who is asleep, to the one who is wise more than to the one who is foolish, and we say the pleasure that comes from life is the one that comes from the uses of the soul, for this is being truly alive. Further, even if there are many uses of the soul, still the most dominant one of all, certainly, is the use of wisdom to the highest degree. Further, it is clear that the pleasure that arises from wisdom and contemplation must be the pleasure that comes from living, either alone or most of all. Therefore living pleasantly and feeling true enjoyment belong only to philosophers, or to them most of all, *for the activity of our truest ideas, filled up by the most real of things and preserving steadfastly for ever the perfection vouchsafed to us, that activity, of all of them, is also the one that is most efficacious of cheerfulness. Hence too on account of the enjoyment itself of the truths and good pleasures those of us with any sense should do philosophy.* (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 11, 86, 10–89, 6)

The opening of this chapter follows the pattern of forward-looking, summarizing tag line that Iamblichus so frequently uses to introduce a block quotation. The closing, while longer, involves many of the other kinds of trait we have come to expect from Iamblichus: otiose inferential particles, excessive enthusiasm, pretentious diction, and generally a lack of progressive argumentation and syllogism.

The complete argument is extremely complex, but we shall offer an outline of it so far as this furthers our goal of assaying the words as attributable to Aristotle: philosophers live most pleasurably and exist to the highest degree because they actively engage the highest

and best part of their soul; the predicates 'living' and 'pleasurable' apply 'more' to certain things that, it turns out, philosophers do to the highest degree; homonyms are identified (that is, different things to which the same name applies), and then a procedure is employed in order to determine to which of the things the comparative 'more' and superlative 'most' apply.

The kind of analytical procedure on display here is well known from the extant works. Each of the terms is said to apply to two different things on the basis of a distinction between capacity (*δύναμις*) and activity (*ἐνέργεια*),¹¹⁶ as well as possession (*ἔχειν*, *κεκτῆσθαι*) and use (*χρησθαι*). In the *Topics*, a text possibly contemporaneous with the *Protrepticus*,¹¹⁷ Aristotle asserts that perception¹¹⁸ and knowledge¹¹⁹ are homonyms on the basis of the same distinction between use and possession. In the *Rhetoric*, he advises that protreptic speeches mentioning wealth should observe that true wealth consists in use and not mere possession.¹²⁰

In chapter 11 of the *Protrepticus* the distinction is illustrated with reference to vision: a seeing animal is one that either has the capacity for sight (even if its eyes are closed) or one that is actively looking at something. But the same procedure is used to analyse living, perceiving, and knowing. Knowing is argued to be the highest of this series. The philosopher, through contemplation, knows to the highest degree, and so lives to the highest degree. And since contemplation is a continuous activity, and continuous activities are the most pleasant, it follows that the philosopher lives the most pleasantly. The focus on vision is not only typical of Aristotle's views (one thinks immediately of the opening of the *Metaphysics*) but is also connected to the passage on vision quoted by Iamblichus from Aristotle in chapter 7.

Let us briefly take stock of these inner five chapters before pro-

¹¹⁶ See É. de Strycker, 'Prédicats univoques et prédicats analogiques dans le "Protreptique" d'Aristote', *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 66 (1968), 597-618; and Meinn, *Origins*, 78-87.

¹¹⁷ Brunschwig puts the date for the *Topics* between 360 and 348 (J. Brunschwig, *Aristotélès: Topiques* (Paris, 1967), xc), and this encompasses the consensus dating for the *Protrepticus* (353-351 according to Düring, *Attempt*, 174).

¹¹⁸ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ἐκείνῳ σιγημένῳ, ἐν μὲν τὸ αἰσθάνω ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ τὸ αἰσθῆσαι, *Χρησθῆναι* (*Top.* 5. 2, 129^b33-4).

¹¹⁹ τὸ ἐπιστῆσθαι... πολλὰ σιγημένῳ, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστῆναι ἔχειν... τὸ δ' ἐπιστῆναι *Χρησθῆναι* (*Top.* 5. 2, 130^a19-21).

¹²⁰ ὁμῶς δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν ἔστιν ἐν τῷ *Χρησθῆναι* μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ *κεκτῆσθαι*; καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐστὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων καὶ ἡ *Χρησις* πλοῦτος (*Rhet.* 1. 5, 136^a23-5).

ceeding to the outer two. Most of these blocks (seven out of nine) can separately be shown to be by Aristotle, and every chapter contains at least some evidence that proves this. The blocks in chapter 7 contain material which Aristotle says he elaborated in his 'exoteric arguments', and the last block of chapter 8 was known to Cicero from a published work. As for which published work of Aristotle the blocks come from, the best candidate for each chapter is his *Protrepticus*, with the possible exception of chapter 8, whose ending has also been attributed to his *Eudemus*.

3.7. Chapter 6

Now that we have examined these five chapters, the inner core of the section that has been attributed to Aristotle, we are in a position to examine the outer extremities, the two chapters that open and close the Aristotle section. Chapter 6 is a more complex chapter: the opening and closing are fairly straightforward and easy to identify as Iamblichean in grammar, diction, and purpose, but the stripping off of the words of Iamblichus does not reveal a single block quotation; we believe we have identified three linked bridge passages which divide the chapter into four blocks. Here is the beginning:

Chapter 6. But since 'our conversation is with humans', not with those who have easy access to the divine share in life, with these kinds of invocations we should mix in some exhortations to the political and practical way of life as well. Let's put it this way: The things that are supports for our way of life, e.g. a body and what's around it, support it in the manner of certain tools, the use of which is dangerous, and rather the contrary is accomplished by those who use them in ways they shouldn't. Well then, we should desire both to acquire this knowledge and to use it appropriately, this knowledge through which we will put all these things to good use. Hence we should do philosophy, if we are going to engage in politics correctly and conduct our own way of life in a beneficial way.

Furthermore, there is a difference between the kinds of knowledge that produce each of the things of which we want to have more and more in our way of life, and the kinds of knowledge that make use of these kinds of knowledge, and the ones that give service are different from the others that issue orders; and in these as it were more commanding kinds of knowledge exists what is good in the strict sense. If, then, only that kind of knowledge which (a) has correctness of judgement, and (b) uses reason, and (c) observes the good as a whole—that is to say, philosophy—is naturally capable of using all of them and issuing orders, we ought, by all

means, to do philosophy, since only philosophy includes within itself this correct judgement and this wisdom to issue orders without errors. (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 6, 67. 20–68. 14)

The opening remark from Iamblichus is a textbook case of a navigational passage whose function is to indicate what comes next, and the decision where to draw the line between the voices is easy: after 'Let's put it this way'. As he sometimes likes to do, Iamblichus tosses in a stylish tag, this one from Plato's *Law* 5 (732 E 3), since 'our conversation is with humans', making this remark in his opening in order to announce a new start, saying that he will provide some 'exhortations to the political and practical way of life'¹¹ as well'.

The three linked bridge passages that we identify in this chapter have a common structure that gives them away as interpolations of the excerptor. Each of them briefly summarizes the previous argument, and then briefly anticipates the argument to come. The mood and content of the passages stand out from the quoted text, and it is instructive to read them together:

Furthermore, since everyone chooses what is possible and what is beneficial, it must be indicated that both these features belong to philosophy, and also that the difficulty of acquiring it is more than outweighed by the magnitude of its benefit; for we all work at the easier tasks with greater pleasure. Now then, that we are capable of acquiring the kinds of knowledge about the just and the expedient and also the ones about nature and the rest of truth, it is easy to demonstrate. (68. 14–21)

Now then, that there is a kind of knowledge of the truth and of the virtue of the soul, and why we are capable of acquiring these, let us take these comments on those as given; and that it is the greatest of goods and the most beneficial of all will be clear from what follows. (69. 20–4)

And as to the benefit and the greatness of the thing, I think this has been sufficiently proven; but why it is much easier to possess it than other goods, one might be convinced by the following. (70. 20–2)

These are evidently markers in the context of a multi-phase ar-

¹¹ Although what immediately follows does relate to the practical life—how philosophy enables one to acquire the knowledge necessary to make proper use of instruments—and the conclusion is drawn that philosophy will be useful for politics and in our own lives (68. 2–3), the rest of the chapter is decidedly not related to the practical and political life: it makes various observations about how it is possible and worthwhile to learn different kinds of science 'despite no reward coming to those who do philosophy' (70. 23–4).

gument whose main purposes are to show regarding philosophy that it is a feasible subject (first bridge, 68. 18–21), that it is highly beneficial for us to acquire (second bridge, 69. 20–4), and that it is well worth the trouble (third bridge, 70. 20–2). This scheme is announced in advance in the first bridge (68. 14–18) and recollected at the end, in the closing (71. 9–12), both times in the same order. What this seems to indicate is that Iamblichus is working from a longer passage in Aristotle's book and is careful to preserve the order and structure of the overall protreptic argument: philosophy is possible, beneficial, and worth the trouble. This seems a clear parallel to what we saw in Iamblichus' version of Plato's *Phaedo* (chapter 13): fast-forward passages are constructed by Iamblichus to skip quickly on to the next highlight, without his readers losing sight of the big picture.

Having identified the interventions of Iamblichus, we predict that what remains is from Aristotle. This can be confirmed both by parallels in the extant works of Aristotle and by other kinds of evidence. The first block (67. 23–68. 14) contains an argument that we need knowledge of the proper use of instruments, including the organs of the body in order to be successful both in politics and in our own lives, because the improper use of instruments is harmful to others and ourselves. There are striking parallels in this passage with ideas unique to Aristotle. That our bodies are tools (used by our souls) is a position explicitly argued for by Aristotle throughout his psychological and biological works.¹² At the beginning of this block, Aristotle distinguishes between 'the kind of knowledge that [enables] us to get more and more of what we want in life' and another kind of knowledge, an ordering or prescriptive kind of knowledge, and at the end he refers to 'prescriptive wisdom' (68. 7, 11, 13). What he means here is made explicit in the *Nicomachean Ethics* when he says that wisdom (*φρόνησις*) is a prescriptive kind of knowledge (*ἐπιστημονική*) because its end is the determination of what should and should not be done.¹³ He also makes the same point explicitly in the *Eudemian Ethics*: 'Since the intellectual [virtues] involve reason, they belong to the [part of the soul] possessing

¹² Especially *DA* 2. 1, 412^a27–412^b10; also 415^b18–20, *PA* 645^b4. For a recent searching account of this idea, see S. Menn, 'Aristotle's Definition of Soul and the Programme of the *De anima*', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 22 (2002), 83–139.

¹³ ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιστημονική ἐστίν· τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μὴ, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν (NE 1143^b8–9).

reason, which prescribes to the soul by possessing reason, but the ethical [virtues belong to] the irrational [part of the soul], which follows the one possessing reason by nature."¹²⁴ For these reasons, we should take everything between the obvious opening ('Let's put it this way' at 67. 23) and the conclusion of the next argument ('we ought, by all means, to do philosophy' at 68. 11-12) to be a quotation of Aristotle.

Which Aristotle work is Iamblichus here exploiting? Simply by reflecting on the overall line of argument which Iamblichus sketches in his bridge passages we are driven to the inescapable answer: the only work which really comes into consideration as the home of a long multi-phase argument that philosophy is possible,¹²⁵ beneficial, and worthwhile is his *Protrepticus*. It is difficult to see in what kind of work other than a protreptic this stretch of argument would be appropriate. When we look at the details of how these three conclusions are reached, in the last three blocks of the chapter, we shall find further corroboration.

This argument, based on the overall argumentative structure of the chapter, can be buttressed by another consideration, based on the single distinctive word *φλοσοφία* ('one should do philosophy'). As we pointed out at the beginning of this paper, this and the title are the only two things we know for sure about Aristotle's *Protrepticus*: a work with that title was written by Aristotle, and it contained the conclusion 'one should do philosophy' (the reports of this fact name both Aristotle and the *Protrepticus*). This term occurs five times in the Aristotle part of Iamblichus' book—in chapters 6, 7, 8, and 12—but not once in the Plato section.¹²⁶

So let us hold on to this conclusion, that the chapter is derived

¹²⁴ ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ διαλογικαὶ μετὰ λόγου, αἱ μὲν τοιαῦτα τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσιν, ὁ ἐμπρακτικὸν ἔστι τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ λόγον ἔχει, αἱ δ' ἡθικαὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρ, ἀκολούθηται δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντι (EE 1220b-11).

¹²⁵ In the section of the *Rhetoric* devoted to protreptic speech, Aristotle dwells on how one might establish that the good in question is possible (*Rhet.* 1. 6, 1363a1-4).

¹²⁶ In the Aristotle section: 68. 2 and 68. 11-12, 71. 20-1, 78. 21, and 89. 22-3. It occurs twice in chapter 5 (61. 11, 64. 28), a chapter with a very complex structure, which it would require another study to elucidate, and once in the closing to ch. 11 (89. 5). It occurs once in a bridge passage written by Iamblichus while he is excerpting from the anonymous author ('Anonymus Iamblichi') he quotes in chapter 20 (124. 16), and he uses it in two other places as a generic protreptic prescription in chapter 21, his commentary on the Pythagorean symbolae (142. 22 and 143. 25). But all six of these cases can be explained by supposing that Iamblichus found the formula repeatedly in Aristotle's work, and then proceeded to use it himself in his own contributions to the excerpts in his book.

from Aristotle, and from his *Protrepticus*, and proceed to study the next block, the second one:

Furthermore, since we all choose what is possible and what is beneficial, it must be indicated¹²⁷ that both these features belong to philosophy, and also that the difficulty of acquiring it is more than outweighed by the magnitude of its benefit; for we all work at the easier tasks with greater pleasure. Now then, that we are capable of acquiring the kinds of knowledge about the just and the expedient and also about both physical nature as well as the other kind of truth, it is easy to demonstrate. For prior things are always more familiar than posterior things, and what is better in nature than what is worse. For there is more knowledge of what is determinate and orderly than of their opposites, and again of the causes than of the effects. And good things are more determinate and organized than bad things, just as a fair person is more determinate and organized than a foul person; for they necessarily have the same mutual difference. And prior things are causes more than posterior things, for if they are taken away, then so are the things that take their being from them: if numbers (are taken away), then so are lines, if lines then surfaces, and if surfaces then solids.¹²⁸

Hence since soul is better than body (being more authoritative in nature), and the kinds of skill and wisdom concerned with the body are medical science and athletic training (for we regard these as being kinds of knowledge and say that some people possess them), clearly for the soul too and the virtues of the soul there is a certain discipline and skill, and we are capable of acquiring it, since surely we are also capable of acquiring knowledge of things of which our ignorance is greater and cognition is harder to come by.

Similarly too for the natural sciences; for wisdom about the causes and the elements is a much higher priority than wisdom about what is secondary; for these are not among the highest, nor from them that the first principles naturally grow, rather it's from those that all other things come into being and are evidently constituted. For whether it is fire or air or number or any other natures that are the causes and first principles of other things, it would be impossible to be ignorant of these things and to recognize any of the other things; for how could anyone either be familiar with speech who was ignorant of syllables, or have knowledge of these who understands nothing of the letters? (Iamb. *Protr.* ch. 6, 68. 14-69. 19)

In the first block of this chapter, Aristotle had concluded that phi-

¹²⁷ Rejecting the conjectures ἀποδεκτόν (Pistelli) and παραδεκτόν (Düring) and returning to the manuscript's παραδεκτόν, Iamblichus uses the term παραδεκτός and its verbal forms repeatedly throughout the DCM.

¹²⁸ Omitting 69. 2-3 στοιχεῖα... οὐκ αὐτὸν as a confusing gloss, not present in the parallel passage in Iamblichus' DCM.

losophy is an ordering knowledge, because it has correctness of judgement, uses reason, and observes the good as a whole (i.e. the good in the strict sense, without qualification, the authoritative good); and further that one ought to do philosophy (*φιλοσοφῆσαι*, 68. 11-14), since this is the most authoritative kind of wisdom. This next block of argument is part of a larger stretch which aims to show that such an authoritative science does in fact exist, despite arguments to the contrary (presumably these arguments to the contrary were contained in the unpreserved section of the *Protrepticus* that Iamblichus skipped over between the end of the first block at 68. 14 and the start of the second block at 68. 21). In *Metaphysics* 4 Aristotle says that the most authoritative knowledge is based on the first principles and causes:

The first principles and causes are the most knowable; for by reason of these, and from these, all other things are known, but these are not known by the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good in each class and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. (*Metaph.* 4. 2, 982^b2-7; cf. *NE* 1. 1, 4. 1, and 8. 3)

In the block just quoted, Aristotle gives a detailed account of how it is in fact possible to come to know first causes and principles. Thus we have a definitively Aristotelian position—that the most authoritative knowledge is of primary principles and causes—but differently put and supported, with an explicitly protreptic purpose.

At this point we need to turn aside and consider an objection to our attribution of the material in these chapters to the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle. In his polemic against the reconstruction of Aristotle's book, W. G. Rabinowitz focused his attack on one idea in the first block of chapter 6 (68. 28-69. 2): 'And prior things are causes more than posterior things, for if they are taken away, then so are the things that take their being from them [*τὰ τῶν ὀυσιῶν ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔχοντα*]: if numbers (are taken away), then so are lines, if lines then surfaces, and if surfaces then solids.' According to Rabinowitz,

It will be noted that at *Protrepticus* 38. 11-14 [Pistelli=68. 28-69. 2 Des Places] the author writes as one committed to a doctrine according to which lines are *generated* from numbers, planes from lines, and solids from planes. Whoever may have been the originator of this doctrine, it is at least clear

that Aristotle did not hold it, for he knows and attacks the doctrine as a Platonist tenet again and again in the *Metaphysics*. (Source, 85, emphasis added)

But this seems to be a bad mistake: Aristotle expresses no commitment to the 'doctrine' stated by Rabinowitz—that bodies are *generated* out of planes, planes out of lines, lines out of points, and points out of number. That is indeed a thesis of certain Platonists rejected by Aristotle in the passages cited by Rabinowitz; but of course this does not mean that Aristotle rejects the priority relation in other ways, such as in knowledge or account.¹⁹ In one of the passages cited by Rabinowitz himself²⁰ against the idea of *generation* from the geometrically prior, Aristotle says, 'We find similar difficulties in the case of the kinds *posterior* to number—the line, plane, and solid' (*Metaph.* M 8, 1085^a7-9). This is all that Aristotle needs to be saying in the *Protrepticus* passage, and it is perfectly reasonable to refer to these geometrical concepts as prior, in accordance with the conventions of the geometrical sciences, and still reject the speculative idea that solid bodies are physically generated out of numbers, points, lines, and planes understood as separate substances and bodies.

In the second *Protrepticus* block in chapter 6, we find other indications that the distinctions, technical terms, and arguments in the quoted text are the building blocks and stock in trade of Aristotle's analytical philosophy. For example, Aristotle says in this block that causes are prior to effects; the orderly is prior to the disorderly; and the naturally good is prior to the bad; and this is a doctrine widely evidenced in several surviving works.²¹ Another indication: it is

¹⁹ In fact, it is evident that he follows conventional geometrical science on this point, as he says without ambiguity in the *Categorías*: 'we use the term "prior" in regard to any order, in both sciences and their arguments. In the sciences, using demonstration, we have what is prior and what is posterior in order. For the elements are prior in order in the geometrical sciences, and in grammar the letters are prior to the syllables' (*Cat.* 12, 14³⁶-2).

²⁰ *Metaph.* 992^b13-18, 1001^b26-1002^a12, 1028^b15-27, 1060^b6-19, 1076^b11-39, 1077^a24-36, 1080^a12-36, 1085^a7-34, 1090^a5-32.

²¹ Aristotle often distinguishes between things better known to us and things better known by nature. 'Things are prior and more familiar in two ways, for it is not the same to be prior by nature and prior in relation to us, nor to be more familiar and more familiar to us. I call prior and more familiar in relation to us what is nearer to perception, prior and more familiar absolutely what is further away. What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest; and these are opposite to each other' (*Post. An.* 1. 2, 71^b33-72^a5). See also *Pr. An.* 2. 23, 68^b35-7, *Top.* 6. 4, *hassin*, *Phys.* 1. 1, *Metaph.* Z 3, 1029^a1-12; *NE* 1. 4, 1095^a2-3.

announced in the *Protrepticus* (by Iamblichus, in the bridge passage at 68. 18–21) that it is possible to acquire knowledge, not only about 'the just and the expedient', but also about 'physical nature', and about 'the rest of truth' as well, a division found in Aristotle's *Topics* (1. 14, 105^b20–1); and the arguments of this second quoted block make these three points, just as Iamblichus had announced, about logic and epistemology (68. 21–69. 2), about practical ethics (69. 3–10), and about natural science (69. 10–19).

The next block of quotation, the third of four in this chapter, develops the notion of authoritative wisdom that this elaboration of causes and principles was designed to substantiate:

Now then, that there is a kind of knowledge of the truth and of the virtue of the soul, and how we are capable of acquiring them, this is what we have said about those topics; and that it is the greatest of goods and the most beneficial of all will be clear from what follows. For we all agree that the most excellent person ought to have authority, i.e. the one who is the supreme in nature, and ought to be alone in a dominant position and to have authority over the law; and this is a sort of wisdom, i.e. a statement based on wisdom. And again, what norm do we have or what more precise standard of good things, than the wise man? For all things that this person will choose, if the choice is based on their knowledge, are good things and their contraries are bad. And since everybody chooses most of all what conforms to their own proper dispositions (a just man choosing to live justly, a man with bravery to live bravely, likewise a self-controlled man to live with self-control), it is clear that the wise man will choose most of all to practise wisdom; for this is the function of that capacity. Hence it's clear that, according to the dominant judgement, wisdom is the supreme among goods.

So one ought not to flee from philosophy, since philosophy is, as we think, both a possession and a use of expertise, and expertise is among the greatest goods; nor should we sail to the Pillars of Heracles and run many risks for the sake of property, while devoting neither effort nor expense for the sake of wisdom. It would surely be slave-like to crave living rather than living well, for one to follow the opinions of the majority rather than evaluating the worth of the majority in terms of one's own opinions, and to seek out property but for what is noble to take no trouble whatsoever. (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 6, 69. 20–70. 19)

The argument from 69. 27 onwards is that the wise person is authoritative and is the norm or standard (*ópos*) of the good, because the wise person is in possession of the criterion (*κρίσις*) of the good, and so can be looked to as a model for the patterns of behaviour and choice that are good. The notion of a good man serving as the

norm and standard of the good is a leading idea in Aristotle's philosophy,¹¹² which is here brought into play as a motivation in favour of the study of philosophy. Once again, we see familiar Aristotelian ideas being deployed for protreptic purposes.

The last block of chapter 6 is evidently a shorter selection from a longer argument that the rewards of philosophy easily outweigh the alleged difficulty of the subject; this shorter section evidently focused on undercutting the impression that philosophy is difficult, a conclusion reinforced by Iamblichus' typical one-sentence reiterating conclusion:

And as to the benefit and the greatness of the thing, I think this has been sufficiently proven, but as to why it is much easier to possess it than other goods, one might be convinced by the following. For, despite no reward coming from people to those who do philosophy, which would make them keen to exert considerable effort in this way, and despite having given the other skills a big head start,¹¹³ nevertheless the fact that in running a short time it has surpassed them in precision seems to me to be a sign of the easiness of philosophy. And again, the fact that everybody feels at home with philosophy and wishes to occupy their leisure with it, renouncing everything else, is no slight evidence that the close attention comes with pleasure; for no one is willing to labour for a long time. In addition to these, its practice greatly differs from all others: philosophers need neither tools nor special places for their job; rather, wherever in the inhabited world anyone's thought runs, one apprehends the truth everywhere equally as if it were present there. *Thus it has been proven that philosophy is possible, and why it's the greatest of goods and is easy to possess; hence on all counts it is worthwhile that we should take it to heart.* (Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 6, 70. 20–71. 12)

Students of ours who have read this passage have expressed open scepticism about the truth of this conclusion, that philosophy is easy. Fair enough, but there is no reason to doubt that Aristotle did entertain this view;¹¹⁴ and he regards it as a consideration in favour of philosophy and the sort of scientific wisdom that comes from objective observation that it does not require its practitioner to be

¹¹² For the *φρόνιμος* as the standard of the good, see also *Top.* 3. 1, 116^a13–17; *NE* 6. 5, *passim*; 6. 12, 1144^a36–b⁷; *Rhet.* 1. 6, 1363^a17. For the idea that the *φρόνιμος* should rule, see *Pol.* 3. 4, 1277^a14–16. On the *κρίσις* of the good, see *NE* 3. 7, 1113^a33. For the *ópos* of the good, see *NE* 6. 1, 1138^a21–5, 32–4.

¹¹³ Omitting *εἰς* in 70. 25, as in the parallel passage at *DCM* 82. 19.

¹¹⁴ In fact, Aristotle recommends discussing the ease of the activity one is encouraging in one of the chapters of the *Rhetoric* devoted to protreptic speech (1. 6, 1363^a21–4).

dependent on particular political allies, or on expensive support (NE 10. 7).

Before leaving chapter 6, we should note that the promissory note issued by Iamblichus at its beginning ('we should mix in some exhortations to the political and practical way of life as well') is fulfilled in a later chapter: in *Protrepticus* chapter 10, Aristotle offers the argument that, as in the other skills, the politician 'must possess a norm of the good with which he can judge what is just and noble and beneficial' (84. 24-7), and so a real political scientist must have a grasp of reality as well as a knowledge of comparative politics. This connection indicates that chapter 6 and chapter 10 are taken from the same book of Aristotle.

3.8. Chapter 12

Next, let us turn to the last and shortest chapter of the Aristotle section, chapter 12. Here we have a single opening sentence from Iamblichus, but it appears that he has written more than a single sentence to close the chapter, which also closes his whole Aristotle section. Here is the entire chapter:

Chapter 12. If we need, not only to reach this conclusion on the basis of the parts of success, but also to establish it on a higher basis, of success as a whole, let us state explicitly that philosophizing stands in the same relation to success as it does to our being good or bad. For all the things that are for this or because of this are to be valued by all, and of the things that make us successful some are as necessities, others are enjoyable. Thus we take the position that success is either wisdom and a certain expertise, or virtue, or great enjoyment, or all these things. Thus if it is wisdom, clearly only philosophers will have a successful life; and if it is virtue of the soul or enjoyment, even then it will belong to them alone or most of all, for the most dominant thing in us is a virtue, and wisdom is the most pleasant of all when one is compared to another. And similarly, even if one says that all these things together are the same as success, it is to be defined as wisdom. Hence everyone who is able to should do philosophy [φιλοσοφῆσαι]; indeed, either this is living perfectly well, or it is, at any rate, the greatest cause of it, so to speak, in our souls. But here, perhaps due to our race being unnatural, it is difficult to learn about things and investigate them, and even perceive them, due to lack of natural talent and unnatural living; but if we were ever able to find salvation again there where we have been set loose from, clearly we would all do so easily and with pleasure. For as it is now, we neglect the good things and carry on doing the necessities, most of all those most regarded as happy by most people, but if we were to take the heavenly road and settle our lives

*on our companion star, then we would be doing philosophy, truly living, and observing spectacles indescribable in beauty, gazing with the soul fixedly at the truth and observing the authority of the gods, rejoicing and continuously deriving enjoyment from the observing, taking pleasure apart from all pain. So in this way, approaching in turn every kind of success, we discover that doing philosophy makes a contribution for us; for this reason it is worthwhile taking it up as being the most excellent and most appropriate thing for us. (Iamblichus, *Protr.* ch. 12, 89. 7-90. 15)*

The opening sentence needs to be stripped away as the obvious work of Iamblichus; it is meta-textual, turgid, and full of the technical words ('on the basis of') which he tends to use in this work. The last sentence, however, is not the extent of Iamblichus' closing remarks; he ends with an allusion to a Platonic idea ('perhaps due to our race being unnatural'), followed by his own Neopythagorean elaboration. We need to make the separation of voices some distance up¹³ from the end, after the word 'souls' at 89. 25, if only because of the evident, indeed palpable, drop in the rhetorical level. This has been well expressed by Werner Jaeger:

To suggest that Aristotle is the author of the conclusion actually found in Iamblichus¹⁴ . . . is to let desire stifle critical reflection. Enthusiastic the sentences may be, and even inspired; but it is not the controlled enthusiasm of Aristotle, who never forgoes the strict rhythm of his apodictic advance, and values form higher than the highest inspiration, often as his arguments perceptibly overflow with the latter. Most of the details of Iamblichus' passage could indeed well have been taken from the *Protrepticus* . . . but the loose and merely associative conjunction of these notions into an edifying summons to the other world, the confusion of ideas that can be detected in them, the sacerdotal unction with which the writer introduces some of Plato's ceremonial words, the presence of certain distinctly Neo-Platonic phrases like 'the heavenly path' and 'the realm of the gods', and lastly the excessive loquacity of the conclusion, with its inability to come to an end—all these things betray retouching by Iamblichus. (*Entwicklung*, 79, Eng. trans.)

This opinion of the authorial persona of Iamblichus is well ex-

¹³ A good parallel is the extended opening remarks to chapter 18 in the Plato section (113. 22-114. 7).

¹⁴ Where this conclusion starts was somewhat in dispute: in his edition of the fragments of Aristotle's dialogues, Walzer divided the text at 89. 22 (60. 7 Pistelli) and marked the concluding part with the reference in parentheses; Ross translated the sentences from 89. 22 to 90. 2 as also coming from Aristotle; but During found the right division, marking the conclusion as starting at 89. 26.

pressed and well judged, in our view, especially the point made by Jaeger that Aristotle's text is always making a steady advance in argument, in contrast to which the contributions of Lamblichus seem to be entirely motionless road signs. The same was very clear in the Plato chapters.

When we strip away this extended concluding section, the conclusion we are left with is that 'everyone who is able to should do philosophy [*φιλοσοφῆν*]; indeed, either this is living perfectly well, or it is, at any rate, the greatest cause of it, so to speak, in our souls' (89. 22-5). This conclusion is reached, at its last stage, by means of an argument about the three kinds of lives: whether one's life is centred on pleasure, excellence, or wisdom, one should do philosophy. Aristotle develops the idea of the three main candidate ways of life in no fewer than three places in the extant works: *Eudemian Ethics* 1. 1-5, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 5, and *Politics* 7. 1-3.

This is evidently the ultimate conclusion of an extended overarching line of reasoning that began back in the 'three lives' argument introduced near the beginning of Lamblichus' chapter 7 (71. 18-22). In our discussion of that chapter (subsection 3.2 above) we saw Aristotle refer these to his 'exoteric arguments'. It should also be noted that Aristotle, in his treatise on rhetoric, spells out that the discussion of the components of happiness is key to protreptic speech: 'all exhortations [*πρὸς ποτα*] and counter-exhortations are about happiness and the things which conduce to it or are detrimental to it' (*Rhet.* 1. 5, 1360^b9-11). So we need to conclude that the book from which the chapter 12 material was excerpted is the same book as the 'exoteric arguments' from which the chapter 7 material was drawn.

Which published work was the source of the chapter 12 material? The clue is again in the single-word conclusion that appears to be highly distinctive of this book of Aristotle's: *φιλοσοφῆν*. We saw above (p. 272) that this appears in chapter 6 (and elsewhere), a chapter that surely must be attributed not just to Aristotle but specifically to his *Protrepticus*; so chapter 12 must be attributed to the *Protrepticus*. And if chapter 6 and chapter 12, then all the intervening chapters too must come from *Protrepticus*, as we discovered in the Plato chapters that Lamblichus does not jump around between works; between any two blocks of quotation from the same work, every intervening block of quotation must also be from that work, as we said above (pp. 240-1). That the blocks of quotation in every

chapter (not just 6 and 12) need to be attributed to *Protrepticus* is a conclusion that will be buttressed by supporting arguments in our next and last section.

4. Summary, conclusions, and new status of the question

Chapters 9, 10, 11, and 12 consist, we saw, of long passages quoted from Aristotle, surrounded by thin comments by Lamblichus (generally only one sentence); this is similar to his way of quoting from Plato in chapters 14-18. We also saw long passages quoted from Aristotle in the other chapters, but with a complication: in chapters 6, 7, and 8 we detect 'bridge' passages, similar in kind to those found in chapters 13 and 19, in which Lamblichus returns to his own voice in order to provide a transition between two separate Plato passages.

So over the seven chapters of Lamblichus we detect fourteen openings and closings, and seven bridge passages written by Lamblichus himself—twenty-one contributions. The rest, we contend, is faithfully quoted material from Aristotle—over 500 lines of material quoted, sometimes perhaps slightly modified, from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. Here is a synopsis of the section in which Lamblichus uses Aristotle as a source:


- Ch. 6. *Opening*—the correct use of goods as tools—*bridge*—the priority of causes and elements—*bridge*—why the wise person has authority—*bridge*—philosophy is worth the trouble—*closing*.
- Ch. 7. *Opening*—the 'ergon' argument—*bridge*—comparison between observation and vision—*closing*.
- Ch. 8. *Opening*—commonly held beliefs—*bridge*—wisdom the opposite of lunacy, puerility, drunkenness, sleep, death—*bridge*—value of property—*bridge*—worthlessness of commonly valued goods illustrated through parables about the eyes of Lynceus, the Orphic rites, the Tyrrhenian pirates, and the Isles of the Blest—*closing*.
- Ch. 9. *Opening*—teleological argument from ends in accordance with nature; infinite regression of the utilitarian conception of education; 'intelligence is the god in us'—*closing*.
- Ch. 10. *Opening*—usefulness of philosophy to politics—*closing*.
- Ch. 11. *Opening*—the equivocal predicates 'living', 'perceiving', 'seeing', and 'knowing'; being wise makes us most fully alive and provides the truest pleasure—*closing*.
- Ch. 12. *Opening*—summary protreptic through the 'three lives' argument—*Lamblichean elaboration and closing*.

We can infer from this synopsis that much may have dropped out of Iamblichus' version, because any chapter division or bridge indicates a gap in the source. And if Aristotle's work was a dialogue, then we can infer that all (or most) traces of that have been erased.

That being said, it seems to us that the rest of these arguments, what amounts to about a dozen blocks of unequal length, have all been extracted from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. But why do we think so? After all, we observed from the study of Plato parallels that Iamblichus quotes from multiple sources, and that was our reasonable prediction.

Most of the fourteen blocks in these seven chapters have as the best candidate for an original Aristotle home the *Protrepticus*, with the notable exception of the last block in chapter 8, the one containing the eyes of Lynceus, the Tyrrhenian pirates, and the claim attributed to Anaxagoras that 'intelligence is the god in us'. Passages in this famous block of text have been claimed to come not from the *Protrepticus* but the *Eudemus*; and other passages have been claimed to come not from the middle but the end of the *Protrepticus*. Neither claim can be true, as the following arguments will show; but if one's method is to look at each sentence or passage individually, not as blocks carefully assembled in a literary construction, one will not be able to reach more solid conclusions.

During our study, we noted five separate themes that link various chapters to each other as being from the same work. When we assemble these links, we find that they define a gridwork of literary unity that cannot reasonably be taken apart. Chapters 7 and 12 are linked by the 'three lives' argument mentioned in chapter 7 and concluded in chapter 12; chapters 6 and 10 are linked by their discussion of the practical and political benefits of wisdom; chapters 6, 7, 8, and 12 are all linked by the signature concluding slogan *φαιδοσοφία* (n. 126); chapters 7 and 11 are linked by elaborate comparisons between perceptual vision and intellectual vision; chapters 7 and 9 contain linked discussions of teleology and the *ergon* argument.



When we remember that Iamblichus uses a natural sequence, in which he never returns to a work having used it, we can show that each of these chapters is attached to each other by at least two separate links in the gridwork. Of all the chapters, the most solidly attached to the rest is our chapter 8. We have no choice but to place chapter 8 in the same work as the chapters before and after it; and this is in virtue of five separate arguments. All five of these apparent links would have to be illusory for the content of chapter 8 to be detachable from the work.

But now that we know that it is all one work, we hardly need to slow down and ask which one. The one work that comes into consideration as possibly containing all this content is Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.

This conclusion is bolstered by considering evidence that seems, oddly, never to have been brought into play for this topic: what Aristotle recommends in *Rhetoric* 1. 5–6 for authors of protreptic discourses reads like a recipe for the kind of exhortation that we find in various of these Aristotle chapters of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*; for details, see above, nn. 99, 125, and 134.

Does it make sense to think that Iamblichus uses different techniques with Aristotle (only one work) and with Plato (several works)? Of course it does: Iamblichus did not have to search across a variety of works of Aristotle to find a rich treasure trove of protreptic arguments, whereas Plato, who did not really believe in the *gene* (and may have been positively hostile to it),¹⁷ never wrote a *Protrepticus* true to genre, and scattered his protreptic arguments and reflections across his corpus. Here again, it is the difference in the works and authors whom he is quoting that accounts for the difference of technique. Iamblichus seems to have made a seven-chapter section out of various works by Plato and combined them

¹⁷ S. R. Slings (ed.), *Plato: Clitophon, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary [Clitophon]* (Cambridge, 1999), 127–64.

into a unified protreptic section, in order to mirror the unity he found ready-made in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.

So we have excellent reason to believe that chapter 8 is a central part of the *Protrepticus*, but others have argued that the Tyrrhenian pirates passage should be ascribed to Aristotle's lost dialogue *Eudemus*, so we need to consider their arguments. The idea goes back a long time (to 1840),¹³⁸ but never gathered much real evidential support, and by the time it was championed most recently, by Brunschwig and Flashar, independently in two papers in the 1960s,¹³⁹ the argument rested on a thin set of considerations. The macabre pessimism of the passage seemed to earlier scholars to fit poorly with an enthusiastic exhortation to philosophy such as *Protrepticus*, and the mythological treatment of the theme of life as a punishment fits well with some quoted passages from Aristotle's *Eudemus*. To these considerations Brunschwig ('Pirates', 186–9) added a very indirect one drawn from a mention of the idea that life on earth is for us a punishment, at the beginning of Cicero's lost work *Consolatio*, which probably drew on Crantor's lost work *On Grief*, which is mentioned in pseudo-Plutarch, *Consolatio*, just before that source makes a long quotation from Aristotle's *Eudemus*. These seemed to Brunschwig sufficient to reopen the question of the provenance of the passage, but the earlier considerations are fallible, he admits, and for them to be decisive we would have to be confident that their pessimism is irreconcilable with the optimism shown by other fragments of *Protrepticus*; but 'nothing is easier to reconcile with optimism than pessimism' ('Pirates', 189). Flashar repeats the old ideas that the horrible Tyrrhenian pirates story does

¹³⁸ A. B. Kriech, *Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker. Eine Prüfung der Darstellung Cicero's* (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, 1; Göttingen, 1840), 17; J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnisse an seinen übrigen Werken* (Berlin, 1863), 144; E. Heitz (ed.), *Aristotelis fragmenta* (Paris, 1869), 49–50; Rose, in *Opera omnia Aristotelis*, v. 1480–20–39 (but Rose changed his mind in 1886 and attributed the passage to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*); O. Gigon, 'Prolegomena to an Edition of the *Eudemus*', in Düring and Owen, *Mid-Fourth Century*, 19–33 at 27–8. In his later collection of fragments for the revised complete works of Aristotle, Gigon evidently abandoned hope of attributing any of the lamblichus material to any particular lost work of Aristotle, calling them collectively 'protreptic commonplaces excerpted from several dialogues' (O. Gigon (ed.), *Librorum deperditorum fragmenta*, in *Aristotelis opera*, iii (Berlin and New York, 1987), 302¹ 13–18²). This opinion is expressed most recently by Most, 'New Fragments', 208 n. 35.

¹³⁹ Brunschwig, 'Pirates', 185–9; Flashar, 'Platon und Aristoteles', 71–3 (independent from each other, as Flashar had not noticed Brunschwig's article).

not make for good upbeat advertising, such as is needed for a protreptic to philosophy, and that the content is appropriate to what we know of *Eudemus*.¹⁴⁰ It seems that these more recent claims have not made any advances over the old subjective impression shared among scholars, and this unsystematic way of reasoning cannot stand up to the example of Plato's *Phaedo*, which does manage to combine those themes in a most remarkable and effective way.

We saw that chapter 8 is not at the end of the work, but somewhere in the middle; since it is clearly a rhetorical climax, it seems to mark the end of an intermediate portion of the book. The order of the work must be the one as given here; but does this make sense? Of course it does. The rhetorical structure of the work is quite lost to us, and many imaginable and plausible scenarios could contain this material in this order. Phillip De Lacy ventured the following appreciation of the material when laid out in this order:

The passages seem to be from a rhetorical piece designed to persuade an audience of privileged young men who are preparing for a political life, whose families own slaves . . . that wealth and power are not enough. Philosophical wisdom, which is easily acquired, uses the best part of the soul to open up a vision of the universe that is enjoyable for itself, with no further end in view. But they must also be assured that attaining this beatific vision does not entail abandoning the political life. Philosophical wisdom will help them succeed in all purposeful activities and will indeed put them at the top of the hierarchy of useful pursuits. Thus in both contemplation and action philosophical wisdom will make their lives successful, upright, and pleasant. This summary follows in general the order of excerpts in Lamblichus.¹⁴¹

The cogency of this summary indicates that there is no *prima facie* need to reorder the line of thought preserved in Lamblichus.

The most famous agent of reordering, Düring, himself remarked: 'It is clear that any such attempt [at reconstruction] must be purely speculative . . . My aim has been to arrange the fragments in a reasonable order. Since it is unlikely that we shall ever be able either to prove or disprove our case, I do not attach much importance to this aspect of our problem.'¹⁴² It would be only fair to consider

¹⁴⁰ He adds as a new consideration a separate echo of the *Eudemus* in chapter 12 (89. 26): 'But here, perhaps due to our race being unnatural, it is difficult to learn about things and investigate them.' Yet this is in the voice of Lamblichus, who was in the habit, as we saw in the Plato chapters, of decorating his own openings and closings with colourful and familiar ideas from the author in question.

¹⁴¹ Letter to D.S.H., 16 May 2001.

¹⁴² Düring, *Attempt*, 37.

Düring's reasons in favour of his scrambled reordering, but he provides none.¹⁴³

There is no need to follow Düring in this idiosyncratic reordering, but perhaps we should consider the widely held view that the ending of chapter 8 closed Aristotle's work. 'Only one thing is pretty certain, namely that the last sentence of the *Protrepticus* is preserved in B 110 [= 78. 19–79. 2 Des Places].'¹⁴⁴ Again, there is no argument for this point, probably because previous generations of scholars, beginning with Hirzel, had become convinced of it, on the basis of a (misunderstood) report from Augustine about how Cicero's dialogue ended,¹⁴⁵ together with a (frail) inference that the note on which Cicero's dialogue ended would have been the same as that on which Aristotle's dialogue ended (because Cicero modelled his work as a protreptic).¹⁴⁶ Düring may have simply felt that the point

¹⁴³ If we make the assumption that he worked in the simplest way, then the result could have been achieved with a relatively short series of steps: move chapter 8 to the end, move three large chunks of text from elsewhere into chapter 6, and import three single sentences. The rationale for moving chapter 8 will be discussed below; the other transpositions seem to have been to move the first part of chapter 9 (to 82. 20) and the last part of chapter 5 (from 65. 1) to after the first block in chapter 6 (67. 14), and to move the remaining bit of chapter 9, together with chapter 10, to near the end of chapter 6 (70. 9). The final changes seem to have been even weirder: prefacing the middle chunk of chapter 6 with a single sentence taken from near the beginning of Iamblichus, *DCM* (B 52), prefacing the chunk 9b–10 with a single sentence removed from the beginning of chapter 7, and replacing that removed sentence with one of his own, an entirely invented sentence (B 58). The result is his new arrangement ('6a' means 'first chunk of chapter 6'): 6a, 9a, 5b, 6b, B 41 prefacing 9b + 10, B 52 prefacing 6c, B 58 prefacing 7, 11 + 12, 8.

¹⁴⁴ Düring, *Attempt*, 37.

¹⁴⁵ 'Commenting this contemplative wisdom . . . Cicero says at the end of the dialogue *Hortensius*: "To us . . . who spend our lives in philosophy this is a great hope—that if that by which we feel and think is mortal and perishable, we shall have a happy setting . . . and a rest from life; if, on the other hand, as the ancient, the greatest, and far the most famous, philosophers thought, we have minds eternal and divine, then we should reflect that the more these minds have been constant in their courses—in the use of reason, and in the desire of discovery—and the less they have mixed and implicated themselves in the vices and errors of mankind, the easier will be their ascent and return to heaven." Then, adding this very clause and summing up his argument, he says: "Wherefore—to bring my speech at last to an end—if we wish either to be quietly extinguished when we have lived our life with these skills, or to move without delay from this to a far better home, all our interest and concern must be bestowed on these studies" (*Trin.* 14. 10. 26, trans. after Ross fr. 100).

¹⁴⁶ On this inference, the extreme scepticism of Rabinowitz, *Sources*, 23–7, is warranted; yet this 'communit opinio' (Flashar, Platon und Aristoteles, 71 n. 56) is still current: 'If, then, the *Hortensius* was "modelled on a protreptic pattern" (*ad exemplum protrepticum*) and if Aristotle's *Protrepticus* was one of its main examples, a passage from the *Protrepticus* which we know was initiated at the end of the

had somehow been established, so that the last sentence of Cicero's dialogue struck him, oddly, as 'modelled on the last sentence of the *Protrepticus*, but entirely different in purport'.¹⁴⁷ Indeed, they do make different points: Aristotle's conclusion is that if we had to exist without cognitive awareness, we might as well not bother to live; Cicero's conclusion is that, whether death is extinction or departure, we must seriously apply ourselves to the study of philosophy, a conclusion that could just as easily have come from Plato as from Aristotle. Slings tries to make the argument explicit as to why the 'large majority of scholars' hold it to be the last paragraph of the work, but adds no new considerations and carries no fresh conviction.¹⁴⁸

One of the main reasons why the ending of chapter 8 was taken to be the ending of the work needs to be addressed head on. Slings repeats what was said at the outset by Hirzel,¹⁴⁹ and never challenged, that since the rhetorical climax at the end of the chapter can hardly be more pointed, it must have been a peroration, and there is nothing for the dialogue to do at this point but finish. Yes, this is possible, but it is by no means necessary that a rhetorical climax should come at the end of such a work. To think that this is a probative inference is to fly in the face of evident facts about Plato's rhetorical climaxes, which often come in the middle of his works. For example, the central speech of his *Theaetetus*¹⁵⁰ contains a tremendous rhetorical climax (Iamblichus quotes the digression, including its climax, in chapter 14, as we saw above), but it would be a mistake to conclude from Iamblichus that this speech closed Plato's work. Likewise, the great speech in *Phaedrus* is crucial to the meaning of the dialogue, climactic, and central.¹⁵¹

Hortensius may be plausibly located near the end of the *Protrepticus* itself (Slings, *Chilophon*, 338).

¹⁴⁷ Düring, *Attempt*, 267.

¹⁴⁸ Slings, *Chilophon*, 336–8, the 'large majority' comprising R. Hirzel, 'Über den *Protreptikos* des Aristoteles' ['Über den *Protreptikos*'], *Hermes*, 10 (1876), 61–100 at 94–5; Rose, *Fragmenta*, fr. 61; Jaeger, *Entwicklung*, 101 n. 1 (Eng. trans.); Bigone, *Pendulo*, i. 97–8; Düring, *Attempt*, 37; id., 'Problems', 169; Schneeweiss, 'Der *Protreptikos*', 228; S. Mansion, 'Contemplation and Action in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*', in Düring and Owen, *Mid-Fourth Century*, 56–75 at 67 n. 1.

¹⁴⁹ Hirzel, 'Über den *Protreptikos*', 94–5.

¹⁵⁰ David Sedley (*Midwife*, 80) argues that the digression is central to the *Theaetetus* both for its interpretation and in its geometrical, or 'logometrical', position.

¹⁵¹ The point that the midpoints of Platonic works are of particularly high significance can be extended quite generally, to include all of his long works (*Meno*

We must surely put a stop now to all this talk of reordering the work and shifting its parts around: the technique of Lamblichus in Plato was a common-sense technique, to work in a natural sequence; it makes sense to assume that he used this common sense with Aristotle too; and no argument for reordering is even remotely probative. The ordering is provided for us by Lamblichus, and it provides a solid skeleton for us to work with in conducting a future reconstruction.¹⁵²

Much has been achieved, but we would jeopardize our achievements by exaggerating them, so we need to remind readers of what is still unknown or unproven. We do not know how much of the *Protrepticus* is still missing. We do not know its overall rhetorical or literary structure. We do not know whether it had characters and speakers and dialogue, or not. But we do have reasonable confidence in a number of conclusions: that Lamblichus was always faithful to the thought of Aristotle, and usually to his language, that he was faithful to the order of the text, and that his quoting pure blocks in natural sequence defines for us in an objective way the limits of the passage that he is quoting. It is at this point that our reasoning is most open to error: it is quite possible that some of our decisions about where to separate the voices are wrong, and it is quite improbable that we have made every separation in the right place. Future scholarship will probably clarify these decisions and solidify most of them, but we cannot now claim to have made every right choice.

and longer, with the exception of *Laus* and perhaps *Philobus*: each of these contains crucial dramatic episodes in their exact centres. To the cases of *Theaetetus* and *Phaedrus*, where the crucial dramatic episode at the centre is a revelation of Platonic doctrine in an extended and impressive speech, we might add the 'central books' of the *Republic*, which comprise the middle third of *Republic* 2-10, and the speech of Timaeus, which comprises the middle two-thirds of *Timaeus/Critias* (though the symmetry of this work is masked by its having been broken into *Timaeus* and *Critias*).

¹⁵² We cannot do that work of reconstruction here, but pause only to offer two important consequences. The passage in chapter 8 that calls on us to honour the 'god in us' looks back to Plato's *Timaeus* and forward to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*; the two texts that David Sedley has convincingly argued ('Becoming like God', 335-9) express the same key idea in different words; now we can also see that this key statement of Aristotle's faith comes at a central point of his *Protrepticus*, a good place to express a key idea in an attractive way. Secondly, the skeleton that is revealed to us in Lamblichus' Aristotle chapters dictates the exact places to situate the two columns of papyrus fragments recently convincingly but interrogatively ascribed to the *Protrepticus* by Glenn Most in 'New Fragments?'

The one serious worry which we needed to keep in mind for a while can now be dispelled or lessened: we noticed that for a page in chapter 13 Lamblichus used a pastiche construction instead of a natural sequence of block quotations, drawing his material from various sources in order to make a transition from the *Phaedo* material to the *Theaetetus* material. But if he worked from only one text of Aristotle, as we can now see, he would not have needed to construct any artificial pastiches to make a transition between works. Yet it remains possible that he did so, in which case there may be a few zones in the seven Aristotle chapters which are more like paraphrase than quotation. So that is the limit of the uncertainty: either strict quotation or strictly modified quotation, but just possibly, perhaps, a paraphrase or two. But even if so, there is no reason at all to suspect that any of Aristotle's thoughts has been distorted, not even in the paraphrase.

If our conclusions are true, then the history of the recovery of the *Protrepticus* seems to have progressed like this. Ingram Bywater noticed that large parts of Lamblichus' *Protrepticus* contained quotations from Aristotle's work of the same name. Many of Bywater's critics were rightly sceptical of his use of Cicero and other material to authenticate the passages he claimed to be recovering. But the critics of his theory that Aristotle's work could be recovered from Lamblichus became excessively focused on the problems of using sources other than Lamblichus' *Protrepticus*.

An artefact of this excessive focus was the methodologically flawed and inconclusive criticism of Rabinowitz,¹⁵³ who ventured to predict what a close study of the Aristotle chapters would reveal, having started with a handful of disputable fragments rather than an analysis of the Plato chapters. It is sobering to realize how wrong he was.

A prediction might be ventured that a painstaking study of those portions of the 'excerpt' [viz. chapters 6-12] which have not been subjected to analysis in the preceding chapter [viz. all of it except one argument at 69, 11-19] will

¹⁵³ It seems that Rabinowitz's ultimate motive was to undermine the developmental hypothesis of Jaeger, and his interest in the philosophy of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, if he had any, does not make itself known in his work. The real point of Rabinowitz's extraordinary screed seems to be revealed in the last note on the last page of his book: 'It is noteworthy that Jaeger's famous theory of Aristotle's "Entwickelung" rests squarely on the assumption that the fragments of the *Protrepticus* are authentic. If they are not, however, this theory would seem to be shaken *à la racine*.'

reveal therein a complex array of doctrines derived from many sources, and, further, that when such a study has been fully carried out, the last ground for the erroneous notion of an 'excerpt'—our ignorance of Iamblichus' actual sources—will have been removed. Only then will the unjustifiable ascription of passages from near and far to the lost *Protrepticus* be checked; and only then will the true poverty of our information concerning the work be realized. (Rabinowitz, *Sources*, 95)

We venture to claim that we have 'fully carried out' the right kind of 'painstaking study' of the correct object of enquiry, namely the parallel groups of chapters quoting both Plato and Aristotle. It was to save other scholars the uncertainty of knowing what a painstaking study would reveal that made us be so very explicit and painstaking. The study needed to be done, and seen to be done.

During was successful (in the minute analysis of his commentary) in showing that the diction and philosophy contained in the sections of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* that had been identified by Bywater were thoroughly Aristotelian, and he rightly realized that the Iamblichus material was the key to any successful recovery. But he failed to extricate Iamblichus' interpolations, and he worsened things by dividing the work into fragments of arbitrary length, by reordering them according to what he thought was reasonable, and by insisting that he could know the literary form of the work (asserting that it was a letter and not a dialogue). Both of these deficiencies of his work—his reordering scheme, and his claim to know the one thing that cannot be known from the source in question—stem directly from his failure to study Iamblichus' methods of chapter construction and excerption of Plato's dialogues. The first person to have seen this clearly, either Flashar or his graduate student, failed to deliver the study asserted by him and acknowledged by all later scholars to be necessary to answer the important exegetical questions, and so even he was led into error.

That brings us to the current situation. These blocks of Aristotelian philosophy language in the back of large volumes and old tomes of fragments, virtually unused, even though no one has mounted any convincing arguments against considering them to be words of Aristotle. A study of the *Protrepticus* in which these blocks are contained reveals that it is probable that Iamblichus maintained a high degree of fidelity to his own sources. It is pretty clear, from both the form and the philosophical content, that we are dealing with a published work, the *Protrepticus* mentioned in many

consistent reports, and duly listed in all the ancient catalogues of Aristotle's works.

All in all, the judgement of the young Bywater ('Lost Dialogue', 66) has been vindicated. His first words on the topic can also serve as our last words:

The Fragment incorporated by Iamblichus would seem to be substantially homogeneous and consecutive, Aristotelian in its contents and with the Aristotelian manner everywhere visible in the style; at times, too, there is a vigor, a refinement, in other words, an originality about the expression which precludes the idea that we are reading a compilation by some inferior hand. So far, then, we are justified in considering it a part of an independent work of Aristotle's—a work which on external grounds I have endeavored to identify with the Dialogue called the *Protrepticus*.

University of Toronto & St Louis University

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allan, D. J., review of Rabinowitz, *Sources*, in *Classical Review*, NS 9 (1959), 124-7.
- 'A Passage from Iamblichus in Praise of the Contemplative Life', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 57 (1975), 246-68.
- Alline, H., *Histoire du texte de Platon* (Paris, 1915).
- Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford, 1991).
- Barnes, J. (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle* [Revised Aristotle] (2 vols.; Princeton, 1984).
- (trans.), *Porphyry: Introduction, with a Commentary* (Oxford, 2003).
- Bernays, J., *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältniss an seinen übrigen Werken* (Berlin, 1863).
- Berti, E., *La filosofia del 'primo' Aristotele* (Padua, 1962), 2nd edn. (Milan, 1997).
- (trans.), *Aristotele: Protreptico. Esortazione alla filosofia* (Turin, 2000).
- Bignone, E., *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* [Perduto] (2 vols.; Florence, 1936).
- 'Nuove testimonianze e frammenti del "Protreptico" di Aristotele', *Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica*, 64 (1936), 225-37.
- Bos, A. P., 'Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: Are they Really Two Different Works?', *Dionysius*, 8 (1984), 19-51.
- Brunschwig, J., 'Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens (à propos des fragments 60 Rose du *Protreptique* ["Pirates"]', *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, 88 (1963), 171-90.
- (ed.), *Aristote: Topiques, I, Livres I-IV* (Paris, 1967).

- Burnet, J. (ed.), *Platonis opera*, vol. i (Oxford 1900).
- (ed.), *Platonis opera*, vol. iv (Oxford 1902).
- Bywater, I., 'On a Lost Dialogue of Aristotle' ['Lost Dialogue'], *Journal of Philology*, 2 (1869), 55–69.
- Carlini, A., *Studi sulla tradizione antica e medievale del Fedone* [Tradizione del Fedone] (Rome, 1972).
- and Strachan, C., *Studi dell'Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere*, 129 (1992), 147–67.
- Casaglia, M. (trans.), *Aristotele: Protreptico. Esortazione alla filosofia* (Florence, 2001).
- Chröst, A. H. (trans.), *Aristotle: Protrepticus. A Reconstruction* (Notre Dame, 1964).
- Cobet, C. G., 'Platonica', *Memosyne*, NS 2 (1874), 241–82.
- Cooper, J., and Hutchinson, D. S. (ed.), *Plato: Complete Works* [Complete Plato] (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1997).
- Des Places, E. (ed.), *Jamblique: Protreptique* (Paris, 1989).
- de Strycker, É., 'Prédicats univoques et prédicats analogiques dans le "Protreptique" d'Aristote', *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 66 (1968), 597–618.
- Diels, H., 'Über die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles' ['Exoterische Reden'], *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 19 (1883), 477–94.
- Dillon, J., 'Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 240–325 A.D.)' ['Iamblichus'], *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, 36.2 (1987), 862–909.
- Dodd, E. R. (ed.), *Plato: Gorgias. A Revised Text, with Introduction and Commentary* [Gorgias] (Oxford, 1959).
- Duke, E. A., et al. (eds.), *Platonis opera*, vol. i [1995 OCT] (Oxford, 1995).
- Düring, I., 'Problems in Aristotle's Protrepticus' ['Problems'], *Eranos*, 52 (1954), 139–71.
- 'Aristotle in the Protrepticus', in *Autour d'Aristote: recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à A. Mansion* (Louvain, 1955), 81–97.
- *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg, 1957).
- (ed.), *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction* [Attempt] (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 12, Göteborg, 1961).
- (trans.), *Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles* (Frankfurt a.M., 1969).
- and Owen, G. E. L. (eds.), *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century: Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum Held at Oxford in August, 1957* [Mid-Fourth Century] (Göteborg, 1960).
- Festa, N. (ed.), *Iamblichus: De communis mathematica scientia* [DCM] (Leipzig, 1891; suppl. U. Klein, repr. Stuttgart, 1975).
- Flashar, H., 'Platon und Aristoteles im Protreptikos des Iamblichos' ['Platon und Aristoteles'], *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 47 (1965), 53–79; repr. in P. Moraux (ed.), *Frühschriften des Aristoteles* (Darmstadt, 1975), 247–69, and in Flashar, Eidola: *Ausgewählte Kleine Schriften* (Amsterdam, 1989), 297–323.
- Follon, J. (trans.), *Aristote: Invitation à la philosophie* (Paris, 2000).
- Furley, D., review of Rabinowitz, *Sources*, in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 89 (1959), 178–80.
- Gigon, O., 'Prolegomena to an Edition of the Eudemus', in Düring and Owen, *Mid-Fourth Century*, 19–33.
- (ed.), 'Librorum perditorum fragmenta', in *Aristotelis opera*, iii (Berlin and New York, 1987), 283^a 41–286^b 39, 302^a 13–318^b 8.
- Heitz, E. (ed.), *Aristotelis fragmenta* (Paris, 1869).
- Hirzel, R., 'Über den Protreptikos des Aristoteles' ['Über den Protreptikos'], *Hermes*, 10 (1876), 61–100.
- Hutchinson, D. S., *The Virtues of Aristotle* (London, 1986).
- Jachmann, G., 'Der Platonext', *Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, phil.-hist. Kl. 11 (1941), 225–389; repr. in id., *Textgeschichtliche Studien* (Königstein/Ts., 1982), 581–745.
- Jaeger, W., *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* [Entwicklung] (Berlin, 1923; English trans. R. Robinson, Oxford, 1948).
- Johnson, M., *Aristotle on Teleology* (Oxford, 2005).
- Krische, A. B., *Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker: Eine Prüfung der Darstellung Cicero's* (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, 1; Göttingen, 1840).
- Lloyd, G. E. R., *Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought* (Cambridge, 1968).
- Mari, M. (trans.), *Anonimo di Giamblico: La pace e il benessere. Idee sull'economia, la società, la morale* (Milan, 2003), with introduction and commentary by M. Mari and preface by D. Musti.
- Mansion, S., review of Rabinowitz, *Sources*, in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 56 (1958), 316–20.
- 'Contemplation and Action in Aristotle's Protrepticus', in Düring and Owen, *Mid-Fourth Century*, 56–75.
- Menn, S., 'The Origins of Aristotle's Concept of *ἐπέχεια*: *ἐπέχεια* and *δύναμις* ['Origins'], *Ancient Philosophy*, 14 (1994), 73–114.
- Aristotle's Definition of Soul and the Programme of the *De anima*, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 22 (2002), 83–139.
- Minica, B., and Partenie, C. (trans.), *Aristotel: Protreptical* (Bucharest, 2005).
- Moraux, P., review of Rabinowitz, *Sources*, in *L'Antiquité classique*, 27 (1958), 460–4.
- Most, G., 'Some New Fragments of Aristotle's Protrepticus?' ['New Fragments?'], in *Studi su codici e papiri filosofici: Platone, Aristotele, Ierotele*

- (Studi e testi per il Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, 6; Florence, 1992), 189–216.
- Mutschmann, H., 'Inhaltsangabe und Kapitelüberschrift im antiken Buch', *Hermes*, 46 (1911), 93–107.
- Nightingale, A. W., *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Natural Context* (Cambridge, 2004).
- O'Meara, D., *Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity* (Oxford, 1989).
- *Platonopolis* (Oxford, 2003).
- Pistelli, H. (ed.), *Iamblich. Protrepticus* (Leipzig, 1888; repr. Stuttgart, 1967).
- Rabinowitz, W. G., *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of its Reconstruction*, vol. 1 [*Sources*] (Berkeley, 1957).
- Reeve, C. D. C. (trans.), *Plato: Republic* (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 2004).
- Rose, V. (ed.), *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus* (Leipzig, 1863).
- (ed.), 'Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta', in *Opera omnia Aristotelis*, v (Berlin, 1870), 1463–589.
- (ed.), *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* [*Fragmenta*] (Leipzig, 1886; repr. 1966).
- Ross, W. D. (trans.), *Select Fragments = The Works of Aristotle*, vol. xii (Oxford, 1952).
- (ed.), *Aristotelis fragmenta selecta* (Oxford, 1955).
- Saffrey, H. D., and Westerink, L. G. (eds.), *Proclus: Théologie platonicienne*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1968).
- Schneeweiss, G., 'Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles' ['Der Protreptikos'] (diss. Munich, 1966).
- Sedley, D., 'Is Aristotle's Teleology Anthropocentric?' ['Teleology Anthropocentric?'], *Phronesis*, 36 (1991), 179–96.
- 'Becoming like God' in the *Timaeus* and Aristotle' ['Becoming like God'], in T. Calvo Martínez and L. Brisson (eds.), *Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias* (Proceedings of the IV Symposium Platonicum; Sankt Augustin, 1997), 327–39.
- *The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus* [*Midwife*] (Oxford, 2004).
- Slings, S. R. (ed.), *Plato: Clitophon, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary* [*Clitophon*] (Cambridge, 1999).
- (ed.), *Platonis Respublica* (Oxford, 2003).
- Spoerri, W., review of Rabinowitz, *Sources*, in *Gnomon*, 32 (1960), 18–25.
- Walzer, R. (ed.), *Aristotelis dialogorum fragmenta* (Florence, 1934).
- Wilpert, P., review of Rabinowitz, *Sources*, in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 42 (1960), 101–6.